
Qass. 
Book_ 



i 



P 



[€a\lcQt mxts ^t^oal etfttion. 



W 



ELEMENTS OF LANGUAGE 



GENERAL GRAMMAR. 



GEORGE PAYNE, LL.D. 




LONDON : 
JOHN GLADDING, 20, CITY ROAD, 

AND 
HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO., 33, PATEKNOSTEK-EOAV. 

1845. 

[Price 25. Gd.] 



PREFACE. 



The object of the writer of this book has been 
to supply what he trusts may prove, for the 
present at least, a desideratum of which the 
want has been long felt. There are extant, 
indeed, even in our own language, several learn- 
ed and able treatises on the principles of lan- 
guage and general grammar ; but, for the most 
part, they are contained in large and expensive 
works, to which comparatively few persons have 
access : while none of them are precisely adapted 
to the class of readers for whose benefit this 
work is designed. 

In publishing this book, the author has sought 
to benefit that large and rapidly augmenting 
class, especially of young people who, to a com- 
petent acquaintance with the principles of their 
own language, seek to add the knowledge of 
those great general principles on which all par- 
ticular grammars are founded. The reader must, 
therefore, especially observe that the present 
work, not being a compendium of English 
grammar, does not seek to supplant any of those 
excellent treatises on that subject which have 



VI PREFACE. 

deservedly won so much favour with the public. 
It assumes the mastery of such a book as 
'^ Murray's Grammar/' especially its syntactical 
part ; and it aims to carry the reader forwards 
into regions of philosophical inquiry upon w^hich 
it was not the province of that excellent writer, 
or any of his coadjutors, to enter. The author 
hopes the present work will be found not un- 
suited to the higher classes in our superior 
schools — to intelligent and inquiring young 
people in general — and to the junior students 
of our various colleges in particular. 

The work, it is hoped, will possess additional 
interest to many w^hose opportunities for reading 
are not extensive, from the account it gives of 
the opinions held by many eminent writers on 
some of the more difficult subjects upon which 
it treats. At a trifling expense, and with a 
small expenditure of time and labour, the reader 
may put himself in possession of the sentiments 
of numerous authors, while the wa'iter will use 
his best efforts to show, amidst such various 
and conflicting opinions, which of them are most 
worthy of general reception. 

Western College, 
Dec. 1842. 



CONTENTS. 



Definition of language 
Subdivision of language 



PAGE 

1 
] 



I. NATURAL LANGUAGE. 

Strictly so called^ — Examples 
How its signs are formed . 
How interpreted .... 

Less strictly so called^ — Examples 
Classification of the signs of both 

Modifications of the features 

Gestures of the body 

Modulations of the voice 



1 
2 
2—3 
3—5 
5 
5 
6 
7 



II. CONVENTIONAL LANGUAGE. 



Character of its signs 
Why called converdional 
Why called artificial . 
Division of its signs 



7 

7—9 

9 

9 



SPOKEN LANGUAGE. 



Consists of artificial sounds 
Wisdom of employing them 



10 
10—11 



WRITTEN LANGUAGE. 

Its signs ........ 12 

Classified 14 

Class 1. Signs significant^ pictures, hieroglyphics, 

&c. 14—16 

Class 2. Signs arhitrary^ Peruvian knots, written 

characters, &c. 16 



VUl 



CONTENTS. 



Class 3. Signs of things, and signs of sounds 

The difference between them 

How the characters are read 

Chinese characters ..... 



PAGE 
17 
17 

17—18 
18—19 



Possible varieties in Characters denoting sounds. 



Verbal characters 
Syllabic characters 
Alphabetical characters 



20 

20 

21—24 



THE ORiaiN OF LANGUAGE. 



First, of spoken language 
How supposed to have arisen 
Arguments in support of its divine origin 
Second, of TVTitten language 
Probably di\dne .... 



25 
25 

26—31 
32 

33—35 



THE OBJECT OF LANGUAGE. 

First theory — communication of thought . . 35 

Second theoYj — production of thought . . 36 

Both considered and harmonized . . 35 — 39 



THE CHARACTER OF LANGUAGE. 



First opinion — is affirmative 
Second opinion — is imperative 
Both examined . 



39—40 
40 — 42 
40—43 



GRAMMAR. 



Proper definition of 
Other definitions examined 
Considered as an art and a science 
general and particular 



43 
43—44 

44 
44—45 



CLASSIFICATION OF WORDS, OR PARTS OF SPEECH. 

Principles of classification .... 45 — 46 



CONTENTS. 



Home Tooke's, Harris's, Hurwitz's 
Common division of the parts of speech 



PAGE 

46—48 
48—49 



NOUN. 



The word itself — import 49 

Whether the noun and adjective distinct . 49 — 51 



Kinds of Nouns, 



Particular nouns 
General nouns 
Origin of general terms 
Nature of general ideas 
Concrete nouns 
Abstract nouns 



51 

52 
53—55 
55—58 
59—60 
60—62 



Accidents of Nouns. 



Explained 



63 



Numbet\ 

Various definitions examined 

What it is 

How many numbers .... 
What nouns only are capable of change 
Methods of denoting it . . . 



63—65 

64 

64 

65—66 

66—68 



Gender. 

Explained 69 

The genders which words should have . 69 — 70 

Principles on which gender has been given to names 

of neuter objects 70 — 72 

Modes of denoting it . * . . 72 — 73 



Case, 



The strict meaning of 
What it denotes 
Ancient account of cases 



73 
73—75 
75—76 



CONTENTS. 



The different cases considered 
Nominative 
Genitive 

Dative and accusative 
Vocative 
Ablative 



PAGE 

76—90 

76 

77—79 

80—83 
84—85 
86—89 



THE ARTICLE. 

Its object illustrated .... 

The limitation a and the are conceived to 

effect 

How explained by Harris 
The does not itself define 
Difference in this between a and the . 
Anomalous use of the English definite 

of the Greek 

Statements of Moses Stuart 
More than two articles 



90—92 



93 

93—94 

95—96 

96—97 

97—99 

99—100 

99—101 

101—103 



THE ADJECTIVE. 



Its name 

Its significance 

Its object and effect 

Apparent anomalies 

Whether it should vary with 

noun, &c. 
Degrees of comparison 
What they denote 
How many 
Are modes as well as degrees 



the number of the 



103—104 

. 104 

105—109 

109—110 

110—111 
. 112 
. 112 

113—116 

116—118 



THE PROXOUX. 

What the name denotes 119 

The personal pronouns are names of relations, 

therefore nouns .... 119 — 124 

Their origin 124 

Why they have number .... 124—125 

Anomaly 125—126 

Whv the/;'.s'^hassex 126—128 



CONTENTS. 


XI 




PAGE 


Other pronouns .... 
Relative pronouns .... 
Different accounts of . 


. 128—130 

. 130 

. 130—136 


Explained 


. 133—136 


THE VERB. 




Its name, import, office, &c. 


. 136—137 


Is a copula 

All verbs may be resolved into is^ &c. . 


. 137—138 
. 138 


Character, &c. of the substantive verb . 


. 138 


Harris's account of examined, &c. 


. 138—146 


The Tenses of Verbs, 




Their origin 

Explained 

General division into past, present, and futi 
justified 


. 146—147 
. 147 

are, 
. 148—150 


Capable of subdivision 

Principles of division .... 

The aorist 


. 151 
. 151 
. 151 


No aorist of the present 


. 151—155 


Divisions of past time .... 


. 156—157 


Aorist 


. 158 


Definite 


. 158—159 


Imperfect ..... 
Perfect 


. 159 
. 160—163 


Pluperfect .... 
Divisions of future time 


. 164 165 
166 


Aorist 


. 166 


Definite 


. 167 


Imperfect .... 
Perfect 


. 167 
. 168 


Modes of forming the future 
Explanation of 57z«/Z and z^Jz'ZZ 
Not used indiscriminately . 


. 169 

. 169—170 

. 170 


Meaning in the different persons . 


. 170—172 


Tenses of the subjunctive . 


. 173 


Present ..... 


. 173—175 


Imperfect .... 
Perfect and pluperfect 


. 176—177 
. . 177 



Xn CONTENTS. 



Number and Person. 

PAGE 

Why supposed to belong to verbs . . 178 — 79 

Terminations by which they are expressed . 179 
Number, &c. not essential to language . . 180 

Moods or Modes of Verbs. 

What they are thought to denote . . . 181 
Definitions by Crombie, Harris, Britannica, &c. 181 — 182 
What modes of verbs are . . . 183 — 184 
Whether resolvable into the indicative . . 184 
Crombie's account of mode and tense consider- 
ed . 185—187 

The number of modes 188—189 

The infinite considered .... 189 

Proved to be a noun 189 — 191 

The Voices and kinds of Verbs. 

Diiferent forms not necessary ... 193 

Transitive and intransitive verbs . . 194 

Common doctrine incorrect . . . 194 — 195 

True doctrine 195—196 



THE PARTICIPLE. 



From what it derives its name 



197 



Harris's account of .... . 197 

What essential to it 198 

Two participles ...... 198 

Incorrectly designated 199 — 203 

Statements of Harris, Crombie, Britannica, &c. 202 — ^204 

Whether the participle occurs in active verbs 204 — 208 

THE ADVERB. 

Derivation and import of the name . . 208 

The purpose of the adverb . . . 209 

Its necessity and use . . . . . 209 

May be fragments of other words . . . 210 



CONTENTS. 



Constitute now a part of speech 
Opinions of Tooke, Britannica, &c 
Shown to be incorrect 
Character oi yes^ and no 
How resolved by Tooke 



PAGE 

211—212 
211 
212 
212 

213—214 



CONJUNCTIONS AND PREPOSITIONS. 

Harris's account of their nature . . . 214 — 215 

Shown to be incorrect .... 216 — 218 

Proof that they have a meaning . . 218 

Are derivative words 218 

Tooke's account of their derivation . . 218 — 220 

Harris's account examined .... 220 — 223 

Derivation of prepositions .... 224 

Particles of other languages . . . 225 — 226 

Ours denote relations .... 226 — 229 
Difference between conjunctions and prepositions230 — 232 

Prepositions denoted first relations of place . 232 — 233 

Afterwards general relations . . . 233 



THE INTERJECTION. 



Meaning of the term 
For what purpose employed 
Tooke's account of them 
Dewar's statements 



234 

234 

234—235 

235—236 



ERRATA. 

Page 32, 4th line, /or Mayee read Magee. 

— 81,5th and 3rd lines from bottom, /br Isecit r^a^laesit. 

— 88, 2nd line,/br pelleo read palleo. 

— 93, 2nd line, /or affect i^ead effect. 

— 94, 4th line from bottom, for I'eception i^ead per- 

ception. 



LANGUAGE 



GENERAL GRAMMAR. 

The word Language, derived immediately from the 
French " langue,' and that from the Latin " lingua^' 
a tongue, must denote, in its true and proper sense, 
certain articulate sounds by which thought and feel- 
ing are expressed or enunciated. By a very natural 
and easy extension of its meaning, it is, however, 
made to comprehend any means whatever — any 
signs, addressed either to the ear or to the eye, by 
which the wants, or wishes, or conceptions of one in- 
dividual may be made known to another. 

Understood in this generalized sense, language 
admits of subdivision into the two great classes of 
Natural, and Artificial or Conventional, language. 

NATURAL LANGUA&E. 

The first class, viz. natural language, includes, 
strictly speaking, only those visible and audible signs 
of internal feeling which are prompted by nature, or 
which are the results of physical constitution. That 
signs of this description exist is undoubted. Thus 
frowning is indicative of displeasure ; weeping of 
sorrow ; laughter of joy ; trembling of fear. The 



I NATURAL LANGUAGE STRICTLY 

whole of these signs^ as well as others of a similar 
character, are made instinctively^ or, as it would per- 
haps be more correct to say, they are the natural 
and visible effects upon the body of the states of 
mind referred to, and betoken their existence, as 
languor and bodily emaciation bespeak the presence 
of disease. The signs, accordingly, accompany the 
first occurrence of these mental states. They can- 
not properly be said to he made^ for they are not the 
results of volition. We weep, and blush, and laugh, 
and tremble, or turn pale, not because we have seen 
others weep, &c. ; nor to develop the mental feeling, 
for that we often wish to conceal ; and the tell-tale 
sign appears to our annoyance and confusion. 

The whole of the signs of this description result, 
then, from the influence of certain mental states upon 
different parts of the animal frame. It is necessary, 
however, to distinguish between the existence of the 
sign, and the interpretation of it. It may be made, 
without being intei'preted, instinctively. And this 
we believe to be the fact of the case. To us, it ap- 
pears as certain, that a person who had never laughed 
or trembled himself — who had never seen others laugh 
or tremble — and in whose mind a connexion had not 
been formed, by the great principle of association, be- 
tween the mental feeling, and its visible sign — would 
be as unable to understand the meaning of laughter 
or trembling itself\ as the meaning of the articulate 
sound, or of the written characters, by which the 
joyous and the painful feeling are denoted. Why 
should instinct be given, and thus wasted, to unfold 
the meaning of a tear, or a frown, when observation 



AND I^OOSELY SO CALLED. O 

and experience would do it with equal certainty, and 
almost equal speed ? 

I am aware, in expressing the opinion that no 
signs are instinctively interpreted, that I have to en- 
counter the high authorities of Mr. Stewart and Dr. 
Brown. The latter refers us to two signs, whose 
meaning is, he conceives, unlocked without the key 
of observation — a mother's smile, and a mother's 
frown. It is admitted that these signs are more 
likely than any other to possess the character 
ascribed to them; yet I cannot think that even they 
actually bear it. The mere infant is obviously in- 
capable of distinguishing between the meaning of the 
two. Its powers of observation must be roused be- 
fore it can do this ; and then the first thing observed 
is, that mamma's smile is followed by a sweet caress, 
(or by some action which is the direct source of plea- 
sure to the child,) and mamma's frown by a gentle 
pat ; and thus a connexion between the sign and its 
meaning is established at so early a period, that we 
are apt to think that the former is instinctively un- 
derstood. But, if God has thus sufficiently provided 
for the interpretation of the sign, it is unphilosophi- 
cal to suppose that he has thrown away an instinct 
to unfold its meaning. 

In addition to these^ which are natural signs 
strictly so called, there are others which, by a little 
extension of the meaning of the term, may be included 
in this class. 

They are such as common sense would lead men, 
ignorant of each other's language, to adopt, when 

b2 



^ DIVISION 

oral communication is impossible. Of this character 

is bending the head forward in token of assent or ap- 
probation ; and shaking the head as a token of dis- 
sent and disapprobation. A motion of the hand to- 
ward the body indicates a desire that a person at a 
distance shonld approach ; a contrary motion, a wish 
that he would recede, or remain where he is. " The 
Indians, of the American continent, incline their 
head, for a moment, on their hand laterally, to de- 
note sleep, and repeat the sign according to the num- 
ber of nights. To indicate combat, the clenched 
hands are held about as high as the neck, and five 
or six inches asunder, then waved two or three times 
laterally, to show the advances and retreats of the 
combatants ; after which the fingers of both hands 
are suifered to spring from the thumbs towards each 
other, as in the art of sprinkling water, to represent 
the flight of arrows. The practice of kissing the 
hand to a person in token of respect — originating, 
probably, in an idea that the gesture signified a wish 
to convey by the hands a salute to the person to 
whom it was addressed — seems to have prevailed 
generally, and at an early period of time." It is al- 
luded to, as an expression of religious adoration, in 
the book of Job : " If I beheld the sun when it shine d, 
or the moon walking in brightness, and my heart 
hath been secretly enticed, or my mouth hath kissed 
my hand ; this also were an iniquity to be punished 
by the judge ; for I should have denied the God that 
is above." 

The whole class of natural signs, consisting of those 



OF NATURAL SI&NS. O 

which are strictly^ and of others which, as we have 
stated, are more loosely^ so denominated, has been 
subdivided into modifications of the features, gestures 
of the body, and modulations of the voice. 

Class. I — Modification of the Features, 

These result from a play of the muscles of the face, 
corresponding with the fluctuating feelings of the 
mind. It is a well known, though inexplicable, fact, 
that all powerful mental feelings and actions do in 
this way affect the countenance, so that the face be- 
comes an index of the mind. The particular muscle 
affected, and the particular manner in which it is 
affected, constitute a natural sign, in the strictest 
sense of the term, (for it is the result of our consti- 
tution,) of the internal feeKng. The scowling eye 
the indignant frown, mark with precision what is 
passing within. The placid look, the composed mien, 
the benignant smile, give universal pleasure, because 
they are regarded as indicating benevolence and 
happiness. 

It is in consequence of this natural action of strong 
feelings upon the muscles, that the passions which 
we habitually indulge, and also the intellectual pur- 
suits that most frequently engross our attention, by 
strengthening particular sets of muscles, leave traces 
of their working behind them, which may be per- 
ceived by an attentive observer. Hence, too, it is, 
as it has been justly stated, that " a person's coun- 
tenance becomes more expressive and characteristic 



6 FIBST AND SECOND CLASS. 

as he advances in life ; and that the appearance of a 
young man or woman, though more beautiful, is not 
so interesting, nor in general so good a subject for a 
painter, as that of a person whose character has been 
longer confirmed by habit." 

A familiar acquaintance with these significant 
modifications of the features is essential to the paint- 
er and the statuary. It is the foundation of the 
science, if such it may be called, of physiognomy. It 
may be useful also to the orator, and it will add to 
the eloquence of the pulpit. 

Class II. — Gestures of the Body. 

Melancholy is displayed by the sinking of the 
head, and the falling down of the arms. Joy, by the 
elevation of the former. Eagerness, by stretching 
the head forward. Pride gives to it a stiff and erect 
posture. Merriment, as we have seen, is indicated 
by laughter ; fear by trembling. All these, and many 
other variations of gesture, are the involuntary re- 
sults of passion. They are the effects of the opera- 
tions of the mind upon the body, and thus develop 
what is going on in those hidden chambers of the 
heart, to which the eyes of others have no access. 

It is said that in Rome "the exhibition of dramatic 
action, or the art of pantomime, without the accom- 
paniment of words, was a common amusement ; and 
that the audience were never at a loss to follow the 
action through all its parts.'' By the use of natural 
language of this kind, also, savages and dumb per- 



CONVENTIONAL LANaUAGE. i 

sons are able to hold considerable intercourse with 
each other. 

Class III. — Modulations of the Voice. 

This class of signs consists of certain cries, such 
as, Oh ! Ah ! Alas ! &c., uttered involuntarily, under 
the influence of any of the stronger passions of our 
nature, and which observation quickly renders intel- 
ligible to the mere infant. 

It is diflicult to say to what extent, by means 
of the whole class of natural signs, intercourse 
might be carried on among those who were destitute of 
conventional language; probably to a greater extent 
than we are ready to imagine . yet still such signs 
must be inadequate to our wants, as intellectual and 
moral agents. Man has thoughts and feelings which 
language, even in its present enlarged and perfect 
state, cannot fully express ! How then could natural 
signs have been made commensurate with his neces- 
sities? To supply this essential defect of natural 
language, we have, secondly, 

ARTIFICIAL OR CONVENTIONAL LANGUAGE. 

The signs employed in this kind of language are, 
for the most part, arbitrary — not being instinctive 
expressions of thought and feeling, nor prompted by 
common sense, as adapted in themselves to teach the 
meaning they convey. Other signs than those which 
are actually employed might have been fixed up'on. 



8 \VHT CALLED CONVENTIONAL. 

In the case of natural language, no sign but trem- 
bling could express fear ; but in conventional language 
tlie articulate sound, man, or tbe characters, m, a, n, 
might have been made to denote it. Hence we find 
that, in other languages, both the sound, and the 
characters, which designate fear, are different. 

This kind of language is generally and very 
properly called conventional^ because the signs it 
employs — having no meaning in themselves, i, e. no 
adaptation to suggest any thought or feeling — 
obtain their meaning from convention, or agreement. 
TThen an Englishman utters the articulate sound, 
horse, his countrymen are aware that he refers to 
a certain animal, because the inhabitants of this 
country have virtually agreed that that sound shall 
be the sign of a horse. But a Frenchman might 
not be aware of its import, because a similar agree- 
ment does not exist, between the two nations, as to 
the meaning of the sign. 

I must not, however, be understood to intimate 
that the language of paradise originated in conven- 
tion, — that Adam and Eve agreed together that 
certain signs should signify certain things, and that, 
as the result of this convention, when either of them, 
at a subsequent time, made a sign, the other under- 
stood its meaning. No one who adheres to the 
literal and grammatical sense of the Bible can 
believe this to have been the case. The remarks 
just made were meant rather to unfold the nature 
of conventional language, than to assert its origin; 
and yet, it deserves to be remembered, that, with 



WHY ARTIFICIAL. \) 

the single exception of our first parents, the know- 
ledge possessed by all nations, and all men, of the 
meaning of arbitrary signs must be traced, virtually 
at least, to convention. God gave to our first 
parents both the signs, and the knowledge of their 
meaning, (which indeed was, in their case, the 
same thing,) by miracle ; but the immediate descen- 
dants of Adam gained their know^ledge of the 
meaning of these signs as we do in the present day. 
And there can be no fountain but convention or 
agreement, from which the meaning of the multi- 
plied and varied signs to denote the same thing, 
which exists among his posterity, could flow. 

Conventional language is, also, called artijicialy 
because its signs are not, for the most part, signifi- 
cant of the meaning they convey. And, as the 
term conventional might be conceived to favour the 
notion of those infidels who imagine that man was 
originally a savage — that language, even in the 
case of the very first of the race, was of human 
invention — perhaps artificial or arbitrary might be 
the better term by which to designate it. 

Conventional or artificial language comprehends 
the signs employed for the purposes of communica- 
tion both when persons are present with, and when 
separated from, each other. The collection of signs 
employed, in the former case, are articulate sounds, 
and, in the latter, arbitrary characters. To this 
circumstance we owe the division of conventional 
language into the two branches of "spoken" and 



10 SPOKEN LANGUA&E. 

"written language/' to each of which we must 
direct some attention. 

SPOKEN LANGUAGE. 

The actual signs by which intercourse is car- 
ried on among persons who are present with each 
other are, as we have said, articulate sounds. The 
adoption of this kind of signs, though highly expe- 
dient, was not absolutely necessary. A set of arbi- 
trary signs consisting of gestures, or motions of dif- 
ferent parts and members of the body, might have 
been fixed upon as the means of communication. 
The sound angel now denotes a certain being, or 
class of beings ; a finger^ jpointing upwards^ might 
have been constituted the sign of the same being: 
and, in that case, the latter sign would have an- 
swered the purpose as effectually as the former. 
Great wisdom, however, has been developed in the 
choice of articulate sounds rather than gestures as 
the means of intercourse in the circumstances now 
supposed, for, in the 

First j)lace^ we can obtain from this source a 
greater variety of signs than from the other. That 
natural and inimitable instrument — the human 
voice — is so constituted by its divine Author as to 
be susceptible of articulate modulations in an almost 
endless variety ! It would be difficult, or rather 
impossible, to multiply gestures to the same extent. 

In the 

Second place, they are made with greater facility 



ITS SIGNS. 11 

and rapidity than the others. Suppose an attempt 
were made to substitute gestures for articulate 
sounds, we should have to encounter the primary 
difficulty of devising gestures sufficiently various 
and abundant to meet the necessities of the case. 
Every part and member of the body must be laid 
under contribution to accomplish this. And, then, 
there would be the secondary, and more impor- 
tant, difficulty of using, and making others tise, 
these gestures, in conversation ! Who would not 
pity our inveterate talkers, (though talkers they 
could not then be called,) every limb and every 
muscle in rapid and incessant action ! How toilsome ! 
why, the " chat" of a day wou]d be worse than the 
labours of Hercules ! The motion of that little 
member, the tongue, over which we have the most 
perfect physical control at least, effects the object 
with incomparably greater ease. And then, who 
would be content to substitute " the human voice 
di^dne,'' with its infinite and graceful varieties, 
for the dumb show of gestures, and the grimace of 
pantomime ? 

Thirdly, they may he employed in various circum- 
stances in which signs, consisting of gestures, would 
he unavailing , Darkness must put a stop to all 
communication by the latter mode. The interven- 
tion of a wall or screen, or any thing which hid 
the persons from each other's view, would produce 
the same result ; nay their presence in the same 
apartment would not, though they were in close 
neighbourhood, avail, if the eye of either should 



12 WRITTEN LANGUAGE. 

wander for a moment from the other party, in the 
conversation. 

WRITTEN LANGUAGE. 

Since mutual intercourse, when persons are to- 
gether, is carried on by means of articulate sounds, 
there exists a broad line of distinction between what 
is hence called spoken and written language, de- 
signed, as the latter is, to perpetuate that intercourse 
when the parties are absent from one another. To 
the nature of this kind of language, especially as de- 
veloped in alphabetical writing, we now proceed to di- 
rect attention. Writing or written language consists 
of certain signs addressed to the eye instead of the ear. 
They may be, as they have been, impressed upon 
a variety of substances,* as leaves, the bark of trees, 

* " The material on which writing was made, differed 
accordmg to its occasion and object. When the object 
was some public memorial, as the inscription of remar- 
kable events, eras, or laws, the material chosen was of a 
durable order, such as stone, wood, or metal. Thus, the 
first example of writing, on record, was on stone. This 
was that of the two tables of the moral law. From a 
passage in chapter xix. of the book of Job, it appears 
that men were, in his time, accustomed to write on plates 
of lead, to cut inscriptions on a rock, and to use an iron 
style. The laws of Solon were inscribed on wood ; the 
laws of the Romans, on plates of brass ; and, from the 
number of the plates, they were called the law of the 
twelve tables. For similar purposes, it was common 
among some ancient nations to write on bricks and flat 
stones ; and we are informed by Herodotus, that the 
Babylonians inscribed on bricks their astronomical obser- 
vations ; the bricks being at first in a soft state, and, 
after the inscription was made, hardened by fire. For 



WRITTEN LANGUAGE. 13 

paper, and parchment ; and then, by the transmis- 
sion of the substances on which they are impressed, 

common and temporary uses, the bark and the leaves of 
trees were employed, particularly those of the palm tree. 
Hence " liber" became the name of a book, and we speak 
of the leaves of a book, and of folios. For more lasting 
uses, the skins of animals were very early employed. 
From the earliest times we find them dressed and pre- 
pared for various purposes. In the book of Exodus, it 
is stated, that the people of Israel used them for the 
covering of the tabernacle ; amongst others, skins dyed 
red are mentioned ; and it has been noticed, as a singu- 
lar fact, that one of the old manuscripts of the law, which 
Dr. Buchanan received from the black Jews in India, 
was written on goat skins, dyed red. In the interior of 
China, also, the roll on which the law is written, used in 
some of the synagogues, is of goat skin made into flexible 
leather, dyed red in a similar manner. The Mexicans 
used skins for their hieroglyphic painting ; and, in the 
Bodleian Library at Oxford, there are two books of hie- 
roglyphics of the same kind. Linen cloth was common 
in very early ages. " I will not," said Abram to the 
King of Sodom, " take from thee a thread of the woof 
even to the latchet." Rebecca is said to have covered 
herself with a vail. Joseph had a coat of many colours ; 
and Pharaoh arrayed him in vesture of fine linen. Linen 
manuscripts are accordingly mentioned by various au- 
thors. Some are found at present ; and Livy makes 
mention of linen books. These various materials soon 
came to be so manufactured as to be well fitted to their 
design. When writing was generally employed in the 
ordinary business of life, materials of a still more artificial 
kind were adopted. Among them was the papyrus of 
Egypt. Paper was afterwards made from various sub- 
stances. But almost every material for writing intended 
to be preserved, yielded at length to the use of parch- 
ment or vellum. For less important purposes various 
materials were adopted. We find, for example, tablets ; 
and these made often of thin pieces of wood. Some- 
times the letters were made in the wood itself; at other 
times on wax covering the wood. Sometimes tablets 



14 FIRST CLASS, OF ITS SIGNS. 

they may become the medium of communication be- 
tween those who are separated by distance, or time. 
The signs capable of being employed in this species 
of language are various. They may, however, be di- 
vided into significant and arbitrary ; signs of words, 
^. e, of articulate sounds, and signs of things. 

Class I. 

Consists of such as are naturally significant, or 
adapted to unfold their own meaning. Of this class we 
may reckon, 

jPz>5^, Pictures, or delineations of external and visi- 
ble objects. The picture of a horse is a significant sign 
of a horse ; and, if it be the case that writing was of 
human invention, pictures there can be little reason 
to doubt must have been the first rude specimens of 
that art. It is said that when America was dis- 
covered this was the only sort of writing practised 

were covered with a substance, like chalk, which could 
easily be rubbed off. From these tablets the writers 
transferred their composition into the more durable form 
of parchment books. To such tablets various passages 
of the scripture refer. Thus Isaiah receives this com- 
mand, " Go, write it before them on a tablet, and note it 
in a book ; that it may be for the time to come, for ever 
and ever." So Paul desires Timothy to bring with him 
" the books, but especially the parchments." Dr. Shaw 
mentions, that in Barbary the children were taught to 
write on a thin piece of wood, covered over with whiten- 
ing. In India children are seen writing lessons on the 
ground strewed over with fine sand : hence you find in 
the scripture allusions to writing in the sand or on the 
earth to mark that which would be " forgotten or blotted 
out." Macgill's Lectures^ pp. 71 — 74. 



FIRST CLASS. 15 

in the kingdom of Mexico. By historical pictures 
the Mexicans, it is affirmed, transmitted to memory 
the most important transactions of their empire. 

Secondly^ Hieroglyphics belong, also, to this 
class. It is important to remember here that the 
characters employed in this mode of writing are not 
diverse from those of the former class; i, e. they are 
still pictures of external and visible objects. The 
difference is not in the character, but in its mean- 
ing. In picture writing, the pictures, which constitute 
the characters, mean the objects of which they are 
delineations. In hieroglyphic al writing they mean 
something which is invisible, — of which no pictures 
can be drawn, but to which Ihe visible objects, 
directly represented, are supposed to bear some 
resemblance or analogy. In the former mode of 
writing, the picture of an eye would mean an eye; 
^. e. would be intended to denote an eye. In the 
latter mode it might mean knowledge, of which an 
eye is supposed to be an emblem ; or Providence, 
w^hich watches over us with sleepless care. In 
Egypt this mode of writing was much studied, and 
brought into a regular art. It was in hieroglyphi- 
cal characters that all the boasted wisdom of the 
priests was conveyed, or, as it would be more cor- 
rect to say, locked up. 

It should be noticed that the signs in picture 
and hieroglyphical writing are manifestly not arbi- 
trary. No sign for a lion, for instance, could, in 
the former, be employed but the picture of a lion ; 
nor, in the latter, could any sign for eternity be 



16 SECOND CLASS. 

used, but the picture of a circle, or of some visible 
object to which eternity bears, or is supposed to 
bear, some analogy. 

Class II. 

Consists of arbitrary signs, ^. e. such as denote 
objects to which they bear neither resemblance nor 
analogy. To this class belongs the mode of writing 
practised among the Peruvians. Intercourse among 
them was carried on by means of small cords of dif- 
ferent colours, with knots of various sizes, and 
differently arranged , — the cords, colours, &c. bear- 
ing an arbitrary and conventional signification. 

In the same class must also be arranged the 
written characters of most modern nations. They 
are arbitrary signs, obviously destitute of meaning, 
and understood only by agreement. 

Our object here is merely to exhibit the nature of 
language, or it might be proper to describe the 
process by which pictures and hieroglyphics might 
at length sink — and, indeed, could scarcely fail of 
sinking — into arbitrary characters. To abridge 
labour, successive parts of the original character 
might be omitted, till by these repeated curtail- 
ments it became a merely arbitrary sign. 

The difference in written characters which it is, 
however, of the greatest importance for the reader 
to observe, is that which exists among those which, 
with the view of exhibiting them in contrast, we 
place in the next class. 



THIRD CLASS. 



Class III. 



17 



Consists of signs of things and signs of words, i.e, 
of articulate sounds. Of the former description are 
the pictures, hieroglyphics, and symbols of ancient 
nations, and the written characters of the Chinese. 
To the latter belong the alphabetical characters 
employed by all Europeans, as well as by the most 
civilized nations of antiquity. The difference 
between these two kinds of signs is obvious and 
radical. The articulate sound made by the utter- 
ance of the written characters m, a, n, is a direct 
sign of the thing or being man. Such also is the 
case with the picture of a man; it means a man. 
But the characters themselves (m, a, n,) form 
together a sign not of the being man, but of the 
sound man. The sound and the picture both 
mean the thing or being ; the characters mean the 
sound. And it is because alphabetical characters 
mean nothing but sounds, i. e, are the signs or 
indications of sounds, and of sounds only, that it is 
possible for a person ignorant of the Latin language, 
for instance, to read a book written in that language 
without understanding it; i. e. without gathering 
from it any knowledge of the things or subjects on 
which it treats. And, when it is said he can read 
the book, the meaning is that he knows and can 
form the sounds which the characters indicate ; but, 
being ignorant of the meaning of these sounds, i, e, 
not knowing of what things or ideas they are the 
signs, he utters them as a parrot might do, without 



18 CHARACTERS HOW READ. 

any conception of their meaning. We shall suppose 
that the commencement of Yirgil's deathless song 
lies before him: he looks at the characters, the 
letters, and words which meet his eye; he under- 
stands them (which, if the characters were Greek, 
he might not do), i, e, he knows the articulate sounds 
of which they are the constituted signs. He utters 
them, " Arma virumque cano." He has now read 
the passage. He has got all the meaning from the 
characters which they possess ; but the meaning of 
the articulate sounds he knows not. He has read 
the book — at any rate the passage — as we are in 
the habit of saying, though somewhat incorrectly, 
without understanding it. 

It is not intended to deny, however, that, after 
the great principle of suggestion, or, as it is more 
commonly called, association, has linked the thing, 
the articulate sound, and the written characters, in 
indissoluble bonds, the latter may directly recall the 
thing or idea without the intervening links. Our 
object has been rather to explain the nature of 
alphabetical characters, or the precise purpose they 
answer, than the secondary information we may now 
derive from them. 

We have said that the Chinese written characters 
are signs of things and not of words. All who have 
written upon the subject are agreed on this point, 
though opinions have differed on the question 
whether they were originally merely arbitrary 
marks, or founded upon some resemblance, or fancied 
resemblance, between the sign and the thing signi- 



CHINESE CHARACTERS. 19 

fied. Each character, by universal testimony, re- 
presents a thing or an idea, no !: an articulate sound. 
It has been thought to be an a Ivantage, consequent 
upon this circumstance, that a Chinese book may be 
read or resolved in Greek, Latin, French, or En- 
glish, &c., as well as in Chinese. It would be 
more correct to say that a Chinese book cannot be 
read at all. To read a book is, as we have seen, to 
give to the characters which meet the eye the 
articulate sounds of which they are the signs. 
Chinese characters, not being signs of sounds, but 
of things, may be understood, but, correctly speak- 
ing, cannot be read. 

A written language formed on the principle of 
the Chinese ought to possess as many distinct 
characters as words. It is a curious fact, in refer- 
ence to the Chinese, of which no satisfactory account 
has been given, that the former greatly exceed in 
number the latter. According to Sir George Staunton, 
its words do not exceed 1500, while its characters 
amount to 80,000, making at an average 50 cha- 
racters to every word. This circumstance cannot 
fail to occasion great ambiguity in oral communica- 
tion ; and it frequently obliges persons^ as we learn, 
in conversation, to write or di*aw the character, to re- 
move the ambiguity — the very reverse of our process : 
we talk to explain writing; they write to explain 
talking. With such a language, requiring so great 
an amount of labour (though less than was once 
imagined) to gain a knowledge of its characters, the 
Chinese cannot well be otherwise than dwarfs in 

c2 



20 VERBAL AND SYLLABIC CHARACTERS. 

general attainments. Indeed it would scarcely be 
going too far to say, that, without alphabetical cha- 
racters founded, as we shall presently see, on the 
analysis of compound sounds, no nation can attain 
to intellectual eminence if it should be fortunate 
enough to escape barbarism. 

Of the kind of signs which indicate sounds, not 
things, alphabetical characters, as it has been stated, 
constitute the most perfect, if not the only specimen. 
Now, with a view to obtain a just conception of their 
nature, the reader is requested to observe, that of 
written languages, formed on the principle of 
employing characters to denote sounds, not things, 
there are three possible varieties. It is not said 
that we have, in any existing language, perfect 
specimens of these varieties ; it is enough for our 
purpose that they might exist. I shall take the 
liberty of calling them the verbal, the syllabic, and 
the alphabetical characters. 

In the first variety, single characters would be 
employed to denote what we call separate words, or 
compound sounds, denoting single things or ideas, 
or classes. Thus there would be a single character 
to intimate the whole articulate sound mankind. 

In the second \ariety separate characters would 
be employed to denote not whole words, as before, 
but syllables, or parts of those very compound 
sounds of which words consist. Thus there would 
be two characters to denote the compound sound 
mankind ; the one a sign of the sound man, the 
other a sign of the sound kind. 



ALPHABETICAL CHARACTERS. 21 

In the third variety separate characters would 
be used, not as formerly to express whole or separate 
words, or even syllables, but simple elementary 
sounds. Thus there would be seven characters to 
denote the whole compound sound mankind. The 
first variety are verbal characters; the second, 
syllabic; the third, alphabetical. 

Now it must be observed, that the alphabetical 
mode of writing is formed on precisely the same 
principles with the syllabic, the only difference 
being that it carries these principles to a point 
much nearer perfection. Syllabic characters suppose 
and proceed upon an imperfect analysis of sound. 
Alphabetical characters imply and require a perfect 
analysis. Let us take the word to which reference 
has been made more than once already — the word 
mankind. It is manifestly a compound sound. A 
superficial analysis might permit us to suppose that 
it consists of two elementary sounds, i. e. the sound 
man and the sound kind. A closer investigation, 
however, shows us that even these latter sounds, 
both of which are syllabic sounds, are capable of a 
still further analysis ; and, extending our investiga- 
tions beyond them, to all the syllables of the lan- 
guage, we find them compounded of a few elemen- 
tary sounds, which, combined as they are capable 
of being in a vast variety of different ways, form 
that immense number of articulate sounds of which 
the spoken language of the country consists. When 
our analysis is complete, and we have ascertained 
the full number of elementary sounds, we appropri- 



22 ALPHABETICAL CHARACTERS. 

ate to each of these sounds an arbitrary mark 
which constitutes its sign ; and the entire collec- 
tion of these arbitrary marks, or letters, as we call 
them, we denominate an alphabet ; the word being 
derived from AX0a and Bera, the first and second 
letters in the Greek alphabet ; and we further say 
of a nation, whose language is constructed upon the 
principle of employing arbitrary characters as signs 
of its simple elementary sounds, that it adopts the 
alphabetical mode of writing. 

Now there are one or two points to which the 
reader's attention must be especially directed before 
we leave this part of the subject. 

The first is the beautiful simplicity of the alpha- 
betical mode of writing. It may be well to point 
out here the progressive steps by which the ultimate 
simplicity is secured. The first, in conception, — 
i. e, for we do not intend to assume the human 
origin of the art of writing — is the adoption of 
characters to represent sounds instead of things. 
All European languages are on this account simpler 
than the Chinese. The next step in the process 
would be the adoption of syllabic instead of verbal 
characters; for, as there are fewer syllables than 
words in every language, by proceeding on this 
principle the number of arbitrary characters, always 
burdensome to the memory, would be considerably 
reduced. The next and final step would be the 
adoption of alphabetical instead of verbal characters ; 
since the number of elementary sounds in all lan- 
guages falls immensely short of the number of 



ALPHABETICAL CHARACTERS. 23 

words, and eveu of syllables. Indeed no language 
contains more than from twenty to six or eight- 
and- twenty. To obtain tbe knowledge of the 
power of the letters which are adopted as theii* 
conventional signs, both singly and in combination, 
is a work attended with little difficulty ; and that 
knowledge being attained, a key to the vocal utter- 
ance of all the words in any language is put into 
the hands of the student at once. 

The second remark regards the extreme subtility 
of analysis which is developed in alphabetical 
writing. Letters, i, e. arbitrary or conventional 
signs of sound, (for the sounds themselves are not 
letters, though this nice distinction between the 
sound and the letter is not always preserved,) in- 
dicate either vowel sounds or consonantal sounds. 
The former are distinct and perfect elementary sounds 
capable of being uttered by one impulse of the breath ; 
and, therefore, the letters which designate them are 
called vowels ; the word being derived from vox, a 
word, or sound. Consonantal sounds, on the other 
hand, do not seem to be fall and perfect elementary 
sounds. They are rather parts of sounds — elements of 
elements, — ^if we may so speak. They are incapable 
of being articulated without the aid of a vowel sound 
prefixed or affixed. Hence the letters which desig- 
nate them are caUed consonants, i. e. letters sounded 
with a vowel. How extremely minute and subtile 
then must be that analysis which, not satisfied with 
going down to simple sounds, makes an attack even 



24 THE ORIOIN OF 

upon these, and attempts at least to resolve articu- 
late speech into elements of elements. Such an 
analysis manifestly requires a profound knowledge 
of articulate speech, and a perfect acquaintance with 
the nature and power of those organs which it 
brings into exercise. Whether the invention of 
alphabetical characters lies within the compass of 
unassisted human power will be considered here- 
after. 



THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE. 

In the hasty view we have taken of the nature of 
language, both spoken and written, z. e. of articu- 
late speech and alphabetical characters, we must 
have seen enough to fill us with admiration of the 
beautifiil yet simple processes (beautiful because they 
are simple) which they develop for the communica- 
tion of human thought and feeling. The inquiry 
can have scarcely failed to suggest itself, " Is lan- 
guage, in either of these great divisions, of human 
invention .^ or were men taught the method of thus 
communicating with each other by their Maker ?'' 
It is impossible, in a treatise of this kind, to avoid 
considering this question ; though, as it is not 
adapted to throw much light upon the general prin- 
ciples of language, we may be as brief as possible. 
Nothing, however, can be done with effect without 
instituting a separate inquiry concerning the two 
general divisions of language. We begin with 



SPOKEN LANGUAGE. . 25 



THE ORIGIN OF SPOKEN LANGUAGE. 

Many ancient and modern writers of great cele- 
brity maintain, that, though all the faculties and 
organs requisite for the forming of articulate speech 
were of course given as constituent parts of the 
human constitution, man was not apprised by any 
special revelation of the invaluable treasure he 
possessed in them, nor prompted in the use of them ; 
that all is to be ascribed to human ingenuity, or 
that articulate language is of human origin. They 
cannot, indeed, state when, and by whom, sounds 
instead of gestures were constituted the signs of 
thought and feeling ; but, in the absence of all his- 
torical light on this point, they set themselves to 
show how our ancestors may, by successive steps, 
hsbte attained to this most perfect method of effect- 
ing an intercommunion of thought and feeling. 

It has been supposed, then, that in the very in- 
fancy of society men would put forth an effort, under 
the prompting of necessity, to communicate to each 
other their wants and wishes; that to effect this 
they would first employ those natural signs of thought 
and feeling of which we have spoken — variations of 
gesture, modulations of the voice, &c. ; that when 
any particular noise distinguished any object to 
which they wished to direct attention, they would 
attempt to secure their purpose by imitating that 
noise by the voice ; and finally, that the effort to do 
this might suggest to some mighty genius among 



26 NOT OF HUMAN ORIGIN 

them the possibility of employing the various 
articulate sounds which the voice is capable of utter- 
ing as the basis of conventional language, adapted 
to express all the variety of human thought and 
feeling. 

Now, it will be observed, that this hypothesis rests 
upon, or requires, the following assumptions : — 

First assumption^ That men had been collected 
together yand society formed ^previously to the existence 
of language y — at any rate before the existence of any 
means of communication except natural signs^ the 
possession of which scarcely elevates man above the 
brute. The very point affirmed is, that language 
is the result of compact, agreement, or convention. 
Such convention implies association and society — 
the association and society of numbers. Till man 
has ceased to be a solitary animal, there can mani- 
festly be no conventional language. But how can 
he cease to be such without language ? How could 
society be formed previous to the existence of lan- 
guage ? or, if formed, how, without the intervention 
of speech, could it be held together ? This is one 
horn of the dilemma on which the advocates of the 
human origin of language are tossed. But there is 
another ; since the hypothesis is burdened with the 

Second as smnption. That the first men were savages; 
for what but savages could they have been with no 
means of communication but such as are inferior to 
those which Hottentots, before missionary enterprize 
had elevated and refined them, enjoyed ? Indeed that 
man was originally a savage, many writers, deeply 



PROVED BY EXPERIENCE. "27 

tinctured with infidelity, who advocate the hypothesis 
under examination, admit. Lord Monboddo, for ex- 
ample, supposes that at first his features were those 
of a monkey, and that he possessed the appendage 
which distinguishes that animal ; but tha.t education 
gradually improved his features, and at length ex- 
tirpated his tail ! It is surely not too much to say, 
that a man must he the very animal of which his 
Lordship speaks to believe this. "We may credit it, 
perhaps, when we see education placing horns upon 
the head of the horse, and removing them from that 
of the cow. 

Few men would even venture to hint at a sup- 
position so ineffably absurd as that of Lord Mon- 
boddo ; but aU who deny the divine origin of lan- 
guage do and must believe that the first men were 
savages. To disprove this assumption is, therefore, 
to overturn their hypothesis. For this purpose I 
appeal, 

I. To the evidence of experience. The following 
summary of facts is chiefly taken from Dr. Doig's 
"Letters to Lord Kaimes on the Savage State," a 
book which we should be happy to see more gene- 
rally read and studied than it is at present. 

Firsts The more populous and extensive kingdoms 
and societies were civilized at a period prior to the 
records of history. The presumption, therefore, is, 
that they were civilized from the beginning. 

Secondy None of the nations that were savages or 
barbarians at the period of their first appearance 
in history, have ever been known to move one 



28 PROVED BY EXPERIENCE. 

step forwards towards a civilized state till impelled 
by some external circumstances. " The original 
savages of Greece were tamed by the Pelasgi^ a 
foreign tribe, and were afterwards farther polished 
by Orpheus, Cecrops, Cadmus, &c., who derived 
their knowledge from Egypt and the East. The 
ancient Romans, a ferocious and motley crew, re- 
ceived the blessings of law and religion from a 
succession of foreign kings; and the conquests of 
Rome at a later period contributed to civilize the 
rest of Europe." "We infer from these facts, that, 
if the first men had been savages, the whole human 
family — there being none to civilize them — must 
have been savages now. 

Thirdy No people that were once civilized, and 
who afterwards degenerated into barbarism, have 
ever recovered their pristine state without foreign 
aid. The inference still is, that, if originally savage, 
man would have been savage still. 

Fourth^ There appears in savages a rooted aver- 
sion to a civilized state. So strong is this aversion, 
indeed, that the Gospel only can subdue it. Greece 
and Rome, it is true, retained civihzation without 
the Gospel, but who shall say that they 6>Z>tained it 
without the aid of its powerful though indirect in- 
fluence ? This fact furnishes a strong presumption 
that, left to the efforts of their natural genius alone, 
men, if originally savage, w^ould not have arisen 
from the degradation of their primitive state. 

Fifth, Civilization, and improvement of every kind, 
have always been carried to the highest pitch of 



BY SCRIPTURE. 29 

perfection in large cities and populous societies. In 
savages the social appetite never reaches beyond 
their own tribe or horde ; and is, consequently, too 
weak and confined to dispose them to unite into 
large communities. Had the whole race, therefore, 
been at one time in a savage state, no nation could 
have attained to any degree of civilization. 

II. I appeal to the evidence of Scripture. Here 
it wiU be unnecessary to enlarge. None but an in- 
fidel can believe that our first parents were savages. 
Their moral, if not intellectual, elevation above their 
degenerate posterity is written as with a sunbeam 
in the volume of Divine revelation. Hence, w^hen 
that great moral revolution takes place in the cha- 
racter of men which restores them to the Divine 
image, they are said to be renewed in the spirit of 
their mind. And, if the first men were not savages, 
they must have had language. We regard this as 
an irresistible conclusion from the premises ; it is, 
however, supported by certain statements of the 
inspired historian which go directly to prove that 
of this distinguishing feature of our race they were 
not destitute. Adam and Eve are said to have 
conversed, and thus to have held intercourse with 
God. The former, as we are told, gave names to 
the animals ; i. e. he uttered articulate sounds, pro- 
bably under especial Divine guidance, which were 
to constitute the arbitrary signs by which they 
should in future be distinguished : in other words, 
language is of Divine origin. 

It may be well, before we proceed, to explain the 



30 LANGUAGE OF DIVINE 

last assertion a little more precisely, as the state- 
ments of several writers on this point are involved 
in considerable obscurity. Dr. Shuckford, who con- 
tends " that the origin of language was from God/' 
seems to understand no more by these words than 
that God gave to Adam an understanding to form 
notions of things, and a power to utter sounds which 
should be to him as names for them. This expla- 
nation is obviously defective. Had no more assist- 
ance than Shuckford supposes been rendered to 
Adam, we might with equal propriety ascribe the 
origin of painting, or any other art, to God. 

Again, we have been told that " the power of 
speech, and the use of speech, were from God.'' By 
" the power of speech" must be meant, I presume, 
the organs of articulation. " The use of speech" 
are words of very doubtful import ; and the two 
phrases together express less than they ought to 
have done. It seems to me manifest that the power 
of understanding, as well as of employing, speech 
must have been from God : in other words, that a 
Divine impulse rested upon the minds of our first 
parents prompting them, when they first sought in- 
tercourse with each other, to utter certain articulate 
sounds, and that the same impulse which prompted 
them to utter these sounds unfolded their meaning. 

Third assumption. The hypothesis of the human 
origin of language assumes that it is within the 
power of savages to invent articulate speech. In- 
deed, the advocates of this hypothesis are involved 
in a double dilemma ; for, if language be of human 



NOT HUMAN ORIGIN. 31 

origin, the first men, not possessing it, must have 
been savages ; but if they had been savages, they 
could not have invented language. The common 
argument against the human origin of language ap- 
plies with double force here. It could not be the 
invention of children, for they are incapable of in- 
vention; nor of adults, for they are incapable of 
speech. It is a well known fact, that sounds to 
which adult persons were not accustomed in infancy, 
are imitated by them with extreme difficulty, and 
indeed are sometimes never completely mastered. 
To conceive of an adult savage, who has never 
uttered articulate sounds — whose organs of speech 
are inflexible to a degree of which we can have but 
a very feeble conception, and ten thousand times 
more incapable of forming those nice and delicate 
modulated sounds which articulate speech employs 
than his limbs of being moulded into the graceful 
positions of the dancing master — is to conceive an 
absurdity. Indeed, one of the most powerful advo- 
cates of the hypothesis is compelled to admit that 
the invention of language " is too difficult for the 
savage state of man, — that, though placed originally 
in a solitary and savage state, men must have asso- 
ciated for ages, and have carried on some common 
work, and even framed some civil polity, and have 
continued for a considerable length of time in that 
state, so as ultimately to gain such powers of ab- 
straction as to be able to form general ideas, before 
language could possibly be formed !" Now, "whether 
such theories, in supposing a mute convergence from 



32 ORIGIN OF WRITTEN LANGUAGE. 

savage barbarism to reflecting civilization, and a 
continued association without an associating tie, 
prove any thing more than their own extravagance, 
it is,'' says Dr. Mayee, "for the reader to judge." 

THE ORIGIN OF WRITTEN LANGUAGE, OR OF 
ALPHABETICAL WRITING. 

Assuming it to be of human origin, many persons 
endeavour to trace its gradual progress through the 
successive steps of picture writing, hieroglyphics, 
arbitrary characters, till the invention was brought 
to perfection in the discovery and adoption of alpha- 
betical characters. Now, if the question were put, 
" Is it beyond the power of man, without Divine 
assistance, to take these successive steps ?" we should 
reply that no doubt can exist with respect to either 
except the last. Considering the proneness to 
imitation which distinguishes man, it may be 
readily conceded that his own ingenuity would 
prompt and enable him to draw rough sketches of 
any visible objects to which he wished to lead the 
thoughts of others ; that some of these sketches or 
pictures would, in process of time, be used as 
hieroglyphics (vide p. 15), thus giving an en- 
larged extent of meaning to the only signs he pos- 
sessed ; that, being difficult to form, these pictures, 
by successive curtailments, prompted by the desire 
of ease and expedition, might lose, at length, all re- 
semblance to the objects, and thus unintentionally 
degenerate into arbitrary signs; and finally, that 



FACTS IN PROOF. 33 

when this change in their original character had 
taken place, other arbitrary signs, to render the 
language more complete, might be added to them. 
All this, we say, may be readily conceded. There 
■ is nothing impossible to man in the steps now de- 
scribed. The difficulty lies in the succeeding ones ; 
in the first of these which effected the important 
transition from signs significant of things to signs 
significant of sounds ; and preeminently in the ulti- 
mate step which originated alphabetical writing by 
adopting arbitrary characters not to denote words, 
i.e. compound sounds {vide p. 21), which would in- 
volve less difficulty, but elementary sounds ! This 
is the paramount difficulty involved in the alphabe- 
tical mode of writing, — this the astonishing invention 
which it develops, — an invention that eclipses by 
its splendour all those of modern times ! We cannot 
but think that these considerations throw great 
probability upon the opinion that alphabetical writ- 
ing was the direct gift of God to man. 

This probability is strengthened by two or three 
important facts which claim attention. 

Firsts The five books of Moses are acknowledged to 
be the most ancient compositions, and to exhibit the 
earliest specimens of alphabetical writing which have 
come down to us. Now these specimens present the 
art in a perfect state, since it seems " impossible to 
make any real improvement upon the Hebrew alpha- 
bet." How, then, is this remarkable difference be- 
tween the art of writing and all other arts to be 
accounted for P How is it to be explained, that 



34 



FACTS IN PROOF. 



while their first specimens were uniformly rude and 
imperfect, alphabetical writing attained its ne plus 
ultra at once ? Admit that it came from God, and 
the fact receives a full explanation. Deny this, and 
it remains unaccountable. 

Second, All the alphabetical characters in the 
world may be traced up to one common origin. 
" The Europeans derived their knowledge of letters 
from the Romans, the Romans from the Greeks, the 
Greeks from the Phoenicians, who, as well as their 
colonists, the Carthaginians, spoke a dialect of the 
Hebrew scarcely varying from the original. Indeed 
all the languages in use among men that have been 
conveyed in alphabetical characters have been the 
languages of people connected either immediately or 
remotely with the Hebrews, who have, as we have 
seen, handed down the earliest specimens of writing 
to posterity." May we not, therefore, conclude that 
their method of writing and their spoken language 
were derived from the same source ? 

Third, History does not even profess to trace the 
origin of alphabetical writing to any particular time, 
or place, or person, which we have certainly reason 
to expect it would have done had the art been of 
human invention. We are not left thus totally in 
the dark in reference to other arts wdiich originated 
in the skill of man. Rival claims, indeed, to the 
honour of invention have been put forward in the 
case of some, as of printing, &c. But there exists 
not a single claimant for the honour of inventing 
alphabetical writing. No one professes even to 



FACTS IN PROOF. 



35 



conjecture, as far as I am aware, where and about 
what period this art sprang into existence ! How 
can this be accounted for, if it had an inventor ? Is 
it possible to conceive that no vestiges should re- 
main of the supposed master-mind to w^hose possessor 
the invaluable fruits of his mighty genius enjoyed by 
us have laid us under such imperishable obligations ? 
I cannot but feel that it is not. Yet vestiges we 
have none. All we know is, that it was in existence 
at a very early period of the world ; that its first 
specimens were perfect ; that it was found among a 
people not distinguished by inventive powers, but 
by Divine communications. The probability, there- 
fore, we cannot but think is, that it constituted one 
of the innumerable blessings bestowed by God upon 
his chosen people. 



THE OBJECT OR DESIGN OF LANGUAGE. 

The diversified statements on this point which 
are found to exist, appear to resolve themselves into 
the two following theories ; firsts that the object of 
language is the communication of our thoughts and 
feelings to others ; second^ the production of certain 
thoughts and feelings in the minds of others. 

Now it might at first sight appear, that the for- 
mer of these theories is undoubtedly the correct one. 
Language consists of the signs of thought and feel- 
ing. It is the admirable vehicle by which the trea- 
sures of one mind oyiay be transmitted to another. 

d2 



36 THE OBJECT 

In the ordinary intercourse of life — in all our 
literary and philosophical treatises — it is the actual 
vehicle of transmission. Who then can douht, we 
are ready to say, that its object is to convey these 
treasures ; — to announce to others the thoughts and 
feelings which lie hidden in that chamber to which 
their eyes can gain no access ? 

Against this theory of the specific object of lan- 
guage it has been urged, as an insuperable objec- 
tion, that it is often used for the purpose of dissem- 
hling the thoughts and feelings of the speaker. And 
this must be admitted. No one can doubt that 
we are frequently imposed upon, the real views of 
those who address us being at direct variance with 
their language. In these cases, language does not 
communicate the thoughts and feelings of the 
speaker ; it was not used with the intention of doing 
it ; and, therefore, the communication of our thoughts 
and feelings cannot, it is contended, be regarded as 
a sufiiciently comprehensivestatementof the general 
object of language. That object is, by one of the latest, 
and certainly one of the most able, writers on gram- 
mar, affirmed to be " the production of thought by 
means of oral sounds.'' 

It may be doubted, however, whether this objec- 
tion against the first of these theories does not possess 
more of plausibility than strength ; since it over- 
looks what appears at least a well-grounded dis- 
tinction, viz. the difference which exists between 
the ge.ieral purpose of language, and the end for 
ivliich^ on particular occasions, it is employed. A 



OF LANGUAGE. 37 

well-known instrument was invented to remove the 
beard, and not to cut the throat ; nor does its occa- 
sional employment for this latter purpose gainsay 
this statement, since it is a perversion of the object for 
which it was formed. Falsehood is, in like manner, a 
deviation from the original purpose of language. If 
of Divine origin, it could not, of course, have been 
given by God as an instrument of deception ; nor, if 
of human origin, can we conceive that it was in- 
vented for that purpose. The object of the liar, in 
the use of the instrument, is to deceive ; the object 
of the instrument itself \^ different: it is to express 
thought ; or to be the vehicle of conveying it from 
one mind to another. 

If there be a difference between the communica- 
tion of our thoughts to others, and the production 
of thought in them, which is invariably assumed, 
there seems to be no reason why those who admit 
the existence of such difference, should deny that, 
in those cases at least in which language does con- 
vey our thoughts and feelings, such transmission 
was the object of the language. We concede to 
them the existence of a more ultimate object, but 
this is surely the proximate obj ect . The direct object 
of putting in motion certain muscles when we wish 
to move from our seat, may be to perform that 
movement ; the ultimate one to obtain possession of 
something we need. The direct object of language 
may thus, in like manner, be the communication of 
thought ; its ultimate the production of thought. 
Language is the means of exhibiting our thoughts. 



38 THE OBJECT OF LANGUAGE. 

and that exhibition is the means of producing similar 
thoughts in the minds of others. 

I cannot but doubt^ however, whether the assumed 
difference between the communication and the pro- 
duction of thought has any existence. If the thought 
be communicated is it not produced ? — if not pro- 
duced, is it communicated? What kind of com- 
munication is that which does not end in produc- 
tion ? — or rather does not identify itself with it ? 
How can wealth be communicated without making 
a person wealthy .^ Yet, obvious as it seems to be 
that the communication and the production of thought 
are identical. Dr. Dewar, one of the most luminous 
writers on the subject of general grammar, seems to 
fancy that even when language expresses our own 
thoughts, there exists a broad line of distinction 
between them. It is probable — possible at any 
rate — that he meant no more by communication 
than the expression or development of thought by 
oral sounds, their conventional signs. Now there 
may be, doubtless, an expression or development of 
thought, without communication of thought, because 
the signs may not be understood ; but where the 
signs are understood there must be production, ^. e. 
the thought of one mind — to use loose, but not 
philosophical language — is communicated to ano- 
ther. To support the existence of a difference be- 
tween the communication and the production of 
thought, we have been told that the former phrase 
describes rather the formal nature of language than 
its object. No mistake, how^ever, could be greater 



THE CHARACTER OF LANGUA&E. 39 

than this ; since language is not the communication 
of thought at all^ but the medium or instrument of 
communicating it. The sword is the instrument of 
shedding human blood, yet who would think of say- 
ing that the shedding of blood is the formal nature 
of the sword ? 

It is probable that, if the advocates of the first 
theory of the object of language had varied their 
phraseology a little, and stated the design of language 
to be to express thought^ without using the term 
" commwiicate^' and adding the word " oiir^' there 
would have existed no controversy on the point. 
Certainly the liar, in giving a false account of a 
transaction, does not communicate his thoughts of 
its nature ; but he expresses thoughts^ though in- 
correct ones. His proximate object is to do this. 
And thus it is in all cases when the conventional 
signs of thought are employed. The direct design 
is to express thought ; the ultimate one may be to 
govern thought ; — to influence the conceptions of 
another by the development of thoughts — ^whether 
our own or not, is of no consequence — w^hich we 
wish him to adopt. 

THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF LANGUAGE. 

Two distinct opinions on this point also have pre- 
vailed ; some writers contending that language is essen- 
tially imperative, others that it is essentially affirma- 
tive. Affirmation, derived from ad fir mare ^ denotes 
here the establishing of a connection between one idea 



40 THE CHARACTER 

and another. When we employ language, say the 
maintainers of its affirmative character, we declare or 
affirm that certain connexions exist in our minds 
between certain ideas. This view of the general 
character of language seems naturally connected with 
the theory, that the ultimate and exclusive object of 
language is the communication, or, rather, the ex- 
pression of thought. If that were the case, it would 
follow that language has fally discharged its office 
when it has given a faithful transcript of the succes- 
sions of thought, — when it has asserted the connexion 
of one idea with another, and thereby conveyed, it 
may be, new information to those to whom our speech 
is directed. It cannot, however, be maintained 
that the mere expression of thought is the ultimate 
and exclusive object of language. The contrary is 
indeed obvious. " The only motive," says an able 
writer, " for making a communication, i. e. for an ex- 
pression of the emotions, feelings, and actings of the 
mind by the use of language, must at first have been 
to obtain the gratification of some object for which 
the concurrence of others was deemed in some way 
necessary. We may, therefore, consider ourselves 
warranted in assuming the imperative verb, denoting 
in general our desire to accomplish an object, either 
by direct command if we conceive ourselves possessed 
with power to compel it, or by request and supplica- 
tion if we can only attain it by the permission of ano- 
ther, as constituting the nucleus or radical part of 
language, from which not only the other branches of 
the verb, but also the other classes of words, were 



OF LANGUAGE. 41 

gradually to be formed." Having thus assumed that 
the imperatives of verbs were the root of language, 
he proceeds to trace, very ingeniously it must be con- 
fessed, the march of the mind, in its gradual advance 
from these original elements to all the varieties, and 
forms, and modifications of words. 

In this opinion he is joined by Dr. Dewar. " The 
contrivances of language," says this able writer, 
" are founded on the known relations existing on 
different occasions between the speaker and the per- 
son addressed ; and are so adapted as to enable the 
former to avail himself of these relations for accom- 
plishing some definite purpose. An answer to the 
inquiry, ' what forms of sentences are likely to be 
earliest and simplest, ' is not obtained by determin- 
ing what connexions of thoughts are simplest in re- 
lation to the solitary mind of the individual, but by 
finding what those purposes are which he is likely 
soonest to have in view in employing the influence 
which language gives him over others. 

" The first objects that strike the attention of man 
in becoming acquainted with his fellows, are their 
motions. In other respects one man is not more 
interesting to another than any piece of dead un- 
changeable matter. He first observes voluntary 
motions of the most palpable kind, and then becomes 
acquainted with more delicate phenomona, such as 
the motions and changes of the human countenance, 
from which he infers the existence of thought in 
other persons, and judges of their nature." " The 
helplessness of man as an individual, and the support 



42 THE CHARACTER OF LANGUAGE. 

which he is capable of deriving from the services of 
his fellows, create perpetual occasions on which he 
wishes for their assistance ; and one of the earliest, 
as well as the most frequent objects of his wishes, 
is to influence them to perform those motions for 
which he finds occasion. These necessities are 
prior to the mere luxury of a mutual communication 
of knowledge and opinion. This fact/' he adds, 
" seems to point out imperative sentences as the 
earliest forms of language." And again : " In 
tracing the nature and origin of human language, 
it appears to us, on the whole, most strictly agree- 
able to the natural history of our species to consider 
all language as imperative, that is, as implying the 
imperative of a verb.'' 

In support of this opinion, Dr. Dewar proceeds to 
show, that even nouns are imperative, because, as 
he says, they imply an imperative, since, when we 
merely mention an object by making use of a noun, 
we in fact desire the person to think of it. He far- 
ther argues that all assertions — even the copula 
" is" itself — may be reduced to imperatives; inas- 
much as this copula is equivalent to the imperative 
of the verb believe-. " God is love ;" i. e. believe 
that he is so. 

The whole of these speculations have little in- 
terest in my view, since they clearly take for grant- 
ed the human origin of language. The entire 
speculation proceeds on the assumption that it is an 
invention which grew out of the necessities of men. 
The argument is, that, as they were first prompted 



GRAMMAR. 43 

to speak by the desire of obtaining what they need- 
ed, imperatives were the primitive elements of lan- 
guage. But, if God gave speech to xidam, he gave 
him, we may rest assured, more than imperatives. 
He would not leave him to rear the edifice of lan- 
guage on so scanty a foundation. All that was 
necessary for the purposes of full communication 
would be imparted ; and, therefore, the process that 
has been described, of nouns, and every other part 
of speech, growing out of this supposed radicle, is a 
mere imaginary process. The imperative has no 
more right to be regarded as the nucleus of language 
than nouns, or any other part of speech the know- 
ledge of which, and the use of which, were imparted 
to Adam at the same time with the imperative. 

GRAMMAR. 

The component parts of language are words ; and 
Grammar has an exclusive relation to words, not 
taking cognizance of ideas at all, except so far as 
may be necessary to secure the proper use of words. 
Grammar is, correctly speaking, the law of language^ 
or that system of rules and principles by which we 
are guided in the choice and modifications of words, 
so as to express our thoughts with accuracy and 
precision. It is generally defined, indeed, to be 
" the art of speaking or writing any language cor- 
rectly ;" and we do not undertake to afiirm that it 
will not admit of this definition. Analogy would, 
indeed, seem almost to require it. Logic may be 



44 A SCIENCE AND AN ART. 

said to be the art of reasoning; rhetoric the art of 
persuading ; — both definitions leading our thoughts 
rather to the practical facility and power which the 
rhetorician and logician have acquired in the appli- 
cation of the rules of their respective arts, than to 
the rules themselves. In exact harmony with these 
definitions, grammar may be said to be the art of 
using words so as to express our thoughts fully and 
correctly. We still think, however, that the term 
grammar is more properly employed to denote " the 
law of language ;" or the system of rules which guide 
to the correct expression of thought ; and that the 
practical facility of thus expressing ourselves should 
rather be considered as the knowledge of grammar, 
or the result of that knowledge, than grammar itself. 

Grammar may be considered as an art and as a 
science. As an art it famishes us with the rules 
by which speech or writing should be guided. As 
a science it investigates the principles which lead to 
the formation of the rules themselves. 

Grammar may be further regarded as particular, 
and general. Particular grammar exhibits the rules 
which guide speech and writing in particular lan- 
guages — rules, at all events those which are peculiar 
to each language — founded upon the practice of 
those persons "who have that degree of conspicuous- 
ness in society which entitles them to fix the stand- 
ard in each ;" for the law of language is posterior 
to the existence and X\ie^ practice of language. 

General or universal grammar examines and de- 
velops those great principles which must operate in 



PARTICULAR AND GENERAL. 45 

the formation of all languages, which constitute the 
common and essential properties of all particular 
grammars, and give to them that mutual resem- 
blance which must exist among all things arranged 
in the same class, thoagh each individual retains its 
peculiar and distinguishing properties. Thus, when 
adjectives have been admitted into any language — 
for adjectives are not essential to language — there 
is a foundation in nature for the change which they 
are made, for the most part, to undergo to indicate 
degrees of comparison. All languages, accordingly, 
claiming any thing like peifection, must have some 
mode of indicating the different degrees in which 
the same property may be possessed by various 
things. But there is no foundation in nature for 
varying the termination of the adjective, as in the 
Latin language, to indicate the number or gender or 
case of the noun to which it belongs : and, accord- 
ingly, this variation is not a common property, but 
forms a distinct feature of certain grammars only. 

THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SIGNS OF LANGUAGE, 
AND THE CHANGES TO WHICH THEY ARE SUBJECT. 

The signs which constitute language, or the words 
of which it consists, are exceedingly numerous ; yet 
they are capable of classification, ^. e. of being arrang- 
ed in a few general divisions, in consequence of the 
resemblances and differences which we are able to 
recognize in their meaning. There is nothing in 
the nature of the case to exempt them from the 



46 MODES OF CLASSIFYING, ETC. 

process which has been instituted in regard to the 
objects of science generally — the process of placing 
them, mentally at least, in groups, forming what we 
call species, and genera. All the words of language 
have been, accordingly, arranged in classes ; to 
which classes we give the name of parts of speech, 
though, as all classification is, to a great degree, 
arbitrary, (the books of a library, for instance, may 
be divided into folios, quartos, octavos, or French, 
English, or classical, philosophical, &c.) we find, as 
it might have been expected, much diversity among 
grammarians in reference to the principles of classi- 
fication, and even with respect to the number of 
parts of speech which they allow. Several parts of 
speech, in general opinion at least, have been by 
some individuals classed together under a more com- 
prehensive head, so as to make the divisions compa- 
ratively few. 

This generalizing process has been carried to the 
greatest extent by the late celebrated Home Tooke. 
He reduces all the parts of speech to two, the Noun, 
and the Verb. Both, he states, are signs of ideas. 
The verb is the " quod loquimur," the noun the '^ de 
qu 0,' ' — what we say, and of what we affirm it. T hus, 
in the example, " The bird flies," " flies" is the "quod 
loquimur," "bird" the " de quo." On this account 
every verb must, as he contends, imply a noun ; since 
every assertion is made concerning some thing, or 
being ; the action of flying, for instance, supposes 
something that flies. According to the classification 
of Mr. Tooke, all those parts of speech which assist 



HORNE TOOKE's, HARRIS's. 47 

in the expression of onr affirmations, which connect 
things, — whether they be participles, or adverbs, 
whether conjunctive or restrictive particles — be- 
long to the verbal class ; while things, and the qual- 
ities of things, constitute the class of nouns. 

The late Mr. Harris, in his Hermes, or treatise 
upon General Grammar, — a work of great authority 
formerly, though distinguished more, perhaps, by its 
learning than by its philosophical spirit, sets out with 
a binary division of the signs of language very simi- 
lar in appearance to that of Mr. Tooke. " All words," 
he tells us, "are significant by themselves, or by rela- 
tion, ^. e. their connexion with some significant word. 
Words, which are significant by themselves, denote 
either substances, or attributes. Words, w^hich are 
significant by relation, gain their meaning by a con- 
nexion with one word only, or with more than one 
In the former case they are definitives ; in the lat- 
ter connectives ; so that in one or other of the four 
classes, substantives, attributives, definitives, or 
connectives, all words whatever may be included. 
If any of these names," he adds, "seem new and un- 
usual, we may introduce others more usual by calling 
the substantives nouns, the attributives verbs, the 
definitives articles, and the connectives conjunctions." 

Professor Hurwitz of the London University sug- 
gests, in his Hebrew Grammar — a work of great 
merit and ability, from its development of many of 
the essential principles of language, together with 
its faithful and luminous statement of the particular 



48 HURWITZ. 

rules of the Hebrew language — tlie following as the 
most philosophical classification of words. 

1st, Such as indicate the objects of thought, or the 
subjects of discourse, comprehending the names of 
things or beings with which we become acquainted 
by perception and consciousness. 

2nd, Such as serve to express whatever is af- 
firmed respecting the objects of contemplation, ^. e. 
verbs, or words denoting action, passion, being, &c. 

S?'d, Such as serve to qualify or particularize 
either the subject or the predicate when they happen 
to be general terms. This class includes adverbs, 
adjectives and definitives. 

4th, Such as serve to indicate the relations of 
things or words, in which the expression of general 
relations has superseded or diverted the attention 
of the mind from their primary particular meaning. 
This class comprehends prepositions and conjunc- 
tions. 

5fk, Such as indicate particular affections or emo- 
tions, as joy, sorrow, &c. He admits at the same 
time that the third and fourth classes may be re- 
solved into the noun and the verb, which two alone, 
he adds, are the most essential parts of speech. 

These different modes of dividing the parts of 
speech have been mentioned chiefly on account of 
the celebrity of their respective advocates; since I 
cannot but agree in opinion with a late able writer, 
" that any attempt to establish a different classifi- 
cation of the parts of speech from that which is 
commonly received will be found of little utility 



NOUN. 49 

either in speculation or practice." We may, there- 
fore, proceed to a more particular consideration of 
the different parts of speech. 

In most languages, probably in all cultivated 
languages, grammarians admit the following parts 
of speech : noun, pronoun, verb, participle, adverb, 
preposition, and conjunction. The Latin and Eng- 
lish grammarians classify the interjection as a dis- 
tinct part of speech ; and, in the Greek and English 
tongues, the article is added to the list. The Eng- 
lish grammar allows the following, viz. the noun, 
article, adjective, pronoun, verb, participle, adverb, 
preposition, conjunction, and interjection, to the se- 
parate consideration of which we now proceed. 

NOUN. 

The word itself is a contraction of nomen, a name ; 
and is used, accordingly, to denote that class of signs 
by which things or ideas are designated. In regard 
to the names of things and of qualities^ it should be 
noted, that different modes of classification have 
been adopted. By some the names of the latter, 
even in the concrete state, ^. e. when thought of in 
connexion with the substances in which they are 
popularly said to inhere, have been placed in the 
class of nouns. Others arrange them as a distinct 
class, which they designate the adjective ; while th« 
names of substances only are classified as nouns. 

The propriety of the classification we adopt ob- 
viously depends upon the nature of substances and 



50 NOUN. 

qualities. If tlie quality were a thing, or entity — 
as many affirm — distinct from the substance in 
which it is found, the name of the quality would 
manifestly be not less a noun than the name of the 
substance itself. If, on the other hand, the doctrine 
of a material substratum, standing under and giving 
necessary support to essentially dependent qualities, 
be a vulgar error, incapable of proof, the mere as- 
sumption of an excessively inquisitive philosophy; 
(all of which is distinctly affirmed by one of the best 
modern writers on general grammar ;) if it be far- 
ther true, as the same writer asserts, that nothing 
exists but qualities ; — that what we call substances 
are only definite assemblages of sensible qualities, 
which, being found constantly united in nature, are 
strongly associated together in our minds ; — if all 
this were fact, and not mere assertion, it would fol- 
low that nouns, as we now call them, should not 
stand as a separate class of words, but be placed in 
the class of adjectives. It is scarcely possible, how- 
ever, to conceive of an absurdity greater than that 
which is involved in the preceding statements of Dr. 
Dewar — even though we should admit that the doc- 
trine commonly maintained concerning the -sub- 
stratum does not very correctly express the facts 
of the case ; for, if a substratum be denied for the 
qualities of matter, we must, to maintain consis- 
tency, deny a substratum for the properties and 
affections of mind : or, in other words, maintain that 
the soul is nothing more than a continuous train of 
thought, and feeling; (and in that case the inquiry 



PARTICULAR NOUNS. 51 

could not fail to arise, " What is God ? ") a senti- 
ment which constitutes the very essence of the in- 
fidel philosophy. The true state of the case is the 
very reverse of what is maintained by Dr. Dewar, 
viz. that " the substances in nature are every thing 
that has a real existence in nature." What we call 
the quality is not, as is too commonly imagined, 
something in the substance, distinct from it, and 
capable of being withdrawn from it. The quality 
or the property is the substance formed capable of 
producing a certain effect upon us, or other beings 
and things with which it comes into contact. It 
is, then, in harmony with the true principles of phi- 
losophy to arrange the noun and adjective in two 
classes, employing the noun to denote the substra- 
tum itself — to adopt the old phraseology — i. e. 
the substance or thing considered apart from the 
effects it is capable of producing and undergoing ; 
and the adjective to express the quality, i. e. the 
substance considered in relation to the effects it un- 
dergoes and produces. 

KINDS OF NOUNS. 

Of nouns there are various kinds ; it is proposed, 
however, in this treatise, to direct the consideration 
of the reader to those only wdth the nature of which 
it is most important for him to obtain a correct 
acquaintance. Nouns, then, we observe, are parti- 
cular or general ; concrete or abstract. 

Particular nouns^ or, as they are more familiarly 

E 3 



52 GENERAL NOUNS. 

called, proper names, are those which belong, or are 
applicable, to individuals only ; as London, Thames, 
Milton, &c. 

General nouns ^ commonly denominated general 
terms, and appellatives, are such as are applied to 
a plurality of objects possessing a common resem- 
blance. They are, in short, the names of species 
and genera; i. e. of classes of objects; for a species 
is, strictly speaking, a class formed of individuals ; 
and a genus a class of classes, or a class formed of 
classes. There can be no doubt that the precise 
difference between species and genus is that which 
has just been stated, viz. that the former contains 
individuals ; and the latter classes. In the habi- 
tual use of the term species and genus this nice 
distinction in their meaning is not, however, pre- 
served. A class is considered, and spoken of, as 
both a species and genus. Yet a different view is, 
and must be, taken of the class when it is thus 
made to bear different names. When we speak of 
it as a genus, we look below it, or think of it as con- 
taining other classes; when we represent it as a 
species, we look above it, or regard it as contained 
in a more comprehensive class: thus ^^iron ore is 
the genus of loadstone, — but a species of mineral." 

It deserves to be especially observed that general 
nouns, or the names of classes, answer the same 
purpose in regard to the class, that a proper name 
does in regard to the individual. The word Buce- 
phalus is the name of an individual animal, and 
serves to distinguish it from ail others which belong 



THEIR ORIGIN. 53 

to the same class. The word horse is the name of 
a class of animals, and serves to distinguish that 
class from all other classes. There is not, then, in 
one point of view at least, so great a distinction 
between general and particular nouns as is usually 
imagined. Both are in on3 sense proper names ; 
the former being the proper name of the individual ; 
the latter the proper name of the class. Bucephalus 
distinguishes Alexander's horse from all other horses ; 
horse distinguishes that class of animals from all 
other classes of animals. 

Of the origin of general nouns or terms different 
accounts have been given. Some consider them 
the offspring of design, under the stimulus of neces- 
sity. When human knowledge had become some- 
what extended, it was found impossible, it has been 
supposed, to conduct language by proper names 
alone. Had such names been given to every tree, 
and plant, and animal, and object of every kind, 
with which men became successively acquainted, 
they could not have found a place in the most te- 
nacious memory. The contrivance, therefore, of 
arranging objects in classes was, it is conceived, 
resorted to : so that, by giving names to the classes, 
proper names would be rendered unnecessary, while 
the nouns of the language being few, would be 
readily acquired and easily remembered. 

Others, again, suppose that they originated in 
what they affirm to be the native tendency of the 
mind to give the same name to objects which nearly 
resemble each other. Thus a very young child is 



54 THEIR ORIGIN. 

disposed to call every man " papa." Of the opera- 
tion of this supposed principle Adam Smith has 
given the following beantifal, though, it must be 
admitted, fanciful illustration. '' The assignation of 
particular names to denote particular objects, i. e. 
the institution of substantive nouns, would probably 
be one of the first steps towards the formation of 
language. The particular cave which sheltered an 
individual from the weather, — the particular tree 
whose fruit relieved his hunger, — the particular 
fountain whose waters allayed his thirst, would first 
be denominated by the words, cave, tree, fountain, 
or by whatever appellatives'' (names, they would 
not as yet be appellatives) "he might think proper 
to mark them. Afterwards when more enlarged ex- 
perience had led him to observe, and his necessary 
occasions obliged him to make mention of other 
caves and other trees, and other fountains, he would 
naturally bestow upon each of those new objects the 
same name by which he had been accustomed to 
express the similar object he was first acquainted 
with. And thus those words, originally the proper 
names of individuals, would insensibly become the 
common names of a multitude." 

The statements of Dr. Brown do not perhaps 
radically differ from those of Adam Smith. They 
are in substance as follows. The great Creator of 
the mind has given to us the power of perceiving 
the qualities or properties of each object of sense 
which presents itself This perception of individual 
properties is embodied in the proper name of each 



DIFFICULTY OF THE PERIPATETICS. 55 

object, and expressed by it. The same great Being 
has bestowed upon us the additional power of recog- 
nising in surrounding objects the points in which 
they resemble each other. This notion of resem- 
blance is embodied in the general term, or, as we 
have ventured to call it, the proper name of the 
class. 

Few things can be more manifest than that this 
last writer has correctly exhibited the manner in 
which general ideas now arise, and new general terms 
are now formed. Yet to a Christian mind the whole 
of the preceding statements — if they are intended to 
lead us back to the actual origin of the first general 
terms — (as Dr. Smith's unquestionably are) must be 
very unsatisfactory ; proceeding, as they evidently do, 
on the assumption that language is altogether of 
human origin ; since if it be, as we think it was, of 
Divine origin, how can there exist a doubt that gene- 
ral as well as proper names were communicated by 
God to the father of the human family. 

Under the reign of the old Peripatetic philosophy 
a great difficulty (to which a brief reference will be 
made for the sake of more fully illustrating the sub- 
ject) surrounded the whole subject of general ideas, 
and the consequent formation of general terms — 
from which juster and simpler views of mental science 
have happily delivered us. This difficulty arose out 
of the old and now exploded system of perception by 
images. According to that theory the objects which 
the mind contemplates in perception are not any 
thing external to the mind, but something in contact 



56 DIFFICULTY EXPERIENCED BY 

with it. The whole doctrine was built upon the asser- 
tion, "Nothing can act where it is not/' then received 
as an axiomatical truth, since it necessarily followed 
from this doctrine that external objects, not being 
present to the mind, cannot act upon it, or that their 
action must be carried on through some medium. It 
was, accordingly, conceived that what they called 
species, ideas, or images of external objects, were 
thrown off by those objects, — that they were trans- 
mitted to the brain through the organs of sense ; — 
and further, that they communicated an impression of 
themselves to the brain, or the mind, as wax receives 
the impression of the seal, without the substance of 
the sea]. These ideas or images of external objects 
were, it was supposed, the things contemplated by 
the mind in perception. 

Now it would be out of place to dwell here upon 
the absurdity of supposing that matter, or supposed 
images of material objects, could make any such im- 
pression upon an immaterial essence like the spirit, 
as is necessarily supposed in the preceding account 
of the Peripatetic theory. But the reader is espe- 
cially requested to observe the impossibility of main- 
taining the existence of general ideas — and, conse- 
quently, of accounting for the origin of general terms 
in connection with this theory. Ideas were, in the 
creed of the Peripatetics, images^ images of course of 
existing objects, or they could not have been «V7Z«^^5. 
But all existing objects are particular obj ects. There 
are classes of objects in the mind, but not in nature. 
Nowhere is there to be found a general man, or a 



THE PERIPATETICS- 57 

general tree^ or a general object of any kind ; i. e. an 
individual destitute- of infividual properties, (for in 
that case he would.,sic)t be an individual,) and en- 
dowed only with common ones. Now, as every ob- 
ject of perception is aii individual object, there can 
of course, on this theory, be no general ideas, ^. e, 
images ; since if there were these general ideas, ^. e. 
images, they would be images of no existing objects; 
in other words, they would not be images at all. At 
all events, the advocates of the old theory of percep- 
tion were thrown upon the following dilemma. Since 
there is no perception, as they conceived, but by 
images, they were constrained to admit either that 
there are universal images, ^. e. as we have seen, 
images of nothing ; or that there exist no general 
ideas : and the philosophers of ancient days rang- 
ed themselves either with the Realists, or the 
Nominalists — as the contending parties were called — 
just as it happened to strike them that less absurdity 
attached itself to the notion of images without ob- 
jects, or words without ideas. 

In the present advanced state of mental science no 
one conceives of an idea as an image or picture of 
an external object — proceeding from that object to 
an organ of sense — making its way through the 
organ to the brain — coming there into contact with 
the mind — and impressing upon it an image of the 
external object. Such notions as these, if they 
could be entertained by any in the present day, 
w^ould be justly regarded as the relics of a bar- 
barous age. An idea of any object, according to the 



58 GENERAL IDEAS. 

present use of the term, is the notion or conception 
which the mind forms of that object. And, since 
the mind has been constituted to perceive not merely 
the individual and distinguishing qualities of objects, 
but to recognize their general and resembling pro- 
perties, it is surely not more wonderful that terms 
should be invented to denote the various respects 
in which surrounding objects are seen to resemble 
each other, than that names should be given to the 
objects themselves. 

General ideas, then, are nothing more than the 
notions we form of those common properties in which 
two or more individual beings or things participate.* 
They are not indebted for their existence to general 
terms, as has been most falsely and unphilosophically 
imagined, but are the parents of general terms ; 
and in this sentiment I am happy to be corroborated 
by so high an authority as that of Dr. H. Dewar. 
" With regard to the opinion of those," says this able 
writer, " who allow the existence of general ideas, 
yet maintain that they owe that existence to the 
formation of general terms, it seems to us completely 
erroneous. A term is invented for the purpose of 
expressing an idea. The recognizance of a resem- 
blance among a plurality of individuals is the foun- 
dation of a general idea ; and this always exists 
before any general term is invented, and before any 

* For more extended remarks on this subject, Vide 
Elements of Mental and Moral Science^ by the Author, 
pp. 194—208, 2nd edition. 



CONCRETE NOUNS. 59 

term which was formerly a^ proper name receives a 
generic application." * 

06/NcEETE AND ABSTRACT NOUNS. 

The term concrete is derived from the Latin 
words '' con" and '' cretus/' — grown together, and is, 
accordingly, fitly used to designate nouns denoting 
things in which the substance and the quality are 
found in a state of union. It is, indeed, more com- 
monly used by grammarians to express the noun 
adjective according to their nomenclature ; and 
then it is regarded as the name of the quality con- 
sidered as in a state of union with some particular 
suhstance. Thus " good" would be represented by 
them as the concrete, and " goodness" as the abstract 
noun. There is no reason, however, why the desig- 
nation, concrete noun, should not be applied to those 
nouns substantive, as they have been called, which 
represent the substance and the quality in combina- 
tion. 

And this, in truth, is the case \Adth almost all 
nouns. We never, indeed, see substances stripped 
of their qualities. The substratum of matter is in- 
visible. We can form, indeed, no conception of the 
essence of matter ; of its properties alone — i. e. of the 
different w^ays in which matter affects us — are we 
cognizant. And, having no ideas of the bare and 
naked substrata of objects, we have, of course, no 
names by which to designate them, because the 

* Vide Edinburgh Encyclopcedia^ article Grammar. 



60 ABSTRACT NOUNS. 

process of naming cani^ot go beyond thought. Our 
nouns must, therefore, denote, for the most part, 
neither the essence, nor the Equalities, of matter 
considered separately, but the latter in "Hnion with, 
or supported by, their invisible substrata ; ^. e. they 
must be concrete nouns. Of this kind are man, 
horse, dog, house, chair, table, &c. &c. 

The reader must, however, be carefal to observe 
that, though we cannot conceive of matter apart from 
its properties, we can and do conceive of the latter 
apart from the former. This has been regarded by 
many as a very anomalous fact, yet it is not really 
such. We have no conceptions of what matter is 
in itself; all our conceptions relate to the effects it 
produces upon us, or other beings or things ; i, e, 
its qualities or properties. How then is it wonder- 
ful that these effects should become distinct objects 
of thought, while the matter which affects — and 
which is the only existing thing — is not thought of, 
simply because it cannot be thought of, at all ! 
When these properties are thus separately or exclu- 
sively thought of, they become, in our conceptions, 
real and separate entities, capable of standing alone, 
and of bearing qualities of which they — in the place 
of real substrata — constitute the support. Thus we 
say, perfect whiteness, great wisdom, exuberant 
goodness; where the qualities whiteness, wisdom, 
and goodness, are exhibited as things, clothed with 
the other qualities specified. The name of the qua- 
lity, when thus conceived of as a thing, is of course 
a noun ; and it is called an abstract noun, because it 



ABSTRACT NOUNS. 61 

is the result of a mental process to which the name 
of abstraction has been given ; a process which has 
been supposed to consist in a separation or abstrac- 
tion of the quality from the substance in which it 
inheres — though it is not an actual separation. We 
cannot really take the quality we call white from 
the egg in w^hich it inheres ; nor the quality denom- 
inated honest from the good man who possesses it : 
but we can mentally withdraw or abstract them, it 
is said, from the egg and the man. Now, without at- 
tempting to disturb phraseology which length of use 
has rendered somewhat unyielding, it will be useful 
to remember, that this mental abstraction is neither 
more nor less than thinking of these specific quali- 
ties of the egg and the man, and not thinking either 
of the latter, or any other qualities possessed by 
them. To think of qualities apart from substances, 
or of one quality apart from other qualities, does not 
appear to involve more difficulty than to think of 
one man in a crowd, apart from the crowd. If a 
difficulty should present itself to any one here, 
founded on the operation of the great principle of 
association, which might be thought to bind the 
cluster of qualities which meet in the egg so firmly 
together, as to prevent one being thought of without 
immediately introducing the other, it may be admit- 
ted that in general this is the case ; yet it is not ne- 
cessarily so. Many circumstances might fix our 
thoughts, for instance, upon the eyes of our friend, while 
the nose and mouth — -though united by association with 
the former feature — might at the moment be disre- 



62 HOW FORMED. 

garded. And it may be further observed^ that, when 
the notions of whiteness and of honesty have been 
formed in the manner in which abstract notions, as 
they are called, are at least generally formed, (viz. 
by observing a number of objects that agree only 
in possessing respectively the qualities specified, 
so as to be struck with their resemblance in these 
respects,) the notions of whiteness and of honesty may 
easily arise without any accompanying conception of 
the objects in which they inhere. 

Abstract nouns are generally formed from ad- 
jectives, and are almost invariably longer, in con- 
sequence of the termination of the original words 
being made to undergo some alteration, or addition ; 
thus from grateful, we obtain gratitude ; from white, 
whiteness ; from red, redness, &c. This is not al- 
together an accidental circumstance, in which case it 
would deserve little or no notice in a treatise on 
general grammar. It obviously results from the facts, 
that the quality was first observed in connexion 
with some object, — that the separate consideration 
of the quality was of a later date, — and that, to de- 
note it, it was obviously the easier and more natural 
method to alter, or add something to, the term which 
expressed the quality in the concrete state, than to 
adopt a new term altogether. Different languages 
have fixed upon different terminations to effect this 
object; thus from the Latin magnus, we have magni- 
tudo in Latin, and magnitude in English. 



ACCIDENTS OF NOUNS. 63 



. THE ACCIDENTS OF NOUNS. 

To enable words to represent, as accurately as 
possible, the objects they denote, they must be sus- 
ceptible of various changes corresponding with and 
adapted and designed to express, the various acci- 
dents of the objects themselves. Thus the subject 
of our thoughts may be one being or thing, or more 
than one. It may be a male, or a female, or neither 
the one nor the other, or both. It may sustain certain 
relations to other beings or things, and these rela- 
tions may be not merely diverse but mutable. These 
are what we call accidents of things or objects, 
because they may or may not exist while the essen- 
tial properties of the things or objects remain. 
Language must, accordingly, have some mode of 
expressing these accidental properties, or it would 
be essentially defective. There exist, therefore, in 
all languages worthy of the name, certain contri- 
vances to effect this object ; and these contrivances — 
to adopt the most generalized form of expression — 
are what we call the accidents of nouns or of words. 
We shall first consider 

THE ACCIDENT OF NUMBER 

Of number as it respects words — for number as it 
respects things is radically different, and grammar 
has an exclusive reference to words — many defini- 
tions have been given, none of which seem perfectly 



64 NUMBER. 

satisfactory. The common grammars tell us " that 
it is the consideration of an object as one or more;" 
a definition which fails to describe aright either 
what number is in the thing or object, or in the 
word. In neither case is it the consideration of an 
object ; and, if it were, how can an object be con- 
sidered as more than one ? Dr. Dewar defines num- 
bers '^ as a sign for representing the exemplification 
of a general idea in more than one individual." 
This sign^ as it would appear, can be nothing else 
than the plural form which the noun assumes ; but, 
if so, how can there be a singular number ? The 
Britannica represents it, more correctly, "as a varia- 
tion in the form of the noun to denote unity, and 
plurality ?" Is it not rather the particular form 
which the noun assumes to accomplish this object, 
rather than, as the last writer states, a variation in 
the form ? We have the singular and the plural 
number. What can number, in both instances, be, 
but the particular form of the noun intended to inti- 
mate that the object designated by it is, in the first 
place, oncy and, in the second, more than one ? Greek 
and Hebrew nouns have also a dual number to 
denote two individuals. It is not, however, essen- 
tial to language, since very few languages possess 
it ; nor is it easy to assign a sufficient reason for 
the adoption of a sign to denote this specific case of 
plurality — two rather than three, or four ; since it 
may fairly be doubted whether two individuals of a 
class are more frequently seen associated in nature 
than any other number. If a conjecture might be 



NUMBEB. 65 

hazarded on this point, it would be that the circum- 
stance of the creation of men and animals in pairs 
gave occasion to the dual number. 

But, though number is a natural accident of 
nouns, all nouns are not capable of undergoing that 
change of form in which it is stated by the Britannica 
to consist. "It can only he essential^' says one 
writer, " to those which denote genera, and species." 
^^It can only apply to general terms,'' adds another. 
The real meaning of these somewhat obscure phrases 
is, that proper names can only assume one of the two 
or three forms in which common terms present 
themselves, viz. the singular form. Thus the dis- 
tinctive term of the class of animals to which we 
belong appears in the form man, or men; but Mil- 
ton can never become Miltons, "because there is 
but one Milton while there are many men." 

To comprehend this fully the reader must recollect 
the explanation that was given (vide p. 52) of pro- 
per names, and general terms ; — that the former de- 
note particular and distinguishing as well as general 
properties ; while the latter are indicative of general 
properties only. The distinguishing properties can 
of course meet only in one individual (or they could 
not be distinguishing) ; the common properties may 
meet in many individuals. As the result of this, the 
name of the individual, comprehending the distin- 
guishing properties, can stand only in the singular 
form; the name of the class, i, e. of the common pro- 
perties, may assume the plural form. " There may 
be many men," says Dr. Dewar (and hence the term 

F 



66 NUMBER. 

admits of the plural as well as the singular form), 
" because the general idea expressed by man may be 
exemplified in more than one ; but there is but one 
Socrates, because the idea expressed by that word, 
being particular, not general, does not accord with 
any other man. If at any time a proper name be- 
comes susceptible of plurality — as when we speak of 
the twelve Caesars, or the seven Jameses — it ceases 
to be a proper name, i. e. to denote the distinguish- 
ing qualities of either of them ; it becomes the name 
of a small class having the name James or Ceesar as 
the one common property." 

A few nouns exist which, in respect to number, bear 
somewhat of an anomalous character. They are such 
as denote objects " not permanently portioned into 
individuals," so that they are not conceived of either 
as one, or more than one. Of this kind are the 
words gold, silver, iron, brass, &c. The plural form 
is not given to them, since, though there may be 
much or little gold, there cannot be many or few golds. 
Yet, as it is impossible to prefix to them the indefinite 
article, or to say a gold, it is, perhaps, scarcely 
right to represent them as being of the singular 
number. 

Various methods may of course be adopted to ex- 
press unity and plurality ; a difference may be made 
in the mode of spelling the singular and plural form ; 
the latter form may add something to the former, 
or number may be indicated by separate words. Of 
this diversity general grammar takes no cognizance. 



MODES OF FORMING IT. 67 

unless, indeed, to ascertain if possible the manner in 
which it originated. 

It is the opinion of Home Tooke that all termina- 
tions, and of course those which indicate number, 
were originally separate words, which were soon 
abbreviated, and conjoined with the principal words, 
so as to form with them one word. The addition of 
a term of this sort is the mode of expressing plu- 
rality in the Bengalese language. " Projaa" signi- 
fies a peasant, "lok," people; and "projaa lok" 
signifies peasants. The writer of the article Gram- 
mar in Hees's Cyclopedia derives the plural sign of 
the Chaldaic, Arabic, and Persian, as well as of the 
Greek, Latin, and most of the modern languages of 
Europe, from a word in the Hebrew language, viz. 
pan signifying a multitude. He supposes that 
this word was at first subjoined to the singular 
word, and that afterwards, for the sake of brevity, 
the Hebrews designated plurality by retaining only 
one of the letters, viz. o ; the Chaldeans, Arabians, 
and others, by retaining the \, Thus the full form 
of the plural was in Hebrew im ; in Chaldean, in ; 
in Arabic, oon ; and in the Persian, aan. This 
theory further supposes the letters 7i and s to have 
had the same origin. The Chaldean " in" is, 
therefore, supposed to have become " es" in the 
formation of many Greek and Latin plurals. From 
the same source they would wish to derive the ^, 
which forms the plural terminations in the English 
and French, while the Italian language is consider- 
ed as following in all nouns the analogy of the second 

F 2 



68 NUMBER. 

declension of the Latin by adopting the terminating 
vowel " i". The same writers might have added, as 
it has been very justly observed, that this " i" of 
the Latin and Italian is the vowel letter of the He- 
brew plural " im/' and that it was natural that a 
language derived from the Hebrew should adopt this 
plural sign. 

Dr. Dewar appears to have little confidence in 
this whole style of etymology ; and, with regard to 
the English plural, avows his very decided opinion 
that it is to be traced to an origin later than that 
now mentioned. He states that the "s" which 
now terminates the plural was originally " is," and 
that the same syllable was used to express the 
genitive case. Thus towns, the plural of town, was 
at first townis ; father's, the genitive of father, was 
fatheris or faderis. He supposes, further, that this 
syllable originally expressed the general circum- 
stance of relation betwixt the idea denoted by the 
noun to which it was attached, and some other ; and 
that the occasions of discourse were trusted to for 
the suggestion of the particular relation. A desire 
of improving the language, amidst the multiplicity 
of relative ideas which arose from intellectual im- 
provement, led, he thinks, our ancestors to appro- 
priate one termination to one subdivision of the 
general meaning, as well as to produce a still greater 
particularity by varying the modes of writing the 
termination. 



GENDER. 



GENDER. 



69 



Besides number, another characteristic feature of 
the beings and things around us, is that of sex. 
Language must, accordingly, employ some method 
of intimating the sex of the object of which the 
word is a sign; and the divers forms or termina- 
tions which nouns are made to assume to effect this 
purpose is what we mean by the genders of words. 
The number of these forms or terminations should 
be decided by the actual differences in this point of 
view which exist in nature. Now everything which 
exists in nature is " either male or female, or both 
male and female, or neither one nor the other." 
Thus, if it should be thought that the existence of 
hermaphrodites is doubtfd, yet it will follow that 
language must have some mode of indicating objects 
which, in reference to gender, are masculine, or 
feminine, or neuter, or that it must be essentially 
defective. And in strict propriety, language should 
give that gender to words which nature has given 
to the objects which they denote; i, e, put every 
noun expressing a male animal in the masculine 
gender ; every name of a female animal in the femi- 
nine gender ; and every name of an inanimate ob- 
ject in the neuter gender. In conformity with this 
correct and important general rule, " all the names 
of animals should have a gender because the ani- 
mals themselves have sex." It has, however, been 
well observed, that " the sex of all is not equally ob- 



70 aENDER. 

vious nor equally worthy of attention ; and that, 
consequently, the same name is applied in some 
languages to all the species, and that name is said 
to be of common gender. On this account diminu- 
tive insects, though they are doubtless male or 
female, seem to be considered in the English lan- 
guage as if they were really creeping things. No 
man speaking of a worm would say he or she creeps, 
but it creeps upon the ground." 

The English language follows, with few excep- 
tions, the order of nature ; and in this point of view 
it differs from most. In the earliest languages there 
was no distinction of gender further than into mas- 
culine and feminine. This has been ascribed by 
some to a vividness of imagination, which generally 
prevails in the infancy of society, leading its pos- 
sessors to conceive of every thing around them as 
pervaded by the principle of life. Some modern 
languages retain this peculiarity of the ancient lan- 
guages. In the French, Italian, and Spanish, there 
is no neuter form ; every object has a name which 
is either masculine or femxinine. Our language, by 
following the order of nature, in reference to gender, 
possesses an advantage over them in the poetical 
and rhetorical style ; for, when nouns naturally 
neuter are converted into the masculine and femi- 
nine, the personification is more distinctly and pro- 
minently marked. 

What are the analogical principles, if any, under 
the guidance of which the masculine or feminine 
gender has been given to the names of inanimate 



GENDER. 71 

objects, it is difficult or impossible to state. It has 
been thought, indeed, that, when an object was re- 
garded as possessing masculine properties — such as 
strength, active energy, communication, &c. — the 
name of the object was, on that account, invested 
with the masculine form or gender : and, on the con- 
trary, that, when feminine qualities — such as beauty, 
reception, &c. — ^were ascribed to it, its name was 
made to assume the feminine gender. Many facts, 
however, seem to render it impossible to accept of 
this as a general explanation. '' Different genders," 
it is alleged, " are ascribed to the names of the same 
things in different languages, and, what is more per- 
plexing still, to different names of the same object 
in the same language." It might possibly be said, 
in reply to the first part of the objection, that, as 
objects possess different qualities, the attention of 
different nations may not be arrested by the same 
quality in the same object ; and that, consequently, 
the gender of the names employed to designate it 
would be different. The sun is adorned by beauty 
as well as strength. The former might strike the 
imagination of one country — the latter the fancy of 
another. In the language of the first, the name of 
the sun would be feminine, in that of the last, mas- 
culine. But what shall we say to the latter part of 
the objection ? Perhaps in some languages the fixing 
upon a specific termination to indicate the gender 
of objects might be subsequent to the giving of names 
to the objects themselves; so that the application 
of the principle, when it came to be applied to the 



72 GENDER. 

existing nouns of the language^ might occasion some 
of the anomalies which have so greatly perplexed 
grammarians. 

That, in the few instances in which the masculine 
or feminine gender has been given, in our language, 
to the names of inanimate objects, analogical prin- 
ciples have governed practice, is not to be doubted. 
Dr. Dewar says, it " only partakes of the nature of 
poetical personification ;" but in all personifications 
the writer or speaker clothes an object with that 
particular sex to w^hich its qualities are conceived to 
bear the greatest resemblance. 

The method of distinguishing gender admits of 
considerable variety. It may be effected by a change 
of the word, or a change of the termination merely, 
and it does not appear that any general rule has 
guided the practice of our language in this respect. It 
might have appeared, a^^riori^ probable that, in those 
species of animals in which the distinction between 
the male and the female is very strongly marked by 
nature, language would mark it w^ith equal distinct- 
ness by selecting separate w^ords to denote the male 
and the female. This is accordingly done in some 
cases, both in English and in other languages. Thus 
we say, husband, w^ife, king, queen, &c; and yet — so 
anomalous is the practice in this respect — that other 
names of the very same objects — though indicating 
different relations — form the feminine by prefixing 
a syllable to the masculine, or altering the ter- 
mination ; as, man, woman, emperor, empress, &c. 



CASE. 



73 



The specific mode of distinguishing gender does not 
belong to the department of general grammar. 

It may be well, before proceeding to another sub- 
ject, to beg the reader again to observe, that ^^both 
number and gender appertain to words because they 
appertain to things; that is to say, because sub- 
stances are one or many, and have sex or no sex, 
substantives have number, and are masculine, femi- 
nine, or neuter. There is, however, this difference 
betw^een the two attributes. Number, as we have 
seen, descends no lower than to the last rank of spe- 
cies : gender stops not here, but descends to every 
individual, however diversified." 



CASE. 

This accident of words properly and strictly denotes 
"certain changes of termination which they are 
made to undergo for the purpose of denoting annexa- 
tion,'' 2. e. the addition of certain individual and dis- 
tinguishing properties, of a peculiar description, to 
those common qualities of which only the words them- 
selves are indicative. In explanation of this state- 
ment, it must be observed, that most nouns are the 
names not of individuals, but of classes of objects, 
called, as we have seen, genera and species. These 
(Classes are formed, mentally at least, when, on ob- 
serving a number of individuals, we recognize cer- 
tain points in which they resemble each other. Thus 
on contemplating a multitude of beings differing in 
size, complexion, &c., we observe, it may be, that all 



74 



CASE. 



possess reason. The common participation of this 
quality constitutes a bond of union among them, and 
the class man is formed in the mind. The term by 
which we designate the general notion which has 
thus arisen in the mind is, as we have seen, the pro- 
per name of the class, and is, accordingly, incapable 
of doing more than of directing our thoughts to the 
class. If we wish at any time to fix attention upon 
a particular individual of that class, we must annex 
to the word which denotes the general qualities some 
sign significant of individual properties, or of those 
properties which make him an individual, and distin- 
guish him from all others. Thus to particularize the 
word horse, for instance, ^. e, to use it so as that it 
shall bring a particular horse to our thoughts, we 
must annex to that word the sign of some particular 
quality which that individual alone is known to pos- 
sess, as whiteness, for instance ; and in the same 
general way must we proceed in other cases. 

Among the number of particular in opposition to 
general properties, are the specific relations sus- 
tained by different individuals. Thus the phrase, 
" a man of God was there,'' exhibits the man as sus- 
taining a relation to God, not borne by all men, and 
which, consequently, serves to distinguish him from 
other men. Language must, accordingly, have signs 
of relations, or of certain classes of relations ; and 
the connexion or annexation of these signs to general 
terms, is one mode, among others, of particularizing 
those terms. This annexation may obviously be 
effected in various ways ; as, for instance, by the use 



CASE. 75 

of prepositions, or by changes of the termination of 
the noun. Strictly speaking, those languages only 
have cases which employ the latter mode of effect- 
ing this purpose ; and this is the more prevalent 
mode, because some of the circumstances and rela- 
tions annexed to the general idea are so general and 
evanescent, that no separate word to denote them 
has ever been invented. 

That w^e are right in thus restricting the mean- 
ing of the term cases, is evident from the follomng 
account which has been given of them. The word 
itself is derived from the Latin cado, cadere, casum, 
to fall. It connects the notion of falling with what 
we call the oblique cases, the origin of which notion 
will appear when we rem'ember the particular mode 
in which the ancient grammarians conceived of the 
nominative case, and the peculiar manner in which 
they represented it. The mere indication of an 
object by an appropriate sign or name was called 
by them the nomination, or naming of that object ; 
hence the name was denominated the nominative case. 
It intimated, as they thought, no connexion; it merely 
announced a particular object by a particular name. 
They represented it by a right line standing perpen- 
dicularly upon a horizontal line ; hence they called 
it the " Rectus casus.'' When some relation existed 
between that word and another, with a view to inti- 
mate its connexion with that other, they bent or in- 
flected the line from its original state, and the falling 
off from the rectus casus they called a casus ; and 
the whole number of inflections from the perpen- 



76 NOMINATIVE. 

dicular denoted the various cases. This account ex- 
plains the meaning of the term declension in its ap- 
plication to nouns ; and shows that by the different 
declensions of nouns was meant the different ways in 
which this line declined from the perpendicular. It 
accounts also for the origin of the phrase " oblique 
cases." The line representing the nominative case 
formed a right angle with the horizontal line, the 
whole of the other lines oblique angles ; hence they 
were called oblique cases. 

The relations which exist among objects are ex- 
ceedingly numerous. Like all other things, they may, 
however, be formed into classes, and names may be 
given to the classes adapted to express their distin- 
guishing characteristics. It is, accordingly, neces- 
sary to give a short explanation of all the cases, to- 
gether with the relations which they are supposed to 
express. 

The Nominative Case. 

This case was conceived by the ancient gramma- 
rians, as we have seen, to be simply the name of the 
thing or object of thought ; and since it indicated no 
relation, and did not fall away, as they conceived, from 
the perpendicular, it ought not to have been compre- 
hended in their list of cases. They were, however, 
evidently wrong in regard to the nominative, which 
always sustains a peculiar relation to some verb ex- 
pressed or understood ; and, for the most part, has 
a peculiar termination, lost in the oblique cases, which 



GENITIVE. 77 

must be supposed to be the sign of that relation. 
" The radical letters of dominus are ^ domin/ and the 
^ us/ which does not appear in the oblique cases, is 
as much a separate sign as the i, o, um, orum, as and 
is, in the other cases." Dominus is, therefore, some- 
thing more than the name of the object. It is the 
name ^^ domin'' with the termination "us" attached to 
it, to denote that it stands in the specific relation to 
the verb of being, as we express it, its nominative 
case. 

The Genitive Case, 

The technical name of this case, among the Greeks, 
is said to have been Hrwo-tc yevLKr) ; or, as was pro- 
bably meant by the words, the general case. " The 
Latin grammarians, in translating this name casus 
genetivus, or the generative case, show that they 
mistook the nature of the genitive." It is preemi- 
nently the general case ; intimating the existence 
of some relation between two objects, but leaving 
the specific relation to be gathered from the whole 
of the passage in which the case occurs. It is, 
indeed, generally supposed that the genitive termi- 
nation, together with the preposition of — which 
answers exactly to it — expresses the particular rela- 
tion of possession ; and it cannot be denied that this 
is true in very numerous instances. There are 
many others, however, in which it cannot well be 
conceived that any such relation is denoted by it. 
The phrase " injuria regis" may mean either an 



78 GENITIVE. 

injury suffered^ or inflicted by the king. Now, 
though an injury received may be in the king's pos- 
session, an injury perpetrated — and which has, ac- 
cordingly, gone from him — cannot. This example 
also powerfully tends to confirm the doctrine, that 
the genitive termination merely denotes general rela- 
tion, leaving it, as in the instance just referred to, 
to the sagacity of the reader or hearer, and to his 
knowledge of the subject, to fix upon the specific 
relation. 

Still it must be carefiiUy observed, that, though 
general, the relation indicated by the genitive ter- 
mination, as w^ell as the preposition of, is not iden- 
tical wdth that which is effected between two nouns 
by the conjunction " and/' This is evident from 
the fact that we cannot, in the former case, as in 
the latter, transpose the connected nouns. When 
" and" occurs between the words man, and virtue, we 
can use either of the phrases virtue and man, or man 
and virtue, and the sense will remain the same; but 
we cannot transpose them when the genitive ter- 
mination, or the preposition of, intervenes, without 
effecting an entire alteration of meaning. " Homo 
virtutis" and "virtus hominis" have a totally differ- 
ent signification. The sign of the genitive, indeed, 
merely intimates that man and virtue are related ; 
but when w^e say "homo virtutis/' the genitive 
termination intimates that something is annexed to 
man. When, on the contrary, we say, " virtus homi- 
nis," we intimate that something is annexed to virtue. 
In each, the notion expressed by man, and virtue, is 



GENITIVE. 79 

not the general notion merely, but that in combina- 
tion with a specific and distinguishing relation. 

Different modes may be adopted to express the 
genitive case ; it does not, however, fall within the 
department of general grammar to give a minute ac- 
count of them. In English the preposition "of" is 
inserted between the two nouns ; or the letter s with 
an apostrophe is added to one of them. Thus we 
say, "the king's crown/' or "the crown of the 
king." 

In the Hebrew language what appears, atfirst sight, 
a singular rule obtains for the formation of the geni- 
tive. The change of termination denoting the rela- 
tion is made on what would be in Greek and Latin 
the governing word ; while the word governed, in 
both those languages, undergoes no change, though 
it is to be considered as in the genitive, and to be 
translated with the sign of that case ; as if, instead 
of saying " homo virtutis" to denote a man of virtue, 
we were to say, " hominis virtus." 

A little reflection will convince any one, it is con- 
ceived, that the Hebrew language is in this pecu- 
liarity of its structure more philosophical than those 
of Greece and Rome, because it connects the change 
of termination with that word which undergoes the 
change of meaning. When, instead of saying "vox, " 
"populus," I join them together and say, "vox 
populi," it is the former of the terms that has by 
their connection undergone a change of meaning, 
and not the latter. Standing alone, or in the unre- 
stricted state, it comprehends all voices, for it is the 



80 DATIVE. 

name of the class of voices ; but in the state of con- 
nexion with populi, in which we have placed it, it 
means a particular voice only — the voice of the 
people. The Hebrews, accordingly, and very justly 
we think, point out the word, whose meaning is thus 
changed by restriction, by altering its termination, 
and, instead of " vox populi,'' write " vocis po- 
pulus." 

It may perhaps be worth observation that when 
the genitive is, in English, expressed by the prepo- 
sition "of" — as in the instance "the voice of the 
people'' — our language conforms as much as it can 
do to the Hebrew mode. In the other method of 
expressing the same relation used by us, viz. " the 
people's voice," we follow the practice of Eome and 
Greece, giving the change of termination to that 
word which remains unchanged in meaning. 

Both in English and in Hebrew the juxtaposition 
of two words is sometimes the only sign of the geni- 
tive case. Thus we say, " cart wheel" " garden wall, " 
"corn field;" — expressions which really mean wheel 
of cart ; wall of garden ; field of corn ; and in 
Hebrew the latter is the order in which the words 
would be arranged, because with them the modified 
or restricted word, or, as they call it, the word in the 
statu regiminis, comes invariably before the other. 

The Dative and Accusative Cases. 

For reasons which will shortly appear, it is judged 
better to consider these cases together, rather than 



DATIVE AND ACCUSATIVE. 81 

separately. The following account has been giVen 
of the derivation and meaning of the terms. 

The word dative, is from the Latin word " do/' to 
give. " It is/' says Johnson, " the epithet to signify 
the person or thing to which any thing is given." 
It takes for its sign, in our language, the preposition 
to or for ; and denotes, accordingly, the relation in 
which the recipient of some communication stands 
to him who made it. 

The accusative case is so denominated from the 
word " accuse," to accuse, — a word applied to judi- 
cial purposes ; and, as an accusation necessarily 
supposes a person against whom it is directed, so 
the exertion of bodily or mental energy implies an 
object which receives this energy, or is the object 
of it, or towards which it is directed. The name of 
this object is said to be in the accusative case. 

The preceding account, if it be correct, renders 
it dif&cult to distinguish, occasionally at least, the 
dative from the accusative, for the former is some- 
times used to denote the object which receives the 
action or energy of a verb. An example of this 
occurs in the following phrase, — ^' Antonius nocuit 
Ciceroni." Here the action of hurting is not less 
clearly represented as passing from Anthony, and 
received by Cicero, than in the phrase, " Antonius 
Isecit Ciceronem." Where then is the difference ? 
The following attempt to discriminate has been 
made by some grammarians. '' The words laecit 
and nocuit both express an energy or action passing 
over to its object; but, in the last case, it so passes 



82 DATIVE AND 

over as to unite the agent with the object, and, in 
the first case, to unite the action with the object. 
'' Finis venit imperio/' brings the end and the em- 
pire into apposition or conjunction. " Deus creavit 
mundum/' places the action of creating and the 
world in conjunction. When, therefore, we wish to 
express the conjunction of the agent and the object, 
we use the dative ; when we intend to denote that 
of the action and the object, we employ the ac- 
cusative. 

The preceding distinction between these cases is 
perhaps the best that can be suggested, if it be true 
that the dative and the accusative do really express 
the transition of an action. It admits of doubt, 
however, to say the least, whether the common no- 
tion of the action passing from one thing to another 
is not founded in mistake. There seems to be no 
ground w^hatever for the supposition except in the 
case of physical actions ; nor is it, even with regard 
to them, strictly accurate. When a man strikes 
his horse or his dog, the action of striking does not 
pass over to them (or they would be striking), though 
they are doubtless affected — and directly affected — 
by it. But mental actions — such as loving, hating, 
fearing, esteeming, &c. can in no respect be con- 
ceived of as passing over to their respective objects. 
Though excited by those objects, the actions them- 
selves begin and terminate in the mind of the agent. 
They do not ev^en pass over in the sense in which 
a physical action may be said to pass over Should 
it be replied, that, as in the case of bodily actions, 



ACCUSATIVE CASES. 83 

the objects are directly affected by these emotions, 
it may be replied that this is not the case. Our 
esteem and love of others may be productive of acts 
by which their objects are affected; but this may 
not be the case, for it is not necessarily implied 
in the affections themselves. Should it be replied, 
again, that the mental actions of which we are speak- 
ing are conceived of as affecting their objects, if not 
as passing over to them ; and that, on this account, 
their names are put in the accusative, it may be 
asked how this solution can account for the fact, that 
certain verbs denoting no action at all, either bodily 
or mental, but quiescent qualities — which affect no 
object different from that to which they belong — 
govern the accusative .^ Such are the words " re- 
semble" in English, and " similare, or simulare," in 
Latin. ^' Here, as no transition of any act or 
motion from one object to another takes place," — for 
there is, in fact, no action to be transferred, — " the 
accusative cannot be considered as expressing such 
a transition." 

These considerations throw great probability upon 
the opinion of Dr. Dewar, that the foundation for 
the use of these cases is not the different modes in 
which an action passes over to its object, but the 
different transitions of thought in the mind of the 
speaker, and the different transitions which he at- 
tempts to produce in the mind of the hearer. With 
reference to the phrase "dedit mihi dextram," he 
gave me the right hand — he says, " there is a more 
ready and rapid transition to the idea expressed in 

a 2 



84 VOCATIVE CASK. 

the accusative, than to that expressed in the dative ; 
and the former idea is more necessary to the com- 
pletion of a significant phrase than the latter. "Dedit 
dextram/' though an incomplete sentence, is not 
quite so deficient as "dedit mihi." When the word 
'^ dedit" is uttered alone, we inquire more impatiently 
what was given, than to whom it was given. The 
accusative termination is employed to indicate the 
idea which the mind most eagerly seeks ; the dative, 
to denote the secondary and subordinate idea. 

The Vocative, 

The term is derived from voco — to call ; its ety- 
mology suggests, accordingly, that the vocative is 
the case employed when we call to any thing. It is 
of course peculiar to nouns which designate persons, 
because they only can hear and understand what is 
said to them. It is a fact worthy of observation, 
that the nominative and the vocative are for the most 
part alike in termination ; — a fact which seems to 
indicate that they were not originally reckoned two 
cases ; — that the nominative was at first employed 
where we now use the vocative. The conjecture is 
strengthened by considering the use to which each 
of these cases is applied. The vocative is used to 
awaken the attention of the person addressed ; " but 
when a man hears his own name (i, e. the nomina- 
tive case), his attention is instantly roused, and he 
is naturally led to listen to what is said. Hence 
when one man wished particularly to solicit the at- 



VOCATIVE CASE. 85 

tention of another, he would naturally pronounce 
his name ;" and thus the nominative case would 
practically become a vocative, the use of which is 
always to solicit attention. 

An objection against this statement would seem 
to be supplied by the fact that the vocative is not 
always the same with the nominative ; — and espe- 
cially that, where it differs from it, it inclines, like 
the imperatives of verbs, to greater brevity. Thus 
the vocative of dominus is domine. A very inge- 
nious attempt has been made by a writer in the 
Encyclopsedia Britannic a to account for the abbrevi- 
ation which most Latin nouns of the second declen- 
sion, ending in us, suffer in the vocative. It cannot, 
however, be considered satisfactory, as it fails to 
show why the " s" has been left out in the vocative, 
and why the " u" has passed there into an " e,'' and 
not in the nominative. Other writers contend that 
the vocative was the earliest (a self-evident absur- 
dity), and so the shortest, form of the noun ; and 
that a practical regard to the abbreviating principle 
might operate in direct addresses, requiring the 
vocative, so as to convey the idea in the shortest 
time, and with the least expenditure of breath. But 
why, it may be asked, should this abbreviating 
principle operate in shortening the vocative and 
not the nominative, which is used so much more 
frequently ? 

Upon the whole, it seems most probable, that the 
nominative was originally used both to name and 
to address, a person, — that, afterwards, to secure 



S6 ABLATIVE CASE. 

greater accuracy, a distinction between the two was 
partially effected, but that no satisfactory reason 
has yet been assigned why the process was not car- 
ried to completion in all the declensions ; — and, far- 
ther, why that distinction was sought to be obtained 
by the abbreviating process in some nouns of the 
second declension. 

The Ablative, 

The word ablative is derived from " ablatum,'' the 
gerund of " af '" or " adfero,'' — to take from. By 
those who originally assigned the name to this case, 
it must then have been conceived to express the 
relation w^hich is denoted by our preposition from, 
or the disjunction of one thing from another ; the 
object represented by the noun, in this case, being 
considered as the point of commencement of the 
motion. This is, however, only one among many 
uses of this case. It is employed to denote causa- 
tion, instrumentality, connexion, &c. ; and is, accor- 
dingly, rendered by several of our prepositions, as, 
for, in, with, by, &c. Some grammarians, con- 
sidering it in the last degree improbable that one 
termination should have been originally intended to 
express so many different relations, have taxed 
their ingenuity to discover some general relation, 
comprehensive of all the others, of which it may be 
supposed to have been primarily the sign. And, if 
such generic relation can be discovered — a relation 
which fairly and obviously includes the species of 



ABLATIVE CASE. 87 

instrumentality, causation, connexion, &c. few would 
be disposed ^to refase assent to their conclusions. 
The writer of the article Grammar in Rees's Cyclo- 
pcedia describes it as pointing to the instrument or 
medium^ by, or through, which an action is performed ; 
and, of course, considers its meaning to be most 
fally expressed in such sentences as " scribo calamo," 
I write with a pen. But when we say, " the ink 
flowed from my pen," it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to conceive of the pen either as the instrument or 
medium of the action. 

The Britannica supposes the generic relation 
denoted by the ablative to be that of concomitance/, 
or that one thing accompanies another ; and, though 
it may be doubted, perhaps, whether this conjecture 
will easily and sufficiently account for all the in- 
stances in which the ablative occurs, it is, we think, 
more comprehensive in its range than that of the 
former writer. When it is asserted that two things 
accompany one another, we sometimes infer that one 
of them is the cause of the other; and we are apt 
to imagine that what we have merely inferred from 
what is said, is actually contained in what is said. 
A similar delusion we very frequently fall into. 
Language is a much more imperfect instrument of 
thought than most persons imagine. It frequently 
expresses not even the half of what is gathered from 
it. "We sometimes forget this, and charge another, 
it may be, with affirming a sentiment which exists 
not in his words, but only as an inference in our 
minds. To illustrate by examples, which have been 



88 ABLATIVE ABSOLUTE. 

frequently referred to, when we say " templnm 
clamore petebant," and " pelleo metn/' it [cannot 
well be supposed that the two ablatives " clamore" 
and " metu'' express such different relations as those 
of concomitancy and causation. Nor is it necessary 
to suppose this. Concomitancy only is in both 
instances asserted ; but, in the latter, causation is 
inferred. All that is said is, " they sought the 
temple in company with clamour," and '' I am pale 
in company with fear." In the last case, however, 
the inference is instantly drawn that the i^dj^ p'oduc- 
ed the paleness ; and " it is because such inferences 
are drawn with the utmost readiness, and without 
any sensible interval of time, that grammarians 
have been deceived into the belief that the meaning 
inferred is fully expressed in the ablative case." 

When the w^ords by which this concomitancy is 
expressed are cut off grammatically from the adjoin- 
ing ones, they are said to be in the ablative absolute ; 
as "illo mortuo," he being dead. '^ Caio and Cassio 
consulibus. " Caius and Cassius being consuls. 
The words are put in the ablative^ because they 
denote concomitancy ; the concomitancy of death 
with the individual denoted by the pronoun he ; 
and of the consular office with Caius and Cassius. 
They are farther said to be in the ablative absolute, 
because they are disjoined from the other parts of 
the sentence. It is, however, a just and important 
remark, "that though such phrases, grammatically 
considered, have no connexion with the rest of the 



RELATIONS HOW EXPRESSED. 89 

sentence, they are introduced to express that on 
which something else has depended. 

To express the various relations indicated by the 
different cases, the Hebrew language prefixes pre- 
positions to the principal word, and combines them 
with it. The French and English most generally 
employ separate prepositions to accomplish this ob- 
ject ; w^hile the Greek and Latin, using as they do 
prepositions to govern the cases, yet express rela- 
tion by the cases themselves. It could not well 
fail to become a question whether the preference 
should be given to the Latin or the English mode 
of denoting relation. On the one hand, it has been 
alleged, that by means of cases we may secure grea- 
ter variety in the collocation of words in a sentence ; 
and, consequently, greater beauty and harmony; — 
that there is less necessity to attend to punctuation ; 
and that we get rid of what has been called the 
" luggage of language.'' On the other hand, it may 
be fairly and truly stated, that cases render the 
acquisition of a language a matter of more labour ; 
that the " luggage" of terminations is more difficult 
to carry than the "luggage'' of prepositions ; that 
while prepositions are more simple than cases, they 
give more distinctness and perspicuity to language ; 
since, "when adjectives and verbs are far separated 
from the nouns to which they belong, we must 
necessarily be prevented from perceiving quickly 
the speaker's meaning ; nay the distance to which 
words are thrown from their connexions, must make 



90 THE ARTICLE. 

it difficulty sometimes impossible, to discern certainly 
tlieir several relations." 



THE ARTICLE. 

Most nouns, as we have seen, are the names of 
classes of objects — of genera and species; and are of 
themselves able, accordingly, to distinguish one 
class from another class, but not one individual of 
any class from another individual belonging to it. 
Yet the application of distinct names to classes of 
objects, especially when the classification descends 
to the infima or lowest species, gives much greater 
precision to language than it could otherwise possess. 
When we speak of a substance formed by the hand 
of God, our phraseology is capable of very extended 
application, and, therefore, exceedingly indefinite : 
that substance may be destitute of life, or endowed 
with it. If, instead of " substance," we employ the 
term " animal," denoting a very comprehensive spe- 
cies in the genus substance, — or '^ man," which indi- 
cates a comparatively limited one, we lose a por- 
tion of the former generality of expression : and, in 
proportion as we descend in our classification by the 
employment of epithets which mark out different 
species of men — such as black, white, tall, short, 
good, bad, &c. &c. — in the same proportion do w^e 
diminish the ambiguity which must always accom- 
pany the use of a general term without any other 
word to limit and fix its meaning. 

Still no general term, how small soever be the 



THE ARTICLE. 91 

class it denotes^ would be sufficient for the purposes 
of communication. We have occasion to speak of 
individuals as well as classes ; and hence language 
must adopt some expedient for denoting the indi- 
vidual to whom we refer. This is partially accom- 
plished, as we have seen, by the cases of nouns, or 
equivalent prepositions ; which, by attaching the 
sign of a particular relation to the general term, 
will serve, at least at times, to distinguish the indi- 
vidual who sustains the relation from all others. 
Thus we say, ^Hhe father of Newton," or ^^ Newton's 
father," and thus distinguish that particular father 
from all others. The same purpose is also secured 
by the use of the adjective, the almost invariable 
office of which is, as we shall hereafter see, to re- 
duce within a more contracted range the application 
of a general term, by the addition of a circumstance 
which belongs to a limited part only of the genus or 
species which that term expresses. The term ma7i 
denotes the class ; a man an individual included in 
that class ; a good man one who belongs to a limited 
part of that class. An additional circumstance at- 
tached by means of another adjective, would limit 
the meaning still more; and an accumulation of 
words of this kind " is capable of affording a combi- 
nation of sufficiently limited occurrence for any pur- 
pose of distinctive description." 

Still this method of limiting the application of 
general terms can be resorted to only when the dis- 
tinctive qualities of individuals are known both to 
us, and to those with whom we converse. We have^ 



92 THE ARTICLE. 

however, frequent occasion to specify individuals 
whose characters are entirely unknown to us. "We 
cannot direct the thoughts of others to them by 
calling them good or bad, wise or foolish, for we are 
ignorant which of these properties they possess. 
Yet the necessities of the case require that, by some 
means, we should indicate the individuals, and even 
the individual, to whom our own thoughts recur. 
To enable us to accomplish this, language employs 
the article, which, as our common grammars tell us, 
is " a word added to nouns to point them out, and 
to show how far their signification extends :'' or, 
more correctly speaking, articles are words employ- 
ed for the purpose of enabling us, on particular 
occasions, to employ general terms to denote par- 
ticular objects. It is manifest, then, that articles, 
in combination with the general terms limited by 
them, are equivalent to, or rather become, proper 
names. They have, however, been commonly 
called definitives, because they serve to define, or 
direct the thoughts to, particular objects so as to 
distinguish them from the other individuals of the 
class to which they belong. Of words (at all events 
of methods) adapted to effect this purpose, whether 
they have been termed by grammarians articles 
or not, it is impossible that any language can be 
entirely destitute. 

Dr. Dewar degrades the article from its rank as 
a distinct part of speech, and asserts that it is to 
all intents an adjective. We cannot coincide with 
this opinion. That the great object and business 



ENGLISH ARTICLES. 



93 



of both is to define, there can be no doubt; but they 
affect this common purpose in so different a manner 
that it seems necessary to regard them as distinct 
classes of words. Adjectives define by adding some 
particular property to the general qualities denoted 
by the general term, and thus they circumscribe its 
application ; but the words a, the, this, that, though 
definitives, are not, as will be afterwards seen, in- 
dicative of qualities, and, therefore, they are not 
adjectives. 

The English articles are usually said to be two, 
" a" and " the," — the former becoming " an" before a 
vowel and a silent h. "A" is commonly said to 
be the indefinite ; and " the," the definite article. 
They are in truth, however, both definites, since 
they both circumscribe the application of general 
terms ; the term man, for instance, unlimited by an 
article, is taken in its widest sense; ^. e, it denotes 
all mankind. Thus we say, " the proper study of 
mankind is man," "where mankind and man may 
change places without making any alteration in the 
sense. But let either of the articles of which we 
are speaking be prefixed to the word man, and that 
word is immediately reduced from the name of a 
whole genus, to denote only a single individual ; 
and instead of the noble truth which this line as- 
serts, the poet will be made to say, that the proper 
study of mankind is not the common nature which 
is diffused through the w^hole human race, but the 
manners and caprice of one individual. Thus far, 
therefore, the two articles agree" {%. e. they are both 



94 HOW THE ARTICLE 

definites) ; " but they differ in this ; that though 
they both limit the specific name to some individual, 
the article " a" leaves the individual itself unascer- 
tained; v\'hereas the article "the" ascertains theindi- 
^ddual also. Thou art a man, is a very general and 
harmless position ; but thou art the man, as Nathan 
said to David, is an assertion capable of striking 
terror and remorse into the heart." 

The preceding statements, which affirm that 
both of the English articles are definite articles, 
assume that the limitation or circumscription of the 
general term is effected bi/ the article (an opinion 
which will be examined presently) ; and that to 
accomplish such circumscription is the proper busi- 
ness of the article. Different statements have been 
given us of the manner in which the article effects 
this purpose. The learned Mr. Harris, in his 
Hermes, explains the matter thus. The article "a" 
indicates a primary perception ; ^^the," an established 
acquaintance. " I see an object pass by,'' he adds, 
^^ which I never saw till now: what do I say? 
There goes a beggar ^ith a long beard. The man 
departs, and returns a week after : what do I say 
then ? There goes the beggar with the long beard. 
In consequence of the change of the article, the indi- 
vidual once vague, is now recognized as something 
known. The article tacitly insinuates a kind of 
previous acquaintance by referring a present recep- 
tion to a like perception already past." 

There are cases, however, in which " the" cannot 
indicate a previous acquaintance (since none existed), 



DEFINES. 95 

and in which it cannot of course define on the prin- 
ciple laid down by Mr. Harris. A very apt case is 
given us in the Britannica. "I am in a room crowded 
with company," '' I feel it difficult to breathe/' '' and, 
looking towards the window, I see in it a person 
whom I never saw before. I instantly send my 
compliments to tJie gentleman in the window, and 
request that, if it be not inconvenient, he will have 
the goodness to let into the room a little air." Now if 
"the" does not define by intimating a previous acquain- 
tance as a means of directing the thoughts of the per- 
son to whom we speak to a particular individual, the 
question is, " how does it define ?" I reply, that it 
may be fairly doubted whether the definition or cir- 
cumscription ascribed to it is really efi'ected by it at 
all. The fact of the case seems to be, not that it is 
able, by its own native power and force, to direct 
the thoughts of the hearer to a specific individual, 
but that it is a sign merely that the speaker refers 
to a specific individual, to whom the mind of the 
hearer is led by circumstances which cannot fail to 
secure this result. Let us take Harris's own ex- 
ample. " There goes the beggar with the long 
beard." Here no doubt the thoughts of the hearer 
are guided, in consequence of the use of this article, 
to a particular beggar; but the question is, what in 
reality guides them to him .^ Is it the article itself.^ 
I answer, no ; the article is incapable of doing this. 
It is a mere sign that the speaker intends a specific 
beggar, and the hearer mfers, fiom previous circum- 
stances, that the mendicant who had been seen the 



96 HOW THE ARTICLE 

week before is the one meant. In cases where there 
exist no peculiar circumstances to lead the mind of 
a hearer to a particular individual, the employment 
of the definite article would fail to do it; i, e, in 
other words, the article itself does not define. I might 
even say, " the friend is here," to a person who, toge- 
ther with myself, had had much delightful inter- 
course with him, yet the words would leave him in 
doubt to whom I referred ; unless, indeed, our com- 
mon affection for that friend surpassed our love for 
any other : and, in that case, this distinguishing 
circumstance w^ould define the general term friend, 
and not the accompanying definite article. 

Substantially the same statements in regard to 
the destitution of power in the article " the" to define 
have been given by Dr. Dewar ; and, as the subject 
is one of considerable importance, I shall lay them 
before the reader. "It is a mistaken notion to 
consider it as possessing the power of distinguishing 
the application of a generic name to an individual 
from the use of that name in a less definite accepta- 
tion. It has not this power in a greater degree 
than adjectives." (Dr. Dewar says, "other" adjec- 
tives, in conformity with his opinion that the article 
is an adjective.) " If we speak of ' the man,' w^e no 
more distinguish any individual than when we say, 
^ a man ;' and not so much as when we say, 'a wise 
man.' " 

In this respect there seems to be a radical, and, 
as far as I know, an unobserved difference between 
the articles "the" and "a" or "an." The latter 



DEFINES. 97 

of itself, or by its own meaning and power defines ; 
for it is, in fact, an abbreviation of the numeral 
one, — spelled and pronounced, to this day, in Scot- 
land, ane. This opinion is farther confirmed by 
the fact, that, " in the French, the indefinite article 
"un,'' and the cardinal " un," or one, are precisely the 
same." In this respect, therefore, our indefinite article 
is more definite than the definite itself; for, even if 
the conjecture of Home Tooke should be correct, 
viz. that the word " the'' is the imperative of a 
Saxon verb ; and that, accordingly, the meaning of 
the words " the man'' is " take man," there would 
be nothing in this phrase itself to lead the thoughts 
of the hearer to a specific individual. Without 
defining circumstances, " take man has been here," 
would leave us in as much uncertainty what par- 
ticular man was meant, as " the man has been 
here." 

This view of the nature of the article the, viz. 
that it is a mere sign to intimate that the speaker 
or writer refers to a specific individual, may throw 
some light upon the apparently anomalous use of the 
article. It is a general law of the English language 
not to employ it in connexion with proper names, 
or terms which are equivalent to them. And the 
reason assigned is the following ; " being in their 
own nature definitives," says Harris, "they cannot 
of course be united with those" (words) " which are 
already as definite as may be," (which is the case 
with proper names), "nor yet with those which, 
being indefinite, cannot be made otherwise. It 



98 Harris's account of 

remains, then, that they must be such as, though 
indefinite, are yet capable, through the article, of 
becoming definite." In illustration of this general 
statement, Harris proceeds to say, " upon these 
principles we see the reason why it is absurd to say 
" the I," or " the thou," because nothing can make 
these pronouns more definite than they are." " Nei- 
ther can we say '' the both," because it is in its 
own nature perfectly definite. Thus if it be said, I 
have read both poets, the expression plainly refers 
to a definite pair. If, on the contrary, it be said, I 
have read two poets, the expression may mean any 
pair whatever. And because two, when standing 
alone, has reference to some indefinite perception, 
while the article the has reference to some definite 
one, we see the reason why it is bad English to say 
" two the men." Such syntax is, in fact, a blending 
of incompatibilities,— that is to say, of a defined 
substantive with an undefined attributive. On the 
contrary, to say, both the men, is good and allowable, 
because the substantive cannot possibly be less apt, 
by being defined, to coalesce with an attributive 
which is defined as well as itself. So likewise it is 
correct to say, the two men ; because here the article, 
being placed in the beginning, extends its power as 
well through the numeral adjective, as the substan- 
tive, and equally contributes to define them both.'' 

Yet, though Harris has correctly stated the gene- 
ral law, in reference to the use of the English article, 
there exist important exceptions, of which, perhaps, 
no satisfactory account can by him be given. When 



ANOMALIES IN ITS USE. 99 

the genitive case is formed by the preposition of, as 
in such instances as ^Maw of God/' ^^ gospel of 
Christ/' "voice of the people/' where the words 
"law/* "gospel/' and "voice/' are, by apposition, 
rendered as definite as though they were proper 
names, w^e invariably, if my memory does not fail 
me, use the article. — thus, " the law of God," &c. &c. 
i, e. we " unite" the article with words which are 
" as definite as may be." This is not the case in 
the Hebrew. The first of the two words, thus con- 
joined, does not, in that language, take the article ; 
the latter, if indefinite, does ; as it does also with 
us. The Hebrews would write " voice of the man." 
Thus anomalous is the use of the English article, 
but in the Greek language, the anomaly is still 
greater. Though, in the cases just referred to, we 
"unite" the article wdth defined general terms, we 
never use it in connexion with proper names. The 
Greeks sometimes employ it in both cases, and 
sometimes not. Nay, Mr. Stewart, in his " Hints 
respecting the Greek article," speaks of it as a com- 
mon principle of the Greek language, that definite 
nouns should take the article, i. e, according to the 
ordinary conceptions of the ofiice of the article, that 
articles should be employed when there is no work 
for them to do. And, when remarking upon a rule 
laid down by Matthise — viz. that "when the noun 
is of itself sufficiently specific, so that no distinction 
from other like things is required, the article 7nay 
be omitted," (one might have expected him to say, 
the article rmist be omitted) — i, e, Mr. S., says 

H 2 



100 ANOMALIES. 

"one might be almost tempted to say, the very 
reason why the article is demanded ^ is the reason 
why it may be omitted.'*' The statements of this 
writer appear to me exceedingly perplexed and con- 
tradictory. He admits that the article is nsed for 
the purpose of effecting specification; and yet, in 
the words jnst quoted, he represents it as a law of 
the language that, when this specification is effected 
by the definite character of the noun, the article 
which was to perform the work of specification must 
still be employed; instead, as we should think, of 
being omitted, simply on the ground that it has then 
no office to perform. 

Without dwelling farther on Mr. Stewart's contra- 
dictions, some of which have been recently and ex- 
cellently exposed by Dr. Davidson in his late w^ork 
on Biblical Criticism, I would fix attention upon the 
fact that great anomalies exist in the use of the 
article, — anomalies of which it will be found, to say 
the very least, exceedingly difficult to give any 
plausible account, while the theory is held that the 
article is really a definite, or that the specification 
is made by it. On that theory it would be prepos- 
terous to use it when the specification was already 
made ; i. e. in connexion with a noun defined by its 
adjuncts, or its very nature ; and yet it is thus em- 
ployed with us in certain cases, and with the 
Greeks in many. These anomalies appear to me 
to be partially, if not entirely, accounted for by the 
doctrine laid down in the previous page ; viz. that the 
article is not a definite, but a premonitory sign that, 



MORE ARTICLES THAN TWO. 



101 



though the speaker or writer employs a general term, 
he wishes the thoughts of his hearers or readers to 
revert to a particular individual comprehended under 
that term. If this be the correct view of the nature 
and ofi&ce of the article, there is evidently more room 
left for the employment of it " pro lubitu scriptoris," 
as Mr. Stewart expresses it. If the noun be itself 
defined, there is no need to utter the premonitory 
sign. The noun itself, by its definite character, will 
do the work of the article. On the other hand, there 
is nothing Xo forbid the use of it. It is not employed, 
as Harris's doctrine represents it, to do what had 
been done already. All that can be said is, that the 
use of it is then unnecessary ^ unless it be thought to 
have the effect of awakening attention, and thereby 
of giving emphasis, — an effect which seems to be 
intended by the singular reduplication of definites 
in the Hebrew, as in such phrases as the following, — 
" the day, the this or that, day." 

I have said that the English language is generally 
supposed to possess two articles only, — the two, ^. e, 
which have just been considered. There can be 
little doubt, however, that several other words belong 
also to the class of articles, or definitives; at least 
that, in certain uses of them, they are such. " If," 
says an able writer, " the office of an article be to 
define and ascertain" (or if they are premonitory 
signs that a definite reference is intended) " the 
words this, that, as well as any, some, all, &c. which 
are commonly called pronominal adjectives, or 
demonstrative pronouns, are more properly articles 



102 MORE ARTICLES 

than any thing else, and as such should be con- 
sidered in universal grammar. Thus when we say, 
" this picture we approve, but that we dislike ;" 
what do we perform by the help of the words this, 
and that, but bring down the common appellation to 
denote individuals, the one as the more near, the 
other as the more remote ? So when we say, " some 
men are virtuous, but all men are mortal,'' what is 
the natural effect of this all, and some, but to define 
that universality and particularity which would 
remain indefinite were we to take them away ? The 
same is evident in such instances as, " some sub- 
stances have sensation, others want it/' " Choose 
any way of acting, and some men will find fault ;" 
for here, some, other, and any, serve all of them to 
define different parts of a given whole ; " some" to 
denote any indeterminate part ; ^^ any," to denote 
an indefinite mode of acting, no matter what ; and 
*^ other," to denote the remaining part, when a part 
has been assumed already." 

" That the word "this" or "that" is, at any rate 
in some of its uses, equivalent to the, is indisputable. 
It would be perfectly so in the speech of Nathan to 
David already referred to ; where " thou art that 
man " would convey exactly the same idea. It follows, 
therefore, that the Latin language is not destitute of 
the article, as has been sometimes afi&rmed; for "hie 
or " ille " exactly answers to our that, and the words 
of Nathan may be rendered, in Latin, ^tu es ille 
homo.' The Greeks and the Hebrews, it is admit- 
ted, possessed the definite article. In the former it 



THAN TWO. 103 

is 0, 7], TO] in the latter n (he) which answers to it, 
and is a plain abbreviation of the pronoun H)iiy or 
w»rr. Neither of these learned languages possesses 
what we call an indefinite article. It is said to be 
unnecessary, because the noun, without any article, 
denotes its undefined state ; and, further, because 
in languages in which the nouns, adjectives, and 
verbs, have inflections, no mistake can arise from 
the want of the indefinite article ; because it can 
always be known by the termination of the noun, 
and the verb, and by the circumstances predi- 
cated of the noun, whether a whole species or an 
individual is intended." This would be correct if, 
when a noun was taken to denote a whole species, 
it was always considered plural, and practically 
treated as such ; but this is not the case. In the 
phrase "man is mortal," the word man is considered 
singular, and connected with a singular verb — a 
verb known to be such. It is hence impossible to 
ascertain from the verb whether the term is intended 
to denote the whole species, or one individual mere- 
ly ; and it must be equally impossible to ascertain 
this, from the termination of any adjective, or verb, 
referring to it, in the Latin language. I cannot but 
think, therefore, that in the possession of an indefi- 
nite article, our language is superior to those of Greece 
and Rome. 

THE ADJECTIVE. 

The reason which led to the adoption of this 



104 ADJECTIVES. 

term, as the name of the class of words denoted by 
it, is apparent. When first employed for this pur- 
pose, the words comprehended in the class must 
have been regarded as adding something to the idea 
expressed by the substantives with which they are 
conjoined. The noun " man " denotes a species of 
animals, and is a sign of those qualities only in 
which the whole species participates. The term 
" good " is a sign of a particular quality possessed 
by some of the species only ; and, when conjoined 
with the noun, it is supposed to add this particular 
property to the general properties of the class. 

Adjectives, then, are the names of properties in 
their concrete state, i. e, when conceived of as in- 
hering in substances. When a quality is thought of 
apart from any substance, the name by which it is 
denoted, in that state, is not an adjective, but a 
substantive. It then becomes, in our conceptions^ 
a thing, capable of supporting properties of its own. 
Hence it is called a noun ; and, in consequence of 
the conceived act by which the separation between 
the quality and the substance is effected, an ahsti'act 
noun. Now, as the adjective is the name of the 
quality in the concrete state, it is manifestly equi- 
valent to the abstract quality, together with a sign 
of connexion with some substance. Good is more 
than goodness. It denotes the entire quality ex- 
pressed by the latter term ; but it includes, in addi- 
tion, the relation embodied in the preposition " of. " 
A good man is a man -p/ goodness. The importance 



THEIR USE. 105 

of this remark will more fully appear when we ad- 
vance to the consideration of the relative pronoun. 

Yet, though every adjective is significant of an 
attribute and a connexion which may be expressed 
by the preposition " of," the exact kind of connexion 
can only be gathered, in most cases at least, from 
our knowledge of the attribute and the substance to 
which it is affirmed to belong. This has been aptly 
illustrated by the following instance : " Color salu- 
bris," — a healthful colour, or colour of health, — sig- 
nifies a colour that indicates health. " Exercitatio 
salubris," — healthful exercise, or exercise of health — 
means not an exercise that indicates health, as in 
the former instance, but preserves it. " Yictus sa- 
lubris," — healthful food, or food of health — denotes 
not food which preserves merely, but improves 
health. " Medicina salubris," — healthful medicine, 
or medicine of health — means not medicine which 
indicates, or preserves, or improves, but restores 
health. In all these cases the connexion exist- 
ing between the quality and the diff"erent nouns 
with which it stands connected, is different; and 
we are thrown entirely upon our general knowledge 
of the facts, and the subject, to discover its precise 
nature. 

The usual and proper effect of adjectives, as we 
have formerly stated in somewhat different terms, is 
to secure the particular application of a general term. 
It does this by adding a particular quality to the 
general qualities denoted by the general term ; so 
that the latter term, though capable of doing more, 



106 THE USE 

will only direct the thoughts of the hearer to the 
individual or individuals who possess this quality. 
I have occasion^ for example^ to speak of^ and direct 
attention to^ a particular man. The word man, is 
too general for my purpose. It may be applied to 
every individual of the human race. It can, of 
itself, only direct the thoughts to the class man in 
distinction from other classes. In what way, then, 
do I proceed so as to make that general term — in 
connexion at least with its adjuncts — call up the 
idea of a particular person ? I annex to it, or con- 
join with it, such words as are significant of indivi- 
dual or personal properties, — properties which serve 
to distinguish him from all other men. Thus I say, 
a prudent man, a wise man, a great man, &c. By 
this addition of signs, significant of particular pro- 
perties, the general term man is modified, as it is 
sometimes expressed, so that it can only be applied 
now to certain men — to those men to whom belong 
the qualities expressed by the adjectives, prudent, 
wise, great, &c. If it be still too general for my 
purpose, I can add to it the signs of other qualities 
and circumstances, till I render it impossible to 
apply it to more than one man in the world. 

Thus the strict and legitimate office of the adjec- 
tive is, as we have seen, to limit a general term by 
adding some particular conception to it. A serious 
mistake has been committed by some writers, in 
reference to this point, in their efforts to show that 
two distinct classes of adjectives are formed by the 
process jnst described. ^^In thus adding to the concep- 



OF ADJECTIVES. 107 

tion we have of an object/' says one of these writers, 
" there are two distinct processes of mind carried 
on, by virtue of which we form two distinct classes 
of adjectives. This division arises solely from the 
effects produced by their use and application. Some 
adjectives increase or extend the conception^ denoted 
by the substantive, by adding to it other conceptions. 
But other adjectives limit or restrict the significa- 
tion of the substantives to which they are appended. 
When I say, the dazzling sun, or an enlivening day, 
I enlarge the amount of conceptions conveyed by 
the words sun and day. But when I say, a poor 
though virtaous and pious man, I limit the substan- 
tive man by the epithets prefixed to it. The term 
man is general, but in proportion to the addition of 
epithets of which particular qualities are described, 
I contract the signification of the general term, and 
appropriate it to an individual object." 

I have quoted this passage because it affords an 
apt illustration of the error against which the reader 
is here cautioned, and into which the sound and ap- 
pearance of words renders us very liable to fall. 
The adjective, " dazzling, " expresses a positive 
idea, — " poor,'' a negative or privative one. What 
more natural, then, than to suppose that the former 
adds, and the latter takes away, something from the 
nouns to which they are prefixed ? The main mis- 
take of this writer — a mistake occasioning the ob- 
scurity which hangs over the passage quoted — lies 
in confounding or identifying the two words signifi- 
cation, and application. Adjectives never contract 



108 THE USE 

the signification of the nouns to which they are 
attached. It is adverse to their nature to do this. 
They invariably add to the signification of the noun ; 
or rather, for that is the more correct way of repre- 
senting it, the noun, combined with the adjective, 
has in it a greater amount of signification, than 
when standing alone. And by thus adding to the 
signification of the noun, the adjective limits its 
application ; for, when the noun, by the addition of 
the adjective, conveys a larger amount of conception, 
its application must have a diminished range. 
" When I say," is the language of the writer just 
referred to, "the dazzling sun, I enlarge the amount 
of conception conveyed by the word sun.'' Here he 
is right, at least partially so, as there is more mean- 
ing in the phrase " dazzling sun,'' than in the word 
" sun" itself. Here he justly adds, " there is evi- 
dently added the particular idea of dazzling to the 
general idea of sun." And, on this account, the 
application of the term sun is diminished. It cannot 
be applied to the sun in all states of brilliancy, but 
in one particular state only. "But when," adds 
this writer, " I say a poor though virtuous and pious 
man, I" do what ? Why limit, or decrease the amount 
of conception conveyed by the term man, we should 
expect him to say, in harmony with his previous 
statements. "What he actually says, however, is 
this, "I limit the substantive man." Now, if he 
had meant to intimate that, by the introduction of 
these adjectives, he limited the application of the 
term man, we might reply that he had done no more 



OF ADJECTIVES. 109 

than he had done in the former case. He evidently 
means, however, that he has limited the conception 
conveyed by the word man, since he afterwards 
talks of contracting the signification of the general 
term. And in this statement he is manifestly in 
error. If, by adding the particular idea of dazzling 
to the general idea of sun, he increases the amount 
of " conception" conveyed by the term sun, in like 
manner by adding the particular idea of poverty to 
the general idea of man, he enlarges the amount of 
" conception'' conveyed by the general term man. 
He does not restrict the " conception'' in either case ; 
he enlarges it in both ; and by enlarging the concep- 
tion, or the amount of meaning contained in the 
general term, — or rather, as w^e have said, contained 
in the clause consisting of the noun and the adjec- 
tive—he diminishes the range of its application. 
And it may be remarked, as a general law, that the 
only w^ay to limit the application of nouns is thus to 
increase their " conception." 

The preceding statements exhibit, without dis- 
pute, the general object and use of the adjective. 
Cases of exception, or of apparent exception, do, how- 
ever, sometimes occur. There are instances in which 
the adjective does not seem to modify or limit the 
application of the substantive with which it is 
joined, but in which the abstract noun involved in 
the adjective is modified or limited — or seems to 
be so — by the accompanying substantive. Livy, 
speaking of the abolition of the regal authority at 
Rome, says that monarchy existed there " ab ur- 



110 ADJECTIVES, 

be condita, ad liberatam ;" i. e. literally, from the 
city built to the city delivered. This, however, is 
thought to convey no meaning. The obvious sense 
of the words is said to be, from the building (the ab- 
stract noun involved in condita) to the deliverance 
(the abstract noun involved in liberatam) of the city. 
Here it is said, the noun city, with which the adjec- 
tives condita and liberatam are connected, modifies 
the abstract nouns involved in them. The general no- 
tions of building, and deliverance, are rendered parti- 
cular by their common connexion with the word city. 
It is the building and deliverance of the city of which 
the historian speaks. Now, if no explanation of such 
idioms can be given which would show that they do 
not involve a departure from the general law, " they 
must be considered," as it has been well observed, 
^' as arbitrary inversions of the parts of speech, which 
do not invalidate the original subserviency of the ad- 
jective to the substantive noun." 

It is not, however, certain that no explanation can 
be given. Why may not the words urbe condita, and 
urbem liberatam, be rendered the built city, and the 
delivered city, and the phrases be understood to 
mean, from the time when the city became a built 
city, to the time when it became a delivered city. 
Thus rendered and understood, the adjectives obvi- 
ously effect the ordinary work of adjectives, — they 
modify the nouns to which they are attached. 

The ancient languages of Greece and Kome invest 
adjectives with the distinctions of gender, number, 
&c., {. e, they vary the termination of adjectives to 



WHETHER VARIED. Ill 

make them correspond with the gender and number, 
&c. of the nouns to which they belong, (as "bonus 
homo/' " bona mulier;" "boni homines," " bonee mu- 
ieres,") the English retain an invariable form. Thus 
we say "a good man," "a good woman ;" " good men," 
" good women." In reference to this diversity, the 
only question which can be touched upon here, is, 
" are there any general principles of language which 
decide in favour of one mode rather than the other?" 
"We think there are such principles. "An attribute," 
as it has been justly said, " admits of no change in 
its nature, whether it belong to a man, or a woman," 
(truth is the same virtue or thing in both sexes,) 
" to one person or to many ; and therefore the words 
expressive of attributes ought, on all occasions and 
in every situation, to be fixed and immutable: for 
as the qualities good and bad, black and white, are 
the same whether they be applied" (belong) "to a 
man or a woman, to many or to few, so the word which 
expresses any one of these attributes ought iu strict- 
ness to admit of no alteration with whatever sub- 
stantive it may be joined." Such we think is the 
order of nature ; and this order the English lan- 
guage, on this, as on other occasions, most strictly 
observes ; for we say equally, a good man or a good 
woman, good men, or good women, a good house, or 
good houses. In the ancient languages which ex- 
pressed relations by varying the termination of the 
noun, and employed sentences" (as they appear to 
us, at least) "of inverted structure, it was necessary 
to vary the adjective that the termination might in- 



112 DEGREES OF COMPARISON. 

dicate the word with which it should be understood 
in connexion." 

One variation, however, the adjective must in all 
languages undergo, since it is founded in nature ; 
its common grammatical designation is, '' Degrees of 
Comparison." 

Adjectives, as we have seen, denote qualities in 
their concrete state ; but qualities in this state are 
capable of what Harris calls extension or remission; 
i, e. as he says, "of more or less." Some substances 
may possess them in a greater, and others inalesser 
degree. Thus of three things resembling each other 
in colour, the wall may be white, — paper whiter, — 
and snow may be the whitest of all. Language 
must, accordingly, have some method of indicating 
the comparative amount in which the same quality 
is possessed by different substances, — the degree,for 
instance, in which snow is whiter thanpaper, and one 
man more wise, or good, or tall than another. The 
methods adopted in language to denote this are tech- 
nically called degrees of comparison. 

A difficulty, however, presents itself here, built upon 
the impossibility of determining the precise amount 
of qualities as they are found in substances. In the 
case of such as can be exactly measured, the degree 
of excess, when there is excess, may be exactly as- 
certained. This is not, however, the case with quali- 
ties in general. Between the first simple white, 
and the superlative whitest, there are infinite degrees 
of more white ; and the same may be said of more 
wise, more good, more tall, &c. How is language 



DEaREES OF COMPARISON. 



113 



to mark these numerous or rather numberless de- 
grees " of extension and remission." A moment's re- 
flection will convince us that the thing cannot be 
done ; and a second reflection will teach us that the 
doing of it is fortunately as unnecessary as it is im- 
practicable ; that it is sufficient to answer all the 
purposes of language, to have some mode of express- 
ing the quality ; of expressing simple comparative 
excess or deficiency ; and, again, the greatest amount 
of excess or deficiency, in the quality. Language 
cannot of course be more precise and perfect than 
thought ; so that, as we cannot fix upon the number 
of degrees of white between white and whitest, lan- 
guage mast necessarily leave that indeterminate in 
expression, which is so in conception. 

We have said that degrees of comparison are the 
modes employed by language to express the different 
amount in which the same quality is possessed by dif- 
ferent substances. As to the number of the degrees of 
comparison, the preceding statements would seem to 
indicate that there must be three, and three only ; the 
positive, to denote that the quality is possessed in the 
common or ordinary degree, — the comparative, in 
more or less than the ordinary degree, — the superla- 
tive, in the highest or lowest degree. These three de- 
grees seem, to exhaust the capabilities both of thought 
and of language. Grammarians are not, however, 
agreed as to the number of degrees of comparison. 
The more prevalent opinion is, perhaps, that two only 
exist, viz. the comparative and superlative ; and that 
w^hat is very frequently at least called the positive 
degree, ^^is the simple state of the adjective. Even 



114 DEaREES OF COMPARISON, 

two, however, seem to be too many for the Encyclo- 
paedia Britannica. '' The doctrine of grammarians/' 
says the writer of the article Grammar, in that work, 
" about three degrees of comparison, positive, com- 
parative, and superlative must be absurd, both be- 
cause in their positive there is no comparison at all, 
and because their superlative is a comparative as 
much as the comparative itself." The denial that 
any comparison is involved in the positive is yet 
more strongly made by a late writer. " Ail adjec- 
tive," says this writer, " denoting the quality, &c. 
considered by itself, without reference to the attri- 
butes of any other, is said to be in the positive state, 
as, ' John is a diligent boy.' In this example," he 
adds, ^^ diligent is an adjective in the positive state, 
because it indicates the accidental property of the 
boy John, without reference to any other boy w4th 
whose diligence his might be compared." 

Were it necessary, which we shall soon see is not 
the case, it would be perfectly easy to meet and over- 
turn the assertion that no comparison is involved in 
the positive. Murray has done it by intimating 
"that the adjective may be supposed to imply a 
secret or general reference to other things, as when 
we say, ' he is a tall man,' we make some reference 
to the ordinary size of men." I cannot but wonder 
that this writer should have spoken so hesitatingly 
upon the subject. Many qualities owe their exist- 
ence even to comparison, so that the simple adjec- 
tive could not be had without it. There is no abso- 
lutely tall man. Tallness is manifestly a relative 
quality. Our notion of it is altogether the result of 



DEGREES OF COMPARISON. 115 

comparison. If one man only existed, he would be 
neither tall nor short ; and, were there such dispro- 
portions in the size of the race as some writers have 
fabled, the tall man of one country would be a short 
man in another, and the short man of the latter a 
tall one in the former. A tall man is one who is of 
higher stature than the majority of his fellows ; i, e. 
he is so by comparison with them. There is not 
Jess of comparison implied in the words, a tall man, 
than in the other form, a very tall man. The dif- 
ference in the two expressions is not that in the 
one, comparison is made, and, in the other, not. It 
is to be found in the class with which the comparison 
is made. A tall man is compared with men gene- 
rally, with the class man ; a taller man is compared 
with the class " tall men." 

But, though comparison is thus really involved in 
the positive, as w^e take the liberty to call it, it is 
not, we repeat, necessary to prove this. The contro- 
versy in reference to the number of degrees of com- 
parison is little better than a logomachy. The ob- 
jections, boih of Smith and of the Britannica, to 
which reference has been made, are founded, we 
think, upon the mere phraseology. They may pos- 
sibly prove that a better mode of designating what 
we now express by the words, " degrees of compa- 
rison," might have been adopted ; but they fail to 
show that there is not a real foundation in nature 
for the common threefold division. The objectors 
have thought more of words than things. In " de- 
grees of comparison^' — the thought has struck them 
as the words fell from their lips — there must be both 

i2 



116 DEGREES OF COMPARISON. 

comparison^ and degrees^ or steps ; but there is no 
step, no advance in the positive. It is only when 
we pass on to the comparative that we have a step^ 
or degree. The positive is not, therefore, a degree ; 
and, if not a degree, far less is it a degree of com- 
parison, for it involves no comparison at all. The 
objection, we think, rests upon phraseology. We 
are not very anxious to defend that ; but the point 
we maintain, is, that there is a real foundation in 
nature for the use of some signs in language, what- 
ever they may be, and however they may be called, 
to denote the possession of the ordinary amount of 
the quality — simple excess or defect — and the highest 
degree of the one and the other. 

It has been said of the superlative that its office 
is to denote the greatest excess or deficiency of 
the quality, as most wise, least wise, &c. That 
this is the general law with respect to its office and 
work, appears to us undoubted, though there are 
anomalous cases which seem, at first view, to pre- 
sent some difficulty. Instances, in our language, 
have been referred to, in which the comparative 
seems to denote a larger measure of the quality 
than the superlative itself. " Socrates was the 
wisest of the Athenians, but Solomon was wiser 
than he." This might be admitted to be a real 
anomaly, — if we should be unable to show that it is 
only such in appearance — ^wdthout surrendering the 
general doctrine, taught above, concerning the office 
of the superlative. The instance just brought for- 
ward is the consequence of the different manner in 



DKOREES OF COMPARISON. 117 

which the comparative and superlative are with us 
used. Let it, then, be observed that the latter is 
only employed when we compare an individual with 
the species to which, at the time at least, we con- 
ceive it to belong, — or one species with the genus 
under which it is comprehended. "When the com- 
parative is used, the objects compared are set in 
direct opposition to each other, and the one is con- 
sidered not as a part of the other, or comprehended 
under it, but as something altogether distinct, and 
belonging to a different class. Thus we could not 
say, " Cicero was more eloquent than any Roman," 
because he was a Roman, ^. e, included in the class 
Romans ; but we might say, if truth allowed, he 
was more eloquent than any Briton, because, not 
being a Briton, he may be set in opposition to them. 
Cases of this kind — in which the circumstance which 
directs the employment of the comparative or the 
superlative is not the degree of the quality possessed 
by the objects compared — are so numerous as to 
lead Dr. Dewar to suggest that the two should be 
called not different " degrees," but "modes," of com- 
parison. Now, that in the instances mentioned 
above, as well as in many others, they are really 
modes of comparison — perhaps rather "modes*' than 
"degrees" — maybe allowed; but the definition of 
the comparative and the superlative, as " modes of 
comparison" merely, would manifestly be too limited, 
not comprehending many cases in which they occur. 
The true doctrine may perhaps be, that they are 
both modes, and degrees ; so that they may be oc- 



118 



DEGREES OF COMPARISON. 



casionally employed for one of these purposes to the 
exclusion of the other. 

Grammarians have been in the habit of making a 
distinction between superlatives of eminence, and su- 
perlatives of comparison. We may, say they, " sim- 
ply affirm that a certain quality is possessed by an 
individual in an eminent degree ; or we may com- 
pare it with a similar quality in others, and affirm 
its superiority." The former is the comparison of 
eminence, — the latter of comparison. " Johnson was 
a very learned man," is an instance of the former ; — 
" Johnson was the most learned of men," of the latter. 
This appears to be a distinction without a diiference. 
The two expressions are surely only two modes of 
saying the same thing. The remarks formerly made 
in reference to the positive degree are equally appli- 
cable here. Comparison, though not intimated, must 
be involved ; for how can we pronounce a man " very 
learned" without thinking oi the amount of his know- 
ledge, in comparison with that of others 1 

None of the preceding remarks in reference to 
comparison are of course applicable to such qualities 
as are incapable of intension and remission. Of this 
nature are those which result from, or rather consist 
in, the figures of bodies, as " circular, quadrangular 
and triangular." These qualities cannot be posses- 
sed in different degrees. One circle, or one triangle, 
may be larger than another, but it cannot be more 
circular or triangular. 

Different modes may be adopted, and are adopt- 
ed, to denote " remission and intension." A letter 



PRONOUNS. 119 

or letters may be added to the positive state of the 
adjective, as wise, wiser, wisest ; or separate words 
may he employed, as very excellent, most excellent. 
The consideration of these diversities lies, however, 
rather within the department of particular than of 
general grammar. 

PRONOUNS. 

The general opinion formerly held concerning the 
class of words bearing this designation, is sufficiently 
indicated by the term itself. They were considered 
^^ PRONOMiNA," i, e. words used "for,'' or instead of 
''nouns'' Our subsequent remarks will, we think, 
render it manifest that this designation mistakes al- 
together the nature and office of the personal pronoun, 
if not those of others. 

It will help us to conceive aright of the nature of 
the personal pronouns, to remember that, in the case 
of every human being, there exist peculiarities of 
character, or circumstances, or relations which serve 
to distinguish him from every one else. These pecu- 
liarities, especially those which consist in relations, 
like the material objects by which we are surrounded, 
have names given to them, as father, mother, child, 
&c. ; and, accordingly, when we wish to direct the 
thoughts of those to whom we speak to an individ- 
ual bearing any one of these relations, we may do it 
by uttering the name of the distinguishing relation, 
perhaps even more certainly than by calling him by 
his proper name. Such distinguishing relations may 



120 PERSONAL PRONOUNS 

be numerous. The same man may be a father, a 
child, a husband, a brother, a subject, or a sovereign. 
Some of them may be comparatively Jl?^r??^a/^e/^^, as 
the above; others maybe incidental and temporary, 
as patient, creditor, debtor, plaintiff, defendant, wit- 
ness, culprit, &c. And, it must be especially no- 
ticed, that the name of any one even of the more 
fleeting and temporary relations — those which exist 
one moment and perish the next — (as witness, which 
is only sustained while the person is delivering his 
testimony) will as effectually serve the purpose of 
specification, or of making known the individual re- 
ferred to, as the name of any of the more permanent 
relations, if not more so. To say the '' witness'* 
says so, while he is giving evidence, would more cer- 
tainly direct the thoughts of the person addressed to 
him, than to say, the ''father^' or " John Jones'' 
(his supposed proper name) says so. 

Now, among the fleeting and temporary relations 
which distinguish certain men from others, may be 
classed the places they occupy in conversation. One 
may be the speaker, another the person spoken to, 
a third, the person spoken of. Each bears a peculiar 
and distinguishing relation, both to one another, and 
to those who hear the conversation, if there be any. 
The words then, /, tliou^ he, &c. are the names of 
these relations, as obviously so as the word father is 
the name of a relation. « T' is the name of the 
relation sustained, for the moment, by the person 
addressing another, or others ; it is equivalent with 
" the speaker:' " Thxm'' is the name of the relation 



ARE NOUNS. 121 

sustained by him to whom he addresses himself; it 
is equivalent to " the person addressed!' He is the 
name of the relation sustained by him of whom he 
says something \ it is equivalent to the person of 
whom something is said. 

The preceding statement of the first and second 
persons agrees substantially with the account given 
of them by the Britannic a, though we think that 
account is a little deficient in regard to precision. 
" The first denotes the speaker " (rather the relation 
sustained by him) " as characterized by the present 
act of speaking, in contradistinction to every other 
character which he may bear. The second denotes 
the party addressed, as characterized by the present 
circumstance of being addressed, in contradistinction 
to every other character, &c.'' Had the writer said 
that /, and thou, are names of the relations sus- 
tained by the speaker and the hearer, at the 
moment, his statement would have been more dis- 
tinct and precise than it is ; yet in substance it is 
correct and important. We dissent, however, from 
him altogether in reference to his account of the 
third person. " It is," he says, "merely a negation 
of the other two, as the neuter gender is a negation 
of the masculine and feminine f it is not," he adds, 
" the speaker, nor the person addressed, but the 
subject of conversation!' It is not easy to conjec- 
ture what is meant by the assertion that "the third 
is a negation of the first and second," unless it be 
that the third is not the first, nor the second. And, 
if this be the meaning, it might be said, with as 



122 PERSONAL PRONOUNS 

much propriety, that the second is a negation of the 
first, and the first of the second, as that the third is 
a negation of both. Besides, if it be a correct defi- 
nition of the third, that it is the subject of conversa- 
tion, then the first and second persons become the 
third, — the former when he talks about himself ^ — 
and the latter when he is talked to concerning him- 
self. "We are somewhat surprised that this sagacious 
writer has failed to complete his own doctrine by 
stating, what is obviously the case, that the third 
person denotes the relation sustained by the person 
or thing of which something is said. If he failed to 
do this under the influence of the recollection, as we 
suspect, that the third person may denote a thing, as 
well as a person, we reply, that that is an unessen- 
tial matter. A thing may sustain the relation of 
which the third person is the sign, though it cannot 
bear that which is denoted by the first and second. 
A thing may be the being talked about, though it 
cannot be either the being that speaks, or that is 
addressed. 

The preceding account of the personal pronouns 
justifies our denial a short time ago that they are 
pronomina. They are not used instead of nouns; 
they are nouns as truly so as proper names them- 
selves. To illustrate this assertion, let it be observed, 
that the term "patient," is not the name of any 
existing being, as the term " tree," or "house;" but 
the name of a relation by which one person may be 
distinguished from another. We, accordingly, ar- 
range it in the same class in which we place all the 



ARE NOUNS. 123 

names of relations ; ^. e. in the class of nouns, not 
of pronouns. It has no title to be placed in the 
latter class. It is not used instead of the proper 
name of the individual ; for his proper name would 
not convey the whole of the idea suggested by the 
term '- patient/' it would fail to express the impor- 
tant and distinguishing fact of his being under medi- 
cal care and direction. Similar remarks may be 
made with regard to the personal pronouns, as they 
are usually called; for it is a very just remark, that 
" when the names of two persons conversing together 
are known to each other, they cannot by the use of 
their names express all that these pronouns express. 
There is a manifest difference between saying '- George 
did this," and " I did this." Nor would the power 
of the pronoun be completely supplied by the name 
even with the additional aid of indication by the 
hand. When one says to another, with whom he is 
conversing, James did so and so, it is surely not 
equivalent with, you did so and so ; if such were the 
case, one might pertinently ask, when both persons 
are known to each other, why do they use the per- 
sonal pronouns ? In short, it is manifest that the 
proper names of these individuals would not express 
that circumstance by which they are temporarily 
distinguished, and exhibited as temporarily distin- 
guished, from all others. The personal pronouns, 
then, as we call them, are not substitutes for nouns, 
^. e. are not pronomina. This, at least, can no more 
be affirmed with truth of them, than of the terms 
parent, king, subject, debtor, creditor, &c. They 



124 WERE PARTICIPLES. 

are the names of relations ; and^ with reference to 
them, as well as the terms parent, &c. with which 
they have jnst been compared, " it is probably mos* 
accurate not to consider one as substituted for ano- 
ther, but to consider each as rendered proper, on 
particular occasions, when a complete and interesting 
distinction is thus formed/' 

It is the opinion of many learned men, that the 
personal pronouns were originally participles, equi- 
valent in meaning with the phrases, ^^the person 
speaking," — ^^ the person spoken to," — and ^Hhe 
person spoken of" With this opinion the following 
conjectural derivation of the first and third person 
exactly agrees, — and both with the doctrine here 
propounded with respect to the nature of these pro- 
nouns. The late Professor Young, of Glasgow, was 
of opinion that the lirst personal pronoun, both in 
Greek and Latin, eycj, was originally eycov, and that 
this w^as an abbreviation of Xeyojv, the speaking per- 
son. Home Tooke derives the third personal pro- 
noun neuter from an old Gothic word, '- Haitan,*' 
signifying to name ; from which came, in the first 
place, het, or hit, and afterwards our word, " it, " de- 
noting the thing last mentioned. 

Personal pronouns have number, because, as it is 
commonly said, the nouns for which they stand are 
susceptible of that variation. Those who regard 
them as pronomina may deem this reason for in- 
vesting them with this attribute sufficient ; but we 
who place them in the class of nouns, must obvi- 
ously seek for another; and that is clearly supplied 



HAVE NUMBER, ETC. 125 

by the fact, that many persons may speak at once, 
or that one, on behalf of others, may give utterance 
to the sentiments entertained in common by them. 
One person, also, or many, may be addressed, or be 
the subject of discourse. Pronouns, then, which 
denote the relations of speaker — person addressed — 
and of the person or thing spoken of, must admit of 
the variation of number. 

The grammatical anomaly prevails in almost all 
modern languages, of using the plural form of the 
second person, when addressing an individual. The 
principle on whicli this practice commenced is not 
very obvious. Perhaps, when censure had to be 
conveyed, it was felt, or thought, to be less offensive 
to employ a form of the pronoun which seemed to 
afford the person addressed the possibility of con- 
ceiving of some one else as the culprit. It may have 
been deemed, on this account, more polite, and so 
have become the ordinary mode of address. The 
rule at present seems to be, never to use the singular 
form of this pronoun except when we wish very 
strongly to mark unity, or singularity, — when the 
being designated " thou'' stands in some sense emi- 
nently alone. Thus we adopt it in solemn addresses 
to the Deity, to intimate " that he is God alone, and 
that there is none like him ; and, again, in contemp- 
tuous and very familiar language, to intimate that 
the person of whom we speak is the meanest of 
human beings, or the dearest and most familiar of 
our friends ; as, thou scoundrel, or, thou best belov- 
ed.'' It is a rule on no account to be violated, that 



126 



WHY THEY 



the plural form of the verb must invariably accom- 
pany the use of the plural pronoun. " You was" is 
a barbarism never to be tolerated. 

But, though all the personal pronouns have num- 
ber, it is observable that neither in Greek, Latin, 
nor any modern language, do those of the first and 
second person carry the distinction of sex. The 
reason assigned for this by Mr. Hanis is, that the 
speaker and hearer, being generally present to each 
other, it would have been superfluous to mark a 
distinction by art, which from nature, and even dress, 
was commonly apparent on both sides. By some 
writejs this reason has been pronounced rather plan- . 
sible than satisfactory; because, it is said, ^^ the 
speaker and hearer may meet in the dark, when 
their persons and their dresses are alike invisible." 
The writer of the article Grammar in the Britannica, 
dissatisfied with the statements of Harris, gives the 
following as the reason. " Sex, and all other pro- 
perties and attributes whatever, except Ihose men- 
tioned above, as descriptive of the nature of these 
pronouns, are foreignfrom the intention of the speaker, 
who, w^hen he uses the pronoun "I," means the 
person who now speaks, no matter whether man or 
woman ; and, when the pronoun " thou," the person, 
no matter whether man or woman, to whom he 
now addresses himself, and nothing more. " But," 
he adds, "the pronoun of the third person, denoting 
neither the speaker nor the hearer, but the subject 
of the discourse, and being merely the substitute of 
a noun which may be either masculine, feminine, or 
neuter, must of necessity agree with the noun which 



HAVE NUMBER. 127 

it represents, and admit of a triple distinction 
significant of gender. Now if there were the radical 
difference between the third per son, and the other two, 
which this writer lays down, ^. e, if the latter were 
nouns, and the former a pronoun, there would be 
more appearance of truth in the doctrine avowed. 
It might, then, be admitted that the first and second 
persons do not carry the distinction of gender^^r the 
reason assigned hy him. But, if all are nouns, being 
names of relations, as we have endeavoured to show, 
this cannot be admitted ; since it must have led to 
the denial of gender to the third person. We agree, 
therefore, with Harris in thinking that the first and 
second persons do not carry the distinction of sex, be- 
cause, on the grounds mentioned by him, it is unne- 
cessary for them to do so ; the instance referred to by 
the objector, being an unfrequent exception to a ge- 
neral rule, for which it was not thought necessary 
to provide. " The case, however," as he justly ob- 
serves, " is otherwise with respect to the third per- 
son, of whose characters and distinctions, including 
sex among the rest, we often know no more than 
what we learn from the discourse. And hence it is, 
that, in most languages, the third person has its 
genders, and that even the English, which allows 
its adjectives no genders at all, has in this pronoun 
the triple distinction of he, she, and it. The utility 
of this distinction,'' he adds, " may be better found 
in supposing it away. Suppose, for example, we 
should read in history these words. He caused him 
to destroy him ; and that we were to be informed 
that the he, which is here thrice repeated, stood 



128 WHETHER OTHERS ARE 

each time for something different ; i. e. for a man, 
for a woman, and for a city, whose *names were 
Alexandei', Thais, and Persepolis. Taking the 
pronoun in this manner, divested of its gender, how 
would it appear which was destroyed, which was 
the destroyer, and which was the cause which moved 
to the destruction ? Bat there are no such doubts 
when we have the genders distinguished ; when, 
instead of the ambiguous sentence, ' He caused him 
to destroy him,' we are told, with the proper dis- 
tinctions, that she caused him to destroy it. Then 
we know with certainty what before we could not, 
that the prompter was the woman, that her instru- 
ment was the hero, and that the subject of their 
cruelty was the unfortunate city." 

It is generally thought that I, thou, he, she, and 
it, comprehend the whole of what are called the per- 
sonal pronouns. Harris, to whom we have so fre- 
quently referred, seems to suppose that " that," 
" other,'' " any," and " some," are pronouns of the 
third person as well as the former. " A single 
person for the first and second persons, an ' V for the 
first, and a ^thou' for the second, are," he says, " suf- 
ficient to all the purposes of speech, as far as those 
persons are considered. But it is not so," he adds, 
'^ with respect to the third person. The various 
relations of the various objects exhibited by this 
(I mean relations of near and distant, present 
and absent, same and different, definite and indefi- 
nite, &c.) made it necessary that here should be not 
one, but many pronouns, such as he, she, this, that 



PERSONAL PRONOUNS. 129 

other, any, ^ome." We have placed the last five in 
the class of articles, — an arrangement which the 
statements of Harris do not supply sufficient reason to 
alter. He himself admits that " the words ' this,' and 
^that,' do not always appear as pronouns. ^^When 
they are associated to some noun, as when we 
say, Hhis habit is virtue,' ^ that man defrauded me,' 
then, as they supply not the place of a noun, but only 
serve to ascertain one, they fall rather into the spe- 
cies of definitives. When they standby themselves, 
however, and represent some nouns," he adds, '' they 
are pronouns, as in the following instances ; ' this is 
virtue ;' ' give me that! " I cannot, however, think 
that there exists any real difference in the use and 
office of the terms this and that, in the above instances. 
There is an obvious ellipsis of some noun in the 
latter examples. The full expression is, " this action^ 
&c. &c. is virtue." "Give me that," ^. e, that book 
or hat, &c. They are as much associated in sense 
with nouns as in the former cases, only the nouns 
are here left to be understood. 

The words my, thy, his, her, our, your, their — 
placed in the class we are now considering — are 
very variously denominated ; by many being called 
pronominal adjectives ; by some, adjective pronouns, 
by others, possessive pronouns ; and by one writer, 
^^ regular possessive pronominal adjectives, denoting 
both the persons for whom they are substituted, and 
the right of possession and property." This last 
writer appears to have formed a just conception of 
what the words denote, but it is doubtful whether 



130 



THE RELATIVE 



they do not intimate more than his language implies. 
They have certainly somewhat of the nature and 
characteristics of the adjective. The Britannica 
says they have the ^^form" of adjectives^ since they 
are subject to no variation " to indicate either gen- 
der, number, or case ; and yet they are put in con- 
cord with nouns, of every gender, and both numbers, 
as, "my wife," "my son," " my book," ^* her hus- 
band," " her sons," " her daughters ;" yet he adds, 
" they have the power of the personal pronouns in 
the possessive case ; "my book is the book of me," — 
" our house is the house of us, &c." It appears to 
me that they have more than the ''Jbnn" of adjec- 
tives. They perform the work of adjectives, i. e. 
they restrict the application of general terms. The 
w^ord my, for instance, in connexion with property, as 
" my property," has an effect upon the noun similar 
to that of the adjective "private," or "personal." 
It is, therefore, properly called an adjective pro- 
noun. 

The orders of pronouns already considered have 
been denominated prepositive pronouns, because 
they are capable of commencing a sentence. There 
exists, however, another order bearing characters 
peculiar to itself — used not for the purpose of intro- 
ducing, but of connecting, sentences, or parts of sen- 
tences, with one another. And, since it must of 
course have a reference to something pieceding, it is 
called the subjunctive, or relative pronoun, the name 
intimating that it subjoins that which follows to that 
which precedes it, — or that it refers to some noun 



PRONOUN. 131 

which occurs in a previous part of the sentence. 
This pronoun is in Greek, og, in Latin, qui, in Eng- 
lish, who, which, or that. 

Very different views are presented by gramma- 
rians of the nature of the relative pronoun; all> 
however, agree first, in maintaining that it contains 
in itself the force or power of a noun^ or of some 
prepositive pronoun, "It is obvious," says the Brit- 
annica, " thatthere is not a single noun, or prepositive 
pronoun, which the relative is not capable of represent- 
ing ; for we say, 7, who saw him yesterday, cannot 
be mistaken; yoii^ who did not see him, may have 
been misinformed ; they^ who neither saw nor heard, 
can know nothing of the matter ; the things which 
he exhibited were wonderful. From these examples, 
it is evident that the relative contains in it the force 
of any other pronoun." 

Again, all agree in supposing that, in addition to 
this, the relative contains in it the force of a connec- 
tive. What this connective is forms the main point 
in controversy; whether, in short, it is the connec- 
tive " and," or " of." Harris maintains the former. 
" Suppose," he says in illustrating his theory, " I 
was to say, light is a body. Light moves with great 
celerity. These words would apparently be two 
distinct sentences. Suppose, instead of the second 
light, I were to place the prepositive " it,'' and say, 
^ light is a body ; it moves with great celerity,' the 
sentence would still be distinct and two. But if I 
add a connective, as, for example, " and," saying, 
' light is a body, and it moves with great celerity,' 

K 2 



13*2 THE RELATIVE 

I then, by connexion, make two into one, as by 
connecting many stones, I make one wall. Now it is 
in the united powers of a connective, and of another 
pronoun, that we may see the force and character of 
the pronoun here treated of. Thus, therefore, if in 
the place of " and it," we substitute " that*' or 
'^ which," saying, ' light is a body which moves with 
great celerity,' — the sentence still retains its unity 
and perfection, and becomes if possible more com- 
pact than before. We may with just reason, there- 
fore, call this pronoun the subjunctive, because it 
cannot, like the prepositive, introduce an original 
sentence, but only serves to subjoin one to some 
other, which is previous." 

This genera] doctrine of Harris — that the relative 
is equivalent to another pronoun^ and the connective 
particle and^ is ably and successfolly contested by the 
writer of the article Grammar in the Encyclopsedia 
Britannica. " Let any one," says this writer, "atten- 
tively consider the two sentences, ^ light is a body 
which moves with great celerity,'- — and ' light is a 
body, and it moves with great celerity,' and he will 
find that they are not perfectly equivalent." This is 
manifestly true. The former of these sentences con- 
tains one proposition only; the latter two. The 
conjunction " and" entirely fails to condense them 
into one. The assertions are still, as at first, "light 
is a body," — " it moves with great celerity." " But by 
this example," adds the Britannica, "Mr. Harris's 
doctrine is not exhibited in all its absurdity. Let us 
try it by another. ' Charles the Twelfth was the 



PRONOUN. 133 

only monarch who conquered kingdoms to bestow 
them on his friends.' Resolve this sentence upon 
Mr. Harris's principles, and you have two proposi- 
tions, of which the first is a notorious falsehood. 
^Charles the Twelfth was the only monarch! — and 
' he conquered kingdoms to bestow them on his 
friends.' " 

This last writer maintains, therefore, that the con- 
nective of which the relative contains the force, 
is not ^^and," but "of, " so that the real meaning of 
the phrase, "light is a body ' wMcK moves with 
great celerity," is, light is a body of it moves with 
great celerity — the whole of the words occurring 
after " of" being in meaning, though not in form, an 
abstract noun, joined to the word body by the pre- 
position " of," and modifying or limiting the appli- 
cation of that word ; as, in the phrase, " man of 
goodness," the latter term modifies the former. 

The truth of this statement must, we think, be 
evident to all who admit that the Britannica has 
given a correct explanation of the clause in which 
the relative stands, viz. that it is of the nature of an 
adjective ; for, if that be the case, it must, like all 
other adjectives, contain the force of the connective 
"of." "A good man" is not a man «/^c/ goodness, 
but a man of goodness. Let us, then, look at the 
statement by which he seeks to support this great 
principle. "It may be laid down," he says, "as a 
general principle, that, by means of the relative pro- 
noun, a clause of a sentence in which there is a verb 
is converted into the nature of an adjective, and 



134 THE RELATIVE 

made to denote some attribute of a substance, or some 
property or circumstance belonging to the antecedent 
noun. Thus, when we say, ^vir sapit qui pauca lo- 
quitur/ the relative clause expresses the quality of 
speaking little as belonging to the man, and as being 
that quality which constitutes, or from which w^e in- 
fer, his wisdom/' 

A general analysis of relative clauses, together 
with the recollection of the purposes for which they 
are employed, fully confirm this view of their nature. 
Take the relative clause in the phrase ^^the man 
who is wise will think of eternity." Who can doubt 
that the w^ords " who is wise'' perform the work of 
an adjective — as really and effectually as the word 
which bears the name adjective — " the man who is 
wise" being perfectly equivalent with " the wise 
man." And so in the instance adduced by the Bri- 
tannic a: "if there w^ere such a word as pauciloquens, 
the quality denoted by the relative clause " qui pauca 
loquitur" might very properly be expressed by it ; 
and the phrase vir sapit pauciloquens would express the 
same assertion with vir sapit qui pauca loquitur." He 
afterwards states, that "the relative phrase is con- 
ceived of as standing in the place of a noun, governed 
in the genitive case by vir. The whole sentence 
might be thus translated, " the man of little speaking" 
{little speaking^ like goodness^ in the phrase " man of 
goodness," being an abstract noun) "is wise ; or, did 
the use" (usage) " of the English language admit of 
it, "the man of he speaks little is wise." In like 
manner when it is said, man, vjho is born of a woman ^ 
is of few days ruH full of trouble," — the relative 



PRONOUN. 135 

clause is equivalent to an abstract noun in the 
genitive case, and the whole might be expressed 
in the following manner, " man of he is horn of a wo- 
man ;" — or, " the born of a woman man, — is of few 
days and full of trouble." There is the same differ- 
ence between the first form of expression and the 
last, as between goodness, and good. " He is born 
of a woman" denotes, like goodness, the abstract state 
of the quality, — " the born of a woman," the con- 
crete ; but the former, with the addition of of is 
perfectly equivalent with the latter, — as, " of good- 
ness" is equivalent with " good." Hence a man of 
" he is horn of a woman' is identical with " a woman 
born man." Hence the relative, in the clause in 
which it stands, has in it the force of the connective 
"of" and not "and." 

Again, the purpose for which the relative clause 
is employed, as well as the analysis of that clause, 
shows that the Britannica has given a correct ex- 
planation of it ; for it is used — that at least is the 
general law — to express some distinguishing quality 
which serves to render more definite the noun to 
which it refers. Thus we say, " the man who is rich," 
or "poor," or "wise," or "foolish," or "pious." In 
each case the relative clause, — who is rich, &c. de- 
fines more folly the previous noun man. The Bri- 
tannica imagines, however, that cases of exception 
exist — cases in which the relative may be resolved 
into a prepositive pronoun, or noun, and the connec- 
tive "and." They are the cases in which the rela- 
tive clause expresses such a property or circumstance 



136 THE VERB 

of the antecedent noun as does not limit its significa- 
tion ;" i. e. as he thinks, such " attributes as are cha- 
racteristic of the species to which the antecedent be- 
longs." "Thus," he adds in explanation, "when it 
is said, ' Man, who is born of a woman, is of few days, 
and fall of trouble,' the relative clause — who is born 
of a woman — expresses an attribute common to all 
men, and therefore cannot modify." Here he adds, 
" the relative clause might be omitted ; and it might 
be said with equal truth, Olanis of few days, and fall 
of trouble." May it not be said, however, that this 
is merely a case of the unnecessary use of the rela- 
tive, and not one of departure from its object or of- 
fice? The effect of the relative clause in this case 
seems to be to bring into prominent view aparticalar 
quahty of man, with which shortness of days, and fre- 
quent subjection to trouble, seem naturally connected. 
If it cannot be said that it specificates man, it cer- 
tainly does seem, at least, to specificate the being 
who is of few days, and fall of trouble. 

THE VERB. 

The term verb, a contraction of verbum, means a 
word. Now, as all the parts of speech are words, 
as well as the verb, the adoption of this name to 
designate this part of speech must have been in- 
tended to indicate the high rank it sustains among 
its fellows — its preeminent necessity to secure one 
of the great purposes of language. Nouns and pro- 
nouns merely designate material objects and quali- 



IS A COPULA. 137 

ties, or mental states. They are significant of the 
elements of thought. Affirming no connexion be- 
tween these elements, they require, for their exist- 
ence, the exercise of no mental faculties except per- 
ception and consciousness. The notions of glass, 
and brittleness, are gained by observation. The 
words exhibit the notions in a detached or separate 
state, and it is only by another mental act that we 
can link them together. When this is done by an 
operation of judgment, we express the result of that 
operation in the proposition, " glass is brittle." Now 
the verb is expressive of this latter operation; not 
of the act of perception, but of the act of judgment. 
We compare brittleness with glass, or the notion of 
the one with that of the other ; we judge that they 
agree with each other, and we embody that judg- 
ment in the proposition stated above. 

The verb, then, performs the work of what is 
logically called the copula of an affirmative propo- 
sition ; or rather it is the copula of all such propo- 
sitions; I. e, it binds the subject and the predicate 
together — affirming or indicating the connexion 
which exists between them. Thus, in the instance, 
" God is good," the verb "is" unites the subject God, 
and the predicate good, and thus virtually asserts, 
at least, that goodness is a Divine attribute. 

Now, that this doctrine in relation to the verb, — 
viz. that it binds together the subject and pre- 
dicate of a proposition, or indicates a connexion 
between them, being thus analogous in its powers to 
the sign + plus, in Algebra, — is true in all cases. 



138 THE VERB IS A COPULA. 

such as^ "God is good," &€., where the attribute is 
expressed by a distinct word, is admitted even by- 
Mr. Harris, whose doctrine, radically different from 
that which is stated here, will be hereafter examined. 
But what shall we say of verbs which seem to contain 
the attribute, such as, walks, hopes, fears, loves, 
hates, &c..^^ How can it be true that the verb is 
only a copula here ? The statements of the writer of 
the article GRAMMARinthe Britannica afford us help 
in reference to these cases ; for he says in substance 
very justly, that every verb, whether active, passive, 
or neuter, may be resolved into the substantive verb, 
as it is improperly called, and an attributive; for 
"walks" is of the same import precisely with, is 
walking, — "hopes" with is hoping, &c. &c. But 
walking, hoping, fearing, loving, &c. are not verbs ; 
whence it follows that " the characteristic of the 
verb — that which constitutes it what it is, and can- 
not be expressed by other words, must be that which 
is signified by the word " is ;" " and that," he adds, 
"appears to us to be neither more nor less than 
assertion." 

If this analysis of what we may call compound 
verbs be correct, ^. e. if each may be resolved into 
the substantive verb, and an attributive, it follows 
that the whole essence of the verb is contained in 
the word " is ;" so that, when its character and 
office are ascertained, we shall have discovered the 
nature of this part of speech in general, We must, 
then, direct our enquiries into the nature of the 
substantive verb. The two prevalent opinions, in 



Harris's account of. 139 

reference to this point, are that which has been 
glanced at in the preceding statements, — or that it 
is a copula ; and the opinion commonly perhaps 
entertained, and expounded fully by Mr. Harris, 
that it denotes or afhrms existence, and so may be 
properly called the verb of existence. The follow- 
ing summary of this writer's statements must be laid 
before the reader. 

" An object," he observes, " must first he before 
it can be anything else ; it cannot be black or white, 
or long or short, till it exist." We must, therefore, 
he thinks, have a word to denote existence ; and 
that, he says, is the object and use of the substan- 
tive verb. It is not a copula. It does not join two 
or more things together; but it denotes or affirms 
existence. " On this account," he adds, " it takes 
precedence of all others, as being essential to the 
very being of every proposition in which it may be 
found either expressed, or by implication ; as w^hen 
we say, ^ the sun is bright,' or, ' the sun rises ; ' 
which means, when resolved, ' the sun is rising ; ' — 
* is' being the verb, and ^ rising' the attributive." 

Having thus attempted to prove that it is the 
very essence of the substantive verb to denote ex- 
istence, he proceeds, with a view to illustrate its 
nature still further, to state, " that all existence is 
either absolute or qualified; absolute, as w^hen we 
say, ^ B is ; ' qualified, as when we say, ^ B is an 
animal ; ' ^ B is black,' is ' round,' &c. and that the 
verb ' is ' can by itself express absolute existence, 
but never the qualified, without subjoining the par- 



140 dewar's account of. 

ticular form ; because the forms of existence being 
in number infinite, if the particular form be not ex- 
pressed we cannot know what is intended." 

Again he says, as to existence in general, " it is 
either mutable or immutable — that some mutable ob- 
jects exist in time, and admit the several distinctions 
of past, present, and future ; while immutable objects 
know no such distinctions ^ — that the word ' is, ' 
when connected with a mutable object, denotes pre- 
sent time exclusively ; but when, in union with an 
immutable object, it does not denote time present in 
opposition to other times, but necessary existence in 
contradistinction to all temporary existence what- 
ever." Now, that the word " is " should, by its own 
proper power, denote things so radically different as 
immutable and temporary existence, is scarcely to 
be imagined. Mr. Harris has confounded the in- 
ference we draw, in each case, with the meaning of 
the verb itself. When we say, God " is," and the 
universe " is," the word '' is " does not surely alter 
its meaning in the two cases ; but, since we know 
that God is from everlasting to everlasting, — and 
that the universe at one time began to be, and will 
at another time perish, we iiifei' that, in the first 
case, it is comprehensive of all time, and, in the 
latter, of the present moment exclusively. 

Dr. Dewar, referring to Mr. Harris's doctrine in 
respect to the substantive verb, says, in his able ar- 
ticle on Grammar in the Edinburgh Encyclopaedia, 
that " Mr. H. has been very unfortunate in his ac- 
count of this verb/' He pronounces it an opinion 



BRITANNICA. 



141 



in all points of view untenable, "that an object must 
first be before it can be anything else ; because it is 
not necessary that the thing spoken of should have 
an actual existence." We can speak of supposed as 
well as of existing objects. Now, certainly no one 
can justify the phraseology of Mr. Harris. For B 
to be black, or white, is not to be any thing else. 
The meaning, however, seems to be, that existence 
is, in the order of nature, — at all events it is so in 
our conceptions, — previous to qualities. But Mr. 
Harris would doubtless reply to this objection of Dr. 
Dewar, that an object must be supposed to have 
existence before it can be supposed to have other 
qualities; so that the objection falls to the ground. 

The Britannica, in opposition to Mr. Harris, and 
in conformity with preceding remarks, says that the 
verb "is" never varies its signification, denoting, 
at one time, as the former thinks, existence, — either 
mutable or immutable, and time, either present or 
all time ; — for that " it has, as a verb, no connexion 
with existence of any kind. All such circumstances 
are superadded," he continues, " to its verbal nature : 
or, to speak more accurately, we infer such circum- 
stances from our previous knowledge of the objects 
concerning which the predication is made. " When 
we say," he adds, " this orange is ripe," (an example 
produced by Mr. Harris to show that " is" denotes 
both existence and present time,) ''. we do indeed 
mean that it is so now, at the present in opposition 
to past and future time; but it is not the verb Hs^ 
but the definite ^ this which fixes the time of matu- 



142 Harris's account 

rity, as well as the place of the orange; for had 
we said, ' oranges are ripe, we might have been 
properly asked when, and where, are they ripe ? — 
although the same verb is used in both sentences." 
The only cases which even seem to afford support 
to the doctrine that " is" is in Harris's sense the 
verb of existence, and is not a mere copula, are those 
in which it stands alone in connexion with a noun, no 
attributive being subjoined, — as in the case, "B is.'' 
Here it might be said the substantive verb cannot 
unite two things together, as when we say, "B is 
black or white," there being but one thing mentioned. 
This may, however, be only a case of ellipsis, — a 
case in which the predicate is left to be supplied by 
the reader. The words are equivalent with the 
expression B + ; i. e. B plus some attribute. And, 
the attributive not being stated, the reader imme- 
diately supplies the most general and necessary one, 
viz. existence ; and the proposition, in the view of 
his intellect, stands thus, "B is existing." 

Sufficient has been said, it is imagined, to show that 
the doctrine of Mr. Harris in regard to the substan- 
tive verb is not unexceptionable; it may be well, 
however, to unfold more fully the difficulties in which 
this writer entangles himself Let it be observed, 
then, that maintaining, as he does, that the office of 
the substantive verb is to denote existence, he yet 
declares that, when it subjoins some particular form 
of existence to a substance, as in the instance, "Ink is 
black," it has little more force than that of a mere 



OPPOSED. 143 

assertion ; ^. e. it affirms the connexion between 
ink and black, or is, according to our doctrine, a 
copula. He further declares, that, " under the same 
character, it is latent in very other verb, by express- 
ing,'' let the reader observe the language, " that 
assertion which is one of their essentials.'' These 
statements appear to me, I acknowledge, loose and 
unsatisfactory. If assertion is essential to all " other 
verbs'' — if this assertion is effected by the verb "is" 
which is involved in them, both of which are af- 
firmed by Mr. Harris, it would seem to follow, by 
necessary consequence, that it is of the very essence 
of this verb to assert ; and yet he tells us that its 
essence is to denote existence — while his subse- 
quent language implies that to denote existence, 
and to assert, or to be a copula, are totally dif- 
ferent things. Mr. Harris's statements involve the 
absurdity of supposing that all verbs, besides the 
substantive verb, assert, and yet that the substan- 
tive verb itself, involved in them, by which the asser- 
tion is effected, does not assert, but denotes existence. 
In no way can these statements be reconciled with 
each other, but by giving to the words " denotes 
existence" a meaning which they do not appear to 
have at any rate distinctly borne in the conception 
of Mr. Harris. If he had said, as he, perhaps, 
might have done, that the substantive verb inva- 
riably asserts, and asserts existence ; that its mean- 
ing is precisely the same in both forms of expression, 
"B is," and, " B is black," in the former case affirm- 
ing that B is existing, and in the latter that B is 



144 Harris's account 

existing black, he would have preserved his state- 
ments from apparent contradiction, and would not 
have been constrained to give to the word is so dif- 
ferent a signification in different cases of its occur- 
rence. If, moreover, he had said this, the differ- 
ence between his doctrine concerning the verb and 
that which is stated by the Britannica would have 
been very considerably reduced. Assertion would 
be, in the opinion of both, the office or essence of the 
verb, the only difference being that, while in the opin- 
ion of the Britannica, the verb directly asserts the 
connexion between the noun and the attribute, in that 
of Harris it does it indirectly, by interposing between 
the predicate denoting the form of existence, and 
the subject, a direct assertion of existence itself,- so 
that the latter becomes a mere copula, — as in the 
instance, " God is good,'' meaning, when resolved in 
this manner, God is existing, or exists, good. 

If this could be supposed to be the meaning of Mr. 
Harris, it would free him from another difficulty in 
which some of his statements seem to involve him. 
" Some attributes," he tells us, "joined to substan- 
tives, make without further help a perfect assertive 
sentence, because they necessarily involve an attri- 
butive and an assertion; as in the instance, John 
writeth, which may be analyzed into, is writing." 
Now, this is obviously true if the substantive verb 
asserts, even though it should, in all cases, merely 
assert existence. But how can it be true if the verb 
does not assert, — if it merely denotes existence, i. e. 
unless Mr. Harris regards the two phrases, "to de- 



OPPOSED. 145 

note existence/' and " to affirm existence" as being 
identical, which his language will, as we have seen, 
scarcely admit ns to suppose. I fear, however, it 
would not deliver him from another difficulty which 
attaches itself to his definition of a verb. Referring 
to such attributives as have been mentioned above, 
he says that " all those attributives which have this 
double power of denoting both an attribute and an 
assertion, make the species of words which gram- 
marians call verbs." Does not this definition de- 
grade the substantive verb from its verbal rank alto- 
gether ? Does the substantive verb, on Mr. Harris's 
principles, denote an attribute, and an assertion ? 
It ts hard to see how it can even contain an asse?'- 
tion. On the principles laid down in the preceding- 
pages, this is, indeed, the case ; for assertion is the 
especial work of all verbs ; it constitutes their es- 
sence. Thus, in the example, ^' Milton was a great 
poet," the verb " was" joins the subject and the predi- 
cate together, or affirms a connexion between them. 
But, unless we have conjectured aright concerning 
the possible meaning of Mr. Harris, in the statement 
of his doctrine, that " it is the business of the sub- 
stantive verb to denote existence," and that, conse- 
quently, the phrase "Bis," must be resolved into B 
is existing — in which case there would be little or no 
difference between him and his opponents — -the verb 
" is" involves no assertion whatever ; and, in that 
case, all other verbs must likewise be destitute of it. 
It is still more clear that the substantive verb does 
not denote an attribute. In the phrase, " Cicero 

L 



146 TENSE. 

was eloquent," it is the latter term, not the verb was, 
that expresses the attribute ; and if it be said that 
existence is an attribute, so that in the phrase, " B 
is," there may be both an assertion, and an attribute, 
I answer that, when that phrase is resolved into, B 
is existing, as it must be to make "is" express asser- 
tion, the attribute is denoted by existing, and not 
by the verb " is/' And, if it be doubtful whether 
that word contains either assertion or an attri- 
bute separately, it is abundantly more clear that it 
cannot contain both conjointly, so that the simple 
verb " ^5," is not a verb at all ; and that designation 
can only be given to compound verbs, such as 
"walks," " fears," &c. which may evidently be re- 
solved into, " is walking," " fearing," &c. 

On the whole, then, there is little ground to doubt 
that the verb, stripped of all its occasional adjuncts, 
is exactly equivalent tc the sign + plus in Algebra, — 
that all that is essential to the verb is assertion (we say 
^55e;^^^«/, because individual verbs may contain more 
than is essential to them as verbs), — " that every 
word which predicates is a verb, and that nothing 
is so which does not predicate." 

The Tenses of Verbs, 

Though it is thus essential to the verb to predi- 
cate, it will be remembered that the sign of predica- 
tion is more frequently implied than expressed; we 
more generally say, "Man lives, or thinks," than man 
"is living," or "thinking." Still the verb always 



ORIGIN OF. 147 

connects an attribute with some subject ; and the 
reader will observe that the modification of the verb 
which we call tense, results from a peculiarity of 
character by which some of these attributes are 
distinguished. "Were they all essential and, of 
course, permanent ones, there would be no need of 
tense. Subjects and attributes being invariably 
united, we should then merely require a sign to ex- 
press the connexion between them, and that sign 
would not need to undergo any variation. Now^ 
this is the case with some attributes, but not with 
all. Man, as it has been well said, " is always 
mortal, but he is not always ill, or in health, or black, 
or white, or in motion, or at rest, &c." Language 
must, consequently, have some method of denoting 
the time in which the attribute is found in connex- 
ion with the subject, — or in which the assertion in- 
volved in the verb is true. This, then, is the origin 
and the use of tenses. They are not intended to 
effect, nor do they effect, any change in the attri- 
bute which the verb connects with its subject, but 
to intimate the time when the connexion exists. 
Thus, scribit, scripsit, scripserat, and scribet, denote 
the same attribute — to write, while the difference 
between them is, that they denote writing at differ- 
ent times, — or rather the different times in which 
the attribute writing is predicable of a certain indi- 
vidual. 

By the tenses of verbs we are, then, to understand 
the particular modifications they are made to undergo 

l2 



148 DISTINCTION 

to render them significant of the times in which the 
assertion involved in the verb is true. 

The most obvious division of time is that which 
separates it into the three classes of past, present, 
and inture time ; nor can any language be regarded 
as complete whose verbs have not tenses to mark 
these distinctions. It is asserted, indeed, by Mr. 
Harris, and said by the Britannica, to have been 
demonstrated by him, that there is no such thing 
as present time, — that, strictly speaking, all. time is 
either past or future, the present resembling a ma- 
thematical point, which, in fact, is nothing. Of 
time in general, the notion of which is gained by 
observing things in succession, it has been said, 
"that it has somethings analogous to space." The 
two things, says Harris, " are both of them by nature 
continuous, and as such they both of them imply 
extension. Thus between London and Salisbury, 
there is the extension of space, and between yester- 
day and to-morrow, the extension ot time. But in 
this they differ, that all the parts of space exist at 
once, and together ; while those of time only exist 
in transition or succession. Hence, then, we may 
gain some idea of time, by considering it under the 
notion of a transient continuity !' It might, perhaps, 
be well to pause here, and ask what the last two 
words mean. Our limits, however, forbid this, and 
we must pass on to the conclusion he draws from 
the affirmed necessarily transient nature of time, 
viz. that there cannot (strictly speaking) be any 
such thing as present time. " For if all time," he 



OF TENSE. 149 

argues, " be transient as well as continuous, it can- 
not, like a line," (i. e, as I understand the words, as 
a line cannot^) " be present all together" (which no 
one ever thought of supposing concerning a line 
coming, we shall suppose, from the right, and slid- 
ing before us to the left; but the question is, must 
not dispart of the line be present, that is, present to 
us ?) " but part will necessarily be gone, and part 
be coming." And, may we not add, part will neces- 
sarily have reached us, and so be present. " If, 
therefore," he continues, " any portion of its conti- 
nuity were to be present at once, it would so far quit 
its transient nature, and be time no longer, but if no 
portion of its continuity can be thus present, how 
can time possibly be present, to which such con- 
tinuity is essential ? " Might we not ask whether, 
if any part of the passing rope be present to us, that 
circumstance would not, on these principles, break 
the continuity of the rope ? 

Denying the existence of present time, he yet 
proceeds to define it ! — as the bound of completion 
to the past, and the bound of commencement to the 
future ; " from whence," he adds, "we may conceive 
its nature or end, which is to be the medium of con- 
tinuity between the past and the fature, so as to 
render time, through all its parts, one entire and 
perfect whole." 

Now I am unable to free myself from the impres- 
sion that in all this there is more of paradox than of 
common sense. It is supported by the appearance 
of mathematical demonstration, yet I cannot but 



150 PRESENT TENSE. 

suspect some radical fallacy in the whole reasoning. 
This is not the place for any disquisition on the 
nature, or notion, of time — one of the most abstract 
of our notions ; but, assuming the popular concep- 
tion of it to be the right one, it would not be difl&- 
cult to show, perhaps, that, if there be no present 
time, there can be no past and future ; for time 
past consists of that which was once present, — and 
time to come of that which will hereafter be present, 
if not to us, at least to our successors. No doubt 
time is essentially transient. It is constantly com- 
ing up to us from the future, and passing onwards 
to the past ; but, for that very reason, it is con- 
stantly passing hy us ; and I see no reason why 
that part of the line which has come up to us, and 
is passing hy us, should not be denominated present 
time, though it be allowed that the line is always in 
motion. 

The common sense of men as it regards present 
time, is strongly marked by the grammars of various 
nations, which almost invariably give a present 
tense to their verbs. The Hebrew is the only one 
of any importance which seems to furnish an excep- 
tion to this remark. According to the ordinary 
import of the term, it has only two tenses, the past 
and the future. " It employs a participle, however, 
to express the idea of present time. In many in- 
stances, too, the future is made to answer the pur- 
poses of the present." 

The general division of time into past, present, 
and future, is, then, we think correct,— since the 



AORIST. 151 

assertion involved in the verb, if true at all, must be 
so in one or other of these periods. It was once 
true — it is true now — or it will be so hereafter. Some 
of these general divisions are, however, capable of 
subdivision. Although this should not be found to 
be the case with present time, it is certain that the 
past and the future may be separated into well de- 
fined portions or periods, capable of being so indi- 
cated as to give to language all necessary precision. 
Our efforts, then, must here be employed to exhibit 
those natural divisions of past and future time which 
form the ground for the distinct tenses of both. 

Before we proceed to do this, however, it may be 
expedient to examine that form of the verb which is 
supposed to indicate no time whatever, — and to in- 
quire whether the present is equally capable of sub- 
division with the past, and the future ; our remarks 
on these two points must be blended together. 

Let it be observed, then, that the assertion in- 
volved in the verb may not refer to any time ; or, 
if there be a reference to time past, or future, it may 
be to time indefinitely past or future. This circum- 
stance has given rise to the tenses called aorists, 
the name of which, descriptive of their meaning, is 
derived from the Greek '^ a," privative, and opog^ a 
bound or limit. The aorist is the unbounded or in- 
definite tense. In the Greek, where the tenses 
called aorists are used, they are confined to past 
time, and are intended to distinguish time which 
is indefinitely past from that which is definitely so. 
It is however manifest, that language will admit of 



152 



PRESENT TENSE. 



an aorist or aorists of the future as well as the past, 
whether any grammars contain such tenses or not. 
Mr. Harris, indeed, thinks there may be an aorist 
of the present, as well as of the past and future. 
"It seems," he says, "agreeable to reason, that, 
whenever time is signified without any farther cir- 
cumscription than that of simple present, past, or 
future, the tense is an aorist." "When I say, I read, 
or am reading," says another advocate of this doc- 
trine, " I express present time definitely ; but w^hen 
I add, a merry heart maketh a glad countenance, I 
state what is not limited to any definite time, but 
what may be afiirmed at all times. Hence the latter 
is time present indefinite, aoptcrrwg." Doubtless, we 
regard the latter assertion as a general one, yet, as 
it is not easy to conceive that of two verbs, in the 
same form and tense, one should " express' definite, 
and the other ^definite time, it must be supposed 
that w^e reach this conclusion by inference. 

The writer of the article Grammar in the Brit- 
annica contends against the admission of an aorist 
of the present, on the ground that from its very na- 
ture it is perfectly indefinite, and, therefore, cannot 
give notice of any determinate portion of time. " A 
thing," he says, " may have been present fifty years 
ago, may be present now, or at any future period/' 
It would seem, at first sight, to follow from this 
statement, that he is bound to admit an aorist of the 
present, — yea to maintain that all present time is 
aoristic, rather than refiise to admit an aorist of the 
present. It must be remembered, however, that he 
only denies the existence of an aoristic present in 



PRESENT TENSE. 



153 



contradistinction to other presents which are to be 
considered definite. 

Dr. Dewar, adopting the suggestion of Home 
Tooke, states that " that part of the verb which is 
called the present indicative is a simple or general 
indicative, and that no time is implied in it. When 
we say, ' the sun rises in summer much earlier than 
in winter/ we assert a fact applicable to past, present, 
and future." " Of the same nature," he adds, " are 
mathematical theorems, and general propositions." 
On this account he conceives that the present indi- 
cative "might receive the appellation of a universal 
aorist.'' The reader must observe that by the phrase, 
a universal aorist. Dr. Dewar intends that this form 
of the verb, is, in reference to time, perfectly indefi- 
nite, that no time is indicated by it, or, what amounts 
to the same thing, that all time is included in it. 

With this opinion I am far more disposed to con- 
cur than with that of those who make an aorist of 
the present tense, in opposition to a supposed definite 
present. It is most manifest to me that the present 
of the indicative is essentially aoristic. The ex- 
pressions " the boy reads," — "the bird flies," — " the 
lion roars," connect indeed the action with the agent, 
but, of themselves, they supply no means of ascer- 
taining the time of the connexion. They do not 
intimate that it exists now, or at the present mo- 
ment. Such expressions constitute indeed the form 
of the verb which is frequently used to denote pre- 
sent transactions; but "the idea of present time is, 
even then, attached to the expressions, in conse- 
quence of an inference drawn from the subject.'' 



154 PEESENT TENSE. 

This is manifest from the fact, that, in the particular 
cases just mentioned, we conceive general time to 
be denoted, — a proof that our conception of time is^ 
in all cases of the use of this form of the verb, 
gained by inference. In confirmation of this opin- 
ion, Dr. Dewar says, that '' this tense is used in 
describing events which have been completed at a 
time past, — as, yesterday, when walking alone, whom 
do I see but my old kinsman. " I am glad, sa;i/s he, 
to find you looking so well. Grammarians," he adds, 
'' never doubting that such indications are essen- 
tially of the present tense, have supposed that in 
such sentences the past is, for the sake of vivid 
representation, described by a figure of speech, as 
present. The statements," he again adds, " now 
made show that such explanations are unneces- 
sary; and, if they are just, the consideration that 
this indication is not restricted to any tense, will 
account for the facility with which we reconcile our 
minds to a figure of speech which would otherwise 
appear a distortion. 

" We sometimes, also," he further observes, " use 
this general indicative in describing future events> 
and then futurity is pointed out by some other word 
in the sentence, or by the evident import of the 
whole. Next Tuesday ts the first of April, is a sen- 
tence equally proper with next Tuesday will he the 
first of April. And we say, without any dread of 
being accused of vicious diction, ^to-morrow he he- 
gins his journey.' '* 

But, though time is not defined by that form of 



PRESENT TENSE. 155 

the indicative which we are now considering, "we 
are not altogether destitute/' Dr. Dewar observes, 
" of resources for marking with precision the present 
tense," or present time. " Every language possesses 
separate words for the purpose, such as now in Eng- 
lish, and the corresponding words in other languages. 
It happens that, in our language, without the use of 
such additions, we indicate present time by employ- 
ing the substantive verb with the participle, instead 
of the usual indicative. " He writes," is the indica- 
tive without tense. " He is writing/' is the present 
indicative. When we say, "he writes a good hand," 
or, "he writes to his relations every month," we 
restrict our meaning to no particular time. But 
when we say, " he is writing," we describe a present 
transaction." He adds, however, with great jus- 
tice, " that this distinction is entirely conventional. 
The original meaning of this combination of words 
implies nothing to distinguish it from the simple 
indicative, as the verb ^ is,' and the termination 
^ ing/ are, with respect to tense, equally general." 

The truth of these statements with respect to both 
forms of the indicative, "he writes," and, "he is 
writing," seems to me to be involved in the definition 
of the verb laid down at the commencement of our 
account of this part of speech, viz. that assertion is 
its essence, or that it is equivalent to the sign + 
in Algebra. The verb, in each case, " he writes/' 
and "he is writing," merely affirms a connexion 
between "he" and "writing." It would seem to 
imply, perhaps, an inseparable connexion ; but, as 



156 PAST TIME. 

we know that some attributes are only at times con- 
nected with their subjects, we infer ^ when the verb 
"is" unites a separable attribute with its subject, 
that they are united at the present instant ; and 
hence this form of the verb, though it expresses no 
time, comes to be regarded by us as indicating pre- 
sent time, and is, indeed, used by us "conventionally" 
for that very purpose. 

Mr. Harris admits into his enumeration of the 
tenses three as belonging to the present; viz. an 
inceptive present, — a middle present, — and a com- 
pletive present. The firsts to denote an action as 
about to begin, as, " I am going to write ;*' the second ^ 
to denote an action as in a state of progress, as, "I 
am writing ;" the thirds to denote it as brought to a 
conclusion, as, " I have written." The distinction 
appears to me to be in harmony with the general 
character of the book, in which there is, occasionally 
at least, more of learning, and of the appearance 
of philosophical distinctions, than of plain common 
sense. It is wonderful that he did not perceive, as 
is justly remarked by the Britannica, that the middle 
present is in fact the only one. Nothing can be 
more obvious than that his inceptive present is a 
future tense ; and his completive present, " I have 
written," a past tense. 

The Divisions of Past Time. 

In reference to this department of time there are 
two or three obvious principles of division, the light 



PRINCIPLES OF DIVISION. 157 

of which will afford us a sufficient guide. Confin- 
ing our observations — ^which for the sake of more 
easy illustration it will be expedient to do — to active 
verbs, it is manifest that the action, declared by the 
verb, must have taken place at some definite or 
indefinite period of past time. Verbs must, accor- 
dingly, be susceptible of variations designed to indi- 
cate the fact in reference to this particular point ; 
i, e. there must be an aoristic past, and a definite 
past, tense. In addition to this they must, also, 
admit of another variation; for, according to the 
general doctrine at least, an action may be consi- 
dered, in respect of time, as past ; but in respect of 
progress, as unfinished. "I was walking," is said 
to denote past time, but incomplete action. " I have 
walked," past time, and finished action. The dis- 
tinction to which 1 now refer is not in the above 
words very accurately stated ; for how can an 
action, declared to be incomplete, or unfinished, be 
affirmed to be past? How can the time be sepa- 
rated from the action? If the latter be unfinished, 
how can the time of performance be gone by.^ — or, 
in other words, how can the form of the verb which 
denotes this be a past tense ? Still the state of' the 
action supplies us, equally with the definiteness or 
indefiniteness of the time, with a principle of division; 
for we may have occasion to represent an action as 
in a state of progress at some past time, — or as 
being now^ completed ; so that we require an imper- 
fect and 2, perfect tense. Again, we may have occa- 
sion to represent an action, or event, as having 



158 AORIST AND DEFINITE. 

taken place before the occurrence of some other 
action, or event, which is, also, a past event. We 
require, accordingly, d. pluperfect tense. These prin- 
ciples of division supply us with five distinct tenses 
of the past ; and they are, we think, as many as 
it will be found expedient for any language to mark. 
The distinctions themselves may be expressed, 
either by altering the termination of the verb, or by 
prefixing auxiliaries to it. We proceed to a more 
particular consideration of them, together with the 
manner in which they are effiected. 

I. Then, we may have occasion to state simply 
that an action took place in some period of past time. 
This gives rise to an aorist of the past. The Greek 
language admits this tense ; the Latin does not. In 
the latter, the preter-perfect is made to serve the 
purpose of the aorist in Greek ; ^, e. to denote a 
finished action at some indefinite past time, as well 
as at some time which is both past and definite. 
The English language, also, possesses this tense. 
The following are examples ; " I wrote a letter to 
him." ^^ The Lord gave." "I fought a good 
fight." These expressions are manifestly aoristic, 
denoting past time, indeed, but leaving it quite un- 
certain whether the actions took place a day, a 
week, a year, or even a century ago. 

n. We may have occasion to state, that an action 
took place at some definite period of past time. This 
gives rise to a tense which stands in direct opposi- 
tion to the aorist of the past, and may be called the 
definite of the past. As far as past time can be de- 



IMPERFECT. 159 

fiuitely marked by changes upon the termination of 
the verb, or by the prefixing of auxiliaries to it, it 
is thus marked by the preter-perfect of Greek and 
English verbs. ^^ I have written my letter/' implies 
that the action of writing had but recently termi- 
nated, and thus fixes the time of its performance. 
In the following expressions the distinction existing 
between the definite and the aoristic past is very 
strongly marked. " The Lord gave.'' Here the 
time of the donation is undetermined : but in the fol- 
lowing clause ; — " The Lord hath taken away/' the 
time of the bereavement is sufliciently indicated ; it 
is represented as having been suffered at, or near to, 
the time when the announcement was made. 

IIL We may have occasion to represent an action 
as having been in the course of accomplishment at a 
former period, — " He was writing when I passed by 
his room." Nothing is here said of the present state 
of the action. It may now^ be proceeding, — or it 
may have been finished. What is the case in this re- 
spect the words themselves do not enable us to judge ; 
and, since room is left, by this form of expression, 
for supposing that the action may even yet be in a 
state of progress, it is denominated by the Latins 
the preter-imperfect tense ; and by the Greeks yet 
more happily, " the incomplete past of the past." 

The tense now under consideration is, as we are 
correctly told by Mr. Harris, " sometimes employed 
to denote what is usual and customary. Thus," he 
adds, " ^snrgebat' and ' scribebat' signify not only 
he was rising, he was writing, but he used to rise. 



160 



PERFECT. 



he used to write." He is not, however, happy in 
his statement of the reason for this mode of using 
the imperfect. The ground on which it rests is, we 
apprehend, that, when an action has become habit- 
ual to a person, there is some reason to suppose 
that it may be going on at the moment when it is 
referred to ; hence the " incomplete past of the 
past," as we have seen the Greeks denominated it, 
is obviously the most proper tense to be employed. 

IV. We may have occasion to represent an action 
as being now fully completed, in contradistinction 
from one which may be in a state of progress. 
This is, in our language, effected by the aid of the 
verb " have," in connexion with the past tense of 
the principal verb. "I was walking," denotes that 
the action of walking had commenced, and was con- 
tinuing, at some former period. " I have walked," 
denotes that I am in possession of the complete act 
of walking, I have it. The following statement of 
the Britannica is not less just than ingenious. 
" The verb have, which is included in the preter- 
perfect, is plainly a verb of the present tense denot- 
ing possession. " In instances," he adds, " where 
^ have' is used in connexion with a noun, this is 
obvious and universally acknowledged. I have a 
gold watch, is, I possess a gold watch. Now, as he 
proceeds to observe, " the verb have must retain 
its signification when used as an auxiliary verb, so 
that the phrase, " I have written a letter," means, I 
possess, at present, the finished action of writing 



PERFECT AND IMPERFECT. 161 

a letter;" L e. the action has been just brought to a 
final close. 

There is thus a broad line of distinction between 
the imperfect and the perfect tenses. Hence, it is 
manifest, that the only true English imperfect is the 
substantive verb, in connexion with the active par- 
ticiple, as, " I was walking." Dr. Dewar, to my sur- 
prise, considers " I walked," " I wrote," &c. as be- 
longing to the imperfect tense. " They denote," he 
says, "that the action was begun, and was continued^' 
he adds, " at some past time." This assertion is 
manifestly contrary to fact. " I wrote my letter,*' 
denotes the action as fully and completely past, as, 
^^ I have written my letter." Whatever differences 
may exist between the two phrases, in this respect 
there is none at all. The Britannica, accordingly, 
considers, " I wrote Dr did write," as the aorist of 
the past, " did," he says, " expresses the finished 
performance of some action." It does not represent 
it as doing, but done. " I wrote, or did w^rite, means 
that, at some past time, I performed the action of 
writing J and finished it." 

Now, if the aorist of the past, and the perfect, 
both denote finished action, where is the difference 
between them ? There is, in fact, extremely little. 
The former is, indeed, a perfect tense, if we may 
thus call it, as contrasted with the imperfect, but it 
does not lose its indefinite character as to time. 
The aorist states an action as finished in some in- 
definite period of past time. The perfect represents 
it as ended at a definite period, by exhibiting its 



162 



PERFECT AND IMPERFECT. 



completion as a thing now possessed. ^^ I wrote a 
letter;" it may be a month or a year ago. '^ I have 
written a letter/' i, e, I j)ossess the finished action 
of writing, and, therefore, it was but lately per- 
formed. 

On this account, as it has been correctly stated, 
" the perfect is always joined with a portion of time 
which includes the present now, or instant; for 
otherwise it could not signify, as it always does, the 
present possession of the finishing of an action ; but 
the aorist, which signifies no such possession, is as 
constantly joined with a portion of past time which 
excludes the present now, or instant. Thus we 
say, ' I have written a letter this day, or this week ; 
but ^I wrote a letter yesterday, last w^eek, &c.' " It 
is proper to observe here, however, that, when a 
portion of time, including the present instant, con- 
sist of obviously distinct parts, we may use the 
aorist; thus we might say, without the least impro- 
priety, I wrote, as well as I have written, a letter 
to-day ; since, on account of the division of the day 
into morning, noon, &c. the expression still retains 
its aoristic character. It leaves it undetermined 
whether the action of writing was performed in the 
early, or the latter part of the day. But it is at 
variance with the practice of every correct speaker 
to say, I have written a letter yesterday. Yesterday 
cannot include the present instant. It has com- 
pletely passed away, and the action of writing went 
along with it. To employ the phrase, " we have 
written a letter yesterday," would be in effect to 



HOW USED. 163 

declare that we now possess an action which van- 
ished with the day that gave it birth. It is, indeed, 
true that the former part of the present day is as 
completely past and gone as yesterday, or the last 
century ; but, in consequence of the artificial dis- 
tinctioDs of time, we are apt to conceive of the w^hole 
period denoted by the respective terms day, week, 
month, year or century, as not moving, but remain- 
ing fixed, till the whole of each has terminated. 
Hence, we both may, and do, say, " I have written 
to him this year," though weeks, and even months, 
may have elapsed since the letter was dispatched. 

The foregoing explanation of this tense will ac- 
count for the very peculiar manner in which it 
was occasionally used by the Latins, viz. " so as to 
imply the very reverse of the verb in its natural 
signification.'* The following instances are given 
by Mr. Harris. "Yixit signified is dead; fuit 
signified now is noty is no more. It was in this 
sense that Cicero addressed the people of Rome, 
when he had put to death the leaders in the Catili- 
narian conspiracy. He appeared in the Forum, and 
cried out with a loud voice, ' Vixerunt ' (they have 
lived)." So Virgil, 



-' Fuimus Trees, fuit Illium, et ingens 
Gloria Dardanidam' 



" The reason of this," adds Mr. Harris, "is de- 
rived from the completive power of the tense here 
mentioned. We see that the periods of nature, and 

M 2 



164 PLUPERFECT. 

of human affairs, are maintained by the reciprocal 
succession of contraries. It is thus with calm and 
tempest; with day and night; with prosperity and 
adversity ; with glory and ignominy ; with life and 
death. Hence, then, in the instances above, the 
completion of one contrary is put for the commence- 
ment of the other, and to say, hath livedo or hath 
beerij has the same meaning with is dead, or is no 
moj'e," There is, perhaps, a little too much of fancy 
in the above representation of a succession of con- 
traries in human affairs. The simple fact seems to 
be, that, in the instances referred to, what Mr. Har- 
ris calls the " commencement of the second period," 
is inferred from the asserted close of the first, — the 
commencement of death from the asserted close of 
life. " Fuit" — he hath lived, i. e. he is now in pos- 
session of the finished action of living. The state 
of living exists, therefore, no longer; in other 
w^ords, he is dead. 

Y. We may have occasion to represent an action as 
having been fully accomplished before the occurrence 
of another past action. This gives rise to the plu- 
perfect tense, as, I had written my letter before you 
came into the room. The entrance of the person 
into the room is here represented, by the aorist, 
came, as a past event, — an event completely past ; 
but the writing of the letter was previous to that 
event. At the time when it took place, the person 
denoted by the pronoun he, had, or possessed, the 
finished action of writing the letter. The action 
had \)^^\\. fully performed though but recently per- 



PLUPERFECT. ^ 165 

formed. This tense is, then^ most aptly denominated 
the pluperfect; or, as the Latins more fully express 
it, the plusquam perfectum, or mo7'e than perfect. 
It is not an aorist, because it represents the action 
as having taken place at a definite period of past 
time. The entrance of the person into the room is, 
in the circumstances of the case, a definite period. 
The writing of the letter took place at a definite 
period before that ; for the word " had'' represents 
it as just accomplished; so that the time is altoge- 
ther definite. It is distinguished from the imperfect 
by its name, and is very properly so distinguished 
since it represents the action as fully accomplished, 
or completely past. It is distinguished from the 
perfect in the same way in which the comparative 
degree differs from the positive, — by an excess of 
the same general qnality. The perfect intimates 
the completion of an action, or, in other words, refers 
to time completely past. The plusquam perfectum 
specifies a period of time which had completely passed 
away before another period which has itself now 
wholly departed. 

The whole of the previous statement tends to 
evince the mistake of those who call the past form 
of English verbs the imperfect tense, instead of the 
aorist ; for, unless the word " came," in the instance, 
" I had written my letter before you came into the 
room," denote time perfectly past, or, an action 
fully accomplished, i. e. unless it be a perfect tense, 
it is obviously impossible that the clause, " I had 
written my letter," can denote time more than per- 



166 AORIST OF THE FUTURE. 

fectly past, or be rightly denominated tlie plusquam 
perfectiim tense. The phiperfect, as we now, and, 
we think, very properly, call it, can only be the 
PERFECT tense^ unless " came'' be a perfect tense, i, e. 
the English aorist, and not the imperfect. 

The Divisions of Future Time, 

The same principles of division which have guided 
ns in reference to past time, will direct ns in the 
division of the future. They are, it will be remem- 
bered, the time and the state of the action. 

The time may be stated definitely, or indefinitely. 

The action may be exhibited as in a state of pro- 
gress, or completed. 

The employment of these principles of division 
may give rise to four distinct tenses of the future, — 
the aorist, the definite, the imperfect, and the perfect 
tenses of that great general division of time. Whe- 
ther there exist in any particular language distinct 
and definite forms of expression to denote these four 
tenses, is a point of subordinate importance. Gene- 
ral grammar inquires what language may be, as well 
as how particular languages came to be what they 
are. 

I. The aorist of the future. Of this tense, "scri- 
bam," or, " I shall write," is an example, denoting 
time to come indefinitely. It does not specify the 
precise period when the action of writing is to be 
performed, whether to-morrow, or next day, or next 
year. It might possibly be the imperfect of the 



DEFINITE AND IMPERFECT. 167 

future as well as the aorist ; i, e. it might assert, as 
some suppose, that the action will be m progress in 
some indefinite period of future time. That fact, if 
it should be found to be a fact, would not deprive it 
of its aoristic character ; and this is all to which 
the attention of the reader is for the present di- 
rected. 

II. The definite future. Of this tense, " scripturus 
sum, I am about to write," is an example. The 
words fix the period when the action of writing is to 
take place. They form, therefore, the definite, in 
opposition to the aoristic, future. '^ Scripsero, I 
shall have written," is another example of this tense ; 
for the words denote that at some other time, which 
is always specified when this form of expression is 
used, the action of writing will have been complet- 
ed — and completed not at a period indefinitely pre- 
vious to that time, but immediately previous to it ; 
for "shall," denotes future time ; " written," finished 
action ; and " have," present possession : so that 
the meaning is, at the time specified, I shall be in 
possession of the finished action of writing the 
letter. 

III. The imperfect of the future. Of this tense, 
" I shall be writing," is an example, since it asserts 
that the action of writing will be in a state of pro- 
gress at some future time ; and, if that time be 
indefinite, it will be an aorist as well as the im- 
perfect. 

Scribam, I shall write, is also regarded as the im- 
perfect future by many, perhaps by most, writers. 



168 FUTURE PERFECT. 

" It denotes," says the Britannica; "future time and 
mcomplete action ; for it does not say whether I am 
to write for a long or a short time, or whether I 
shall finish what I promised to begin." This is, 
I cannot but think, a mistake. " Scribam," I shall 
write, appears to be the simple aorist of the future, 
denoting indefinite time, but, as iu the case of the 
aorist of the past, finished action. Were the case 
otherwise, there would be no difference in meaning 
between " I shall write," and, " I shall be writing," 
the supposition of which involves absurdity. That 
the phrase, " I shall be writing," denotes in- 
complete action, there can be no doubt. This is the 
only true imperfect of the future. The other phrase, 
" I shall write," is the perfect as well as the aorist 
of the future. 

IV. The perfect of the future. " Scripsero, I 
shall have written," was referred to formerly as an 
example of the definite future. It is, also, the 
perfect in opposition to the imperfect. The word 
" written,*' denotes finished action, and " have" defi- 
nite time. It may perhaps be an imperfection in 
our language that the same phrase should be used 
to signify two separate divisions of the future ; yet 
the practice occasions no ambiguity, nor is it the 
only case of the kind. " Scribam," according to the 
view we take of it, is both an aorist, and a perfect. 
On the contrary, " scripturus sum," I am about to 
write, is a definite future, as well as a perfect. The 
words, as we have seen, fix the period when the 
action is to take place. They do not, therefore, 
form an aorist ; and they would seem to denote. 



FUTURE HOW FORMED. 169 

though this is not the general opinion, complete 
action, — not less so, indeed, than, "I shall write," — 
and so to constitute a perfect tense. Were it true 
that the phrase, "I am about to w^rite," denotes un- 
finished action, — or forms an imperfect tense — there 
would be no difference between it and the phrase, 
" I am about to be writing ;" a supposition which 
involves absurdity. " I am about to be writing," 
is an example of the definite combined with the 
true imperfect fiiture. 

The future tense may be formed, it is obvious, 
in various w^ays. Dr. Dewar states, that the words 
employed to denote it " are derived from verbs sig- 
nifying resolution, obligation, or other preparatory 
circumstances ; and, with respect to etymology, are 
■equivalent to such English expressions as, ^I intend 
to go,* ' I must go,' ' I am likely to go,' * I prepare to 
go.' " This is manifestly the case with the words 
"shall" and "will," employed in our language to 
denote future time. Shall is of Saxon origin, and 
means owe, or ought. Thus, in Chaucer, " The 
faith I shall to God," obviously intends, the faith I 
owe to God. " I shall it," means I owe it, — it is my 
duty to do it ; and, as it is assumed that duty is 
generally discharged, the word " shall," in connexion 
with a verb of action, may be employed to denote 
the certain occurrence of that action. 

" Will" is the old English verb " wol," or " woll," 
and has precisely the same signification. " I will 
it" means I desire or determine it; so that both 
words, will and shall, are admirably adapted to de- 
note future actions whose existence depends upon 



170 AUXILIARIES. 

determination, obligation, &c. The two terms are 
not, however, used indiscriminately to denote future 
events. A proper regard is paid to their original 
meanings when employed for this purpose. Hence 
" will," generally at least, expresses determination; 
" shall" obligation. "I will write," i.e. lam de- 
termined to write. " Thou wilt write," i. e. art 
determined to write. " He will write," ^. e. he is 
determined to write. It is said, indeed, that will, 
in the first person, expresses determination ; but, in 
the second and third, simple futurity only. This, 
however, if it be so, is not the original but a second- 
ary sense of the w^ord, — a sense which it naturally 
and almost necessarily acquires. When the future 
occurrence of an event depends upon the resolution of 
others, to declare that they vnll it, is almost equiva- 
lent with affirming that it will take place. Hence 
will, in the second and third persons, have come, by 
inference, to denote simple futurity, though they 
primarily express resolution, and express it on the 
part of these persons. Dr. Henry Dewar, indeed, 
denies this. He affirms that the auxiliary " will" 
does not express the resolution of the person spoken 
of, or to, but that of the speaker ; and he produces 
an instance which, it must be confessed, appears, at 
first view, to establish the truth of the first part of 
his assertion, though it leaves the second part, as 
the reader will observe, without any confirmation. 
" We say," is his language, " if you become ob- 
noxious to the criminal law, you will be punished. 
The word will," he adds, " does not imply intention 



BY WHICH FORMED. 171 

or even consent, (^. e. as he means, on the part of 
the person transgressing,) yet it is appropriate, be- 
cause " shall" would imply constraint or authority 
on the part of the speaker." Now, suppose it were 
admitted that, in this instance, the word " will" 
does not express the resolution of the person spoken 
to, we might ask the Doctor how it can possibly ex- 
press the resolution of the speaker, as he affirms it 
does. It is here used, no doubt, as many other 
words are, in its secondary sense — the sense of 
simple futurity. \X is frequently used in this 
secondary sense, not bearing the sense of resolution 
at all; but when this its primary meaning is con- 
veyed by it, it is important to remark that it denotes 
not as Dr. Dewar says the resolution of the speaker, 
but of the person spoken of or to. Thus in asking 
questions, " Will you grant what I request ?" This 
is surely an inquiry respecting the resolution of the 
person addressed. Again, in affirmations, as, " You 
will do as I request;" i. e. you will resolve, on re- 
flection, to act as I wish. 

A similar change has taken place in reference to 
the auxiliary " shall." " 1 shall write " really 
means, as we have seen, primarily at least, I owe to 
write; it is my duty to write. No determination on 
the part of the speaker, as all admit, is expressed by 
shall in the first person. How^ comes it, then, to 
express such determination — as it is generally sup- 
posed it does — in the second and third persons ? 
" you shall do it,'* " he shall do it ;" i. e. as the words 
are explained, I am determined that you and he 



172 AUXILIARIES AND 

shall do it. The present writer would suggest that 
such expressions may be elliptical, and capable of 
being thus resolved, " I will so arrange matters as 
to render it your duty to do it. I will make you 
" shall/' or owe, it. I will place you under the 
powerful authority of obligation to do it. Originally 
its exclusive meaning may have been, I will oblige 
you to do it by rendering it your duty ; but, in pro- 
cess of time, this particular mode of obligation was 
less regarded, and it came to include even physical 
force as one of various modes of giving certainty to 
actions. A remark by Dr. Dewar on the auxiliary 
will, deserves attention. " When we mention any 
thing future with respect to ourselves, although it 
should be the effect of our intention, this does not 
render it proper," he says, " to use the auxiliary 
will;" and, in confirmation of this opinion, he adds, 
^^ in expressing the common acts of our lives which 
are to fill up our future time, we say simply, I 
' shall go,' I ^ shall tell you the whole matter.' The 
reason of this seems to be, that, though the acts re- 
ferred to may, and indeed must, be the result of our 
resolution, or volition, we do not intend to exhibit 
them in that light. Our design is merely to inti- 
mate their certain futurity. Hence we avoid the 
use of the word " will," since it might convey more 
than we intend. " Shall,'' in its secondary sense, 
expresses all we mean ; though, in its primary sense, 
it denotes that we are under obligation to perform 
the promised actions. 

In addition to the tenses of the indicative, those 



SUBJUNCTIVE PRESENT. 173 

of the subjunctive require some notice. Anticipa- 
ting as little as possible remarks which will require 
to be made on the subject of the modes of verbs, it 
is yet necessary to remind the reader that, consis- 
tently with preceding statements concerning the es- 
sence of the verb, the subjunctive must assert as 
well as the indicative. The difference between the 
two modes is thus correctly stated by the Britannica. 
" The indicative asserts something directly concern- 
ing the action; the subjunctive something concerning 
the power or liberty of the agent to perform it." 
Keeping these remarks in mind, it will be seen that, 
though the tenses of the subjunctive bear the same 
name with those of the indicative, their import must 
be materially different. 

1 . The Present of the Subjunctive, 

This tense answers, in the Greek and Latin, "to 
the English auxiliaries may and can." It will, there- 
fore, be necessary to explain the meaning of these 
terms. " May" is a verb of the present tense de- 
noting liberty, permission, or freedom from external 
impediment. "Can" is, also, a verb in the same 
tense, expressive of power, skill, or freedom from in- 
ternal impediment. It is said to be the same with 
the old English verb to "con, " signifying to know. 
The following instance, quoted from the Britannica, 
admirably illustrates the difference between these 
two verbs. "Suppose," says the waiter of the ar- 
ticle Grammar in that work, " we say to one of our 



174 PRESENT. 

transcribers, ^you may write a treatise on grammar/ 
to which he returns for answer, ' I cannot ;' our as- 
sertion evidently supposes him at liberty to write the 
treatise; his answer implies that he is unable or im- 
skilled to do it." 

Now, as the words " may" and '^ can" retain, when 
conjoined with another verb, the meaning which they 
bear when standing alone, the present of the sub- 
junctive, must affirm the existence of present liberty 
or power. " 1 may and can write," means, I have 
permission and power to write ; i. e, I possess both 
710W, — or at the moment of uttering the declaration. 
The writing is represented d.'^ future^ but the permis- 
sion and power to perform it as pi'esent. There are 
cases, however, in which the liberty seems to be fu- 
ture, as well as the action ; as, " You may go to- 
morrow." It has been replied by some that the 
liberty, though it must not be used till to-morrow, is 
now given; as wealth may be possessed though, for 
a season, we should be interdicted from using it. If 
it should be doubted whether liberty, not to be used 
nowy can be properly said to be Jore5e?^^ liberty, the 
reply of the Britannica may be thought sufficient. 
" The liberty or ability, signified by this tense, is 
always represented as present ; but the time of this 
presence is indefinite. If no pa^rticular time be spe- 
cified, we generally refer it to the time of speaking ; 
but another point may be given from which we are 
to compute. ^When he shall have finished you may 
then proceed as you propose.' Here the liberty of 
proceeding is stated as present, not at the time of 



SUBJUNCTIVE. 175 

speaking, but at the time of his finishing, which is 
future to the time of his speaking." 

Most writers maintain that a very near affinity 
exists between the present of the subjunctive, and 
the future of the indicative, — so near as to render 
it often " of little consequence which mode of ex- 
pression we employ." Dr. Dewar says, that the 
phrase, ^* I may go," is " radically future in its ap- 
plication." To a certain extent this is true ; yet 
we must bear carefully in mind the distinction which 
exists between the action itself, and the liberty of 
the agent to perform it. The example produced by 
Dr. Dewar, represents the going as future ; and to 
that extent, the tense, we are now considering, has 
an affinity with the indicative future ; but it denotes 
the present possession of the liberty to go, and, in 
that respect, is not a future. If the entire phrase, 
" I may go," were future in its application, as Dr. 
Dewar asserts, it would be impossible to regard it 
as \\\& present of the subjunctive. 

The preceding statements explain one or two 
facts alluded to by more than one w^riter. The 
tense of which we are speaking represents the action 
as contingent^ — a fact not satisfactorily accounted 
for by the Britannica. We have seen that the clause 
"I may go," exhibits the action ^i going as future. 
It is, therefore, contingent on two accounts. In the 
first place, the liberty to go, which is affirmed to 
exist at present, may cease before the period of 
going arrives : or, secondly, if it remain, it may not 
be used. " It is not necessary that a man should 



176 



IMPERFECT. 



perform an action because he has the capacity to 
perform it." 

Again, this tense is used to signify command or 
request^ as, " you may give my compliments to him ;" 
i. e. for that is all that is said, " you are at liberty 
to do so.'' The person addressed infers, however, 
that we wish him to do it; hence the phrase is a 
virtual command. 

2. The Imperfect of the Subjunctive, 

The Britannica states very justly, that this tense 
asserts the liberty to perform an action as having 
existed in some indefinite period of past time, while 
it leaves room for supposing that its performance 
may be even yet in progress ; as, " I said that I would 
do whatever he might command." It maybe well to 
observe here that, when the subjunctive is connected 
with an indicative verb in the past tense, — as in the 
instances, " I said that I would go," "I knew that I 
should fall," the statement of the Britannica ap- 
pears evidently to hold good. But is it equally evi- 
dent, or even true, that past time is expressed by 
the subjunctive in such phrases as the following, "I 
would go if you would reward me." The meaning of 
the auxiliaries will afford assistance in this point. 
"Might" is thepreterite of the verb "may ;" " could" 
the preterite of the verb " can ;" "would" the preter- 
ite of the verb " will." I might or could go ; i. e. I had 
permission or power to go. The act of going is by 
this phrase represented as future in relation to the 



IMPERFECT. 



177 



permission or power ; the permission, &c., is past in 
relation to the act. The jjermtssto?i, &c. is said to 
have existed in time past ; the going, should it take 
place at all, will exist in time to come. This expla- 
nation accounts for the different degrees of certainty 
w^hich " may" and "might"' impress on the future 
events which they are employed to introduce. Both 
of them denote, as it has been justly said, "uncer- 
tain or conditional futurity." But " may" inti- 
mates, as every one feels, " a state of greater prepa- 
ration, and a stronger probability of the contingency 
taking place." This it does by the force of its own 
meaning. " I may go," intends I have now per- 
mission to go. "I might go," means I had formerly 
permission to go. But, as the words do not state 
that the permission yet remains, yea seem rather to 
intimate that it has been withdrawn, the act of 
going is doubly uncertain. 

The example, referred to formerly, "I would go 
if you would reward me," is of more difficult reso- 
lution. Still, as " would'' is the past tense of will, it 
must denote past time. But, as all time is relative 
and as an event may be past in relation to one 
period, and future in relation to another, the deter- 
mination expressed by "'would," though subsequent 
to the present moment, may be previous to the period 
of the delicately solicited reward. The words carry 
us forward to the latter period; and the speaker, 
looking back from that period, says not that deter- 
mination will then exist, but that it had existed, or, 



178 PERFECT AND PLUPERFECT. 

would have existed, if the promise of a reward had 
been given. 

3. The Perfect of the Subjunctive, 

Of this tense, the Britannica seems to have given 
a just account. The present of this mode " states 
the agent as at liberty to be performing an unfinished 
action ; the perfect states him as at liberty to per- 
form the action considered as finished. ' I may be 
writing a letter when you come/ ^. e, I am at liberty 
to be writing a letter when you come. ' I may have 
written a letter when you come/ i, e. I am at liberty 
to be in possession of the finished action of writing 
a letter when you come." 

4. The Pluperfect of the Subjunctive, 

This tense represents an agent as having been at 
liberty to possess a finished action before another 
action which is past and finished; as, "I might have 
written a letter before you came/' i, e. ''\ was, then, 
at liberty to possess the finished action of writing a 
letter." 

Nmnber and Person. 

Besides tense, number and person are supposed to 
belong to verbs. "Energies,'' it has been said, 
" are the attributes of persons ; hence verbs, which 
denote them, must be susceptible of personality, 



NUMBER AND PERSON. 179 

number, and even of gender." In point of fact, in 
all the learned languages, the distinctions of number 
and person exist ; and, if these are admitted, there 
does not appear to be any sufficient reason for the 
exclusion of gender. It is the fact, indeed, that in 
other languages than the Hebrew the distinction of 
gender is preserved in some of the tenses. 

With respect to the terminations by which the 
more ancient languages distinguish the first, second, 
and third persons, it has been justly stated that they 
are pronouns, or fragments of pronouns, and are 
equally complete as if they had been separate words. 
This is obviously the case with the Hebrew, and 
not much less so with the Latin. " The termina- 
tion in amo, for instance, was probably derived 
from ego ; the s, in amas, from av ; the t, in amat, 
from avTOQ ; the amas from -qixeiQ. Of atis and ant, 
no account can be given. But difficulties in ety- 
mology do not in the least degree invalidate the 
general position that such terminations are real 
pronouns. Atis and ant have exactly the same 
meaning with vjielq and avroiJ' 

The inflexions in English verbs seem to possess a 
somewhat different character. They do not supply 
the place of the nominatives, but are used along 
with them. We say, "/love ;" " thou lovest ;" "• he 
loves." Our English terminations are not, conse- 
quently, complete pronouns as in Latin ; but " ac- 
companying signs, intimating that a particular sort 
of word is the nominative to the verb ; and, being 
less essential than in the Latin, they are fewer, and 

n2 



180 NUMBER AND PERSON. 

less varied. The first person singular, and all the 
three persons plural, consist of the simple verb with 
the pronoun prefixed. " I love," " we love/' " ye 
love/' ^^ they love." On this account, in connexion 
with other reasons, our language admits of less in- 
version in the order of the words. 

Yet, though the distinctions of number, person, 
and gender are marked in the verbs of various 
countries, they are by no means essential to lan- 
guage. Thpy are, indeed, we think, unphilosophi- 
cal, — an opinion which appears to result necessarily 
from the view which has been given, in preceding 
pages, of the nature of the verb. If the verb affirms, 
or unites the subject and predicate of a proposition, 
and does uothing more, it surely ought not to be 
made to undergo any change ; for, as it has been 
truly said, " affirmation is the same whether it be 
made by you or by me, or a third person ; or whe- 
ther it be made by one man, or by a thousand." In 
languages, where considerable variety in the collo- 
cation of words is practised, it is, however, expe- 
dient, if not necessary, that the terminations of the 
verb should vary with the number and person of its 
nominative, so as to enable us to connect with cer- 
tainty the substantive, or pronoun, with its verbal 
attributive. '^ The same," adds the writer last 
quoted, " may be said of sex with respect to adjec- 
tives. They have terminations which vary as they 
represent beings male or female, though it is past 
dispute that substantives alone are susceptible of 
sex" (or rather, as he should have said, the beings 



MOODS OR MODES. 



181 



whom the substantives represent) : "we, therefore/* 
he adds, "pass over these matters, and all of like 
kind, as being rather among the elegances of par- 
ticular languages, and, therefore, to be learned from 
the particular grammar of each tongue, than among 
the essentials of language ; which essentials alone 
are the subject of inquiry in a treatise on universal 
grammar/' 

Moods or Modes of Verbs, 

Of modes, in relation to verbs, it is by no means 
easy to give a definition. It is, perhaps, generally 
thought that those forms of expression to which we 
appropriate the name of modes, are intended to re- 
present different modifications of the action, &c. of 
the verb. "Actions and states of being," says Dr. 
Crombie, "may be predicated as either certain or 
contingent, free or necessary, possible or impossible, 
obligatory or optional ; in short, as they may take 
place in a variety of ways, they may be spoken of 
as diversified in their modes of production!' This 
is true, but a mode of production is not a mode of 
action or existence ; so that his subsequent defini- 
tion of mode, viz. as " that which expresses the 
mode or manner of existence^' does not accord with 
his statement of that which gives rise to it. The 
general definition of modes, referred to above, is sufii- 
ciently refated by the Britannica. "Amo, amem, ama," 
says this writer, " do not signify modes of loving, for 
modes of loving are, loving little, loving much, lov- 



1S2 ACCOUNT OF BY 

ing long, &c/' Murray tells us, "that mode is a 
particular form of the verb showing the manner in 
which the being, action, or passion, is represented." 
But the phrases, " I may love," and " let me love," 
indicate no difference in the manner of loving. Any 
difference which exists is not to be found in the 
action itself, but in the state and circumstances of 
the agent. In the former case he declares his liberty 
to perform the action ; in the latter he asks for 
liberty to do it. Harris tells us that " the modes 
of verbs exhibit some way or other the soul and its 
affections." It has been justly said, in reply to this 
statement, that "it does not discriminate between 
the meaning of mode, and the object of language in 
general ; all language being intended to exhibit the 
soul and its affections." A second definition of mode 
by Murray is more to the purpose. " Mode consists 
in the change which the verb undergoes to signify 
various intentions of the mind, and various modifi- 
cations and circumstances of action." It may be 
objected, however, that, unless the auxiliary be re- 
garded as a part of the verb, the verb itself under- 
goes no change. We say, I love ; I may love ; let 
ine love. Nor is the object of the assumed change 
stated in the concluding part of the definition with 
sufficient precision. A similar objection lies also 
against the definition of the Britannica. " Gram- 
matical modes of verbs are concise modes of express- 
ing some of those combinations of thoughts w^hich 
occur most frequently, and of which assertion is an 
essential part." The commendable effort, made by 



MURRAY, HARRIS, &C. 183 

the powerfQl writer of the article " Grammar/' in 
that work, to generalize the definition, deprives it of 
distinctness and perspicuity. It is possible that, in 
consistency with his own principles, he might have 
given a more intelligible account of the matter- 
Affirmation is, as we have seen, the essence of the 
verb. It follows, then, that, in every mode, there 
must be affirmation. But affirmation may have 
different subjects; or the verb may affirm different 
things. It may assert something concerning the 
action, or the agent. It may declare that a certain 
action is performed by a certain agent, — or that he 
has liberty or power to perform it, — or that he washes 
to perform it, — or wishes that others should perform 
it. The modes of verbs are then contrivances in 
language to indicate these, and similar differences, 
in the subjects of affirmation, or in the things affirm- 
ed by the verb. The indicative simply asserts that 
a connexion exists between a certain action (we 
confine our illustrations to verbs of action, for the 
purpose of securing simplicity) and a certain agent ; 
as, "I write." The subjunctive asserts that an 
agent has liberty or power to perform a certain 
action; as, "I may write." The imperative asserts 
that he desires to perform it, or to have it perform- 
ed; as, " let me write," "let them write," &c. In 
all these cases the verb asserts. No doubt can 
exist of this, in any instance, with the exception of 
the last. It might, possibly, be thought that, in the 
imperative, " write thou," there is no assertion. But, 
on examination, it appears most manifestly to be a 



184 riFFERENT MODES 

compendious or abbreviated form of asserting the 
desire^ or if you will, the determination, of the 
speaker, that the action of writing should be per- 
formed : it is equivalent with " I desire or command 
you to write." 

It is on this account that some grammarians deny 
the propriety of admitting an imperative inode, or 
rather the existence of the imperative. All impera- 
tive sentences resolve themselves, we are told, into 
indicative sentences. To be consistent, they should 
deny the existence of a subjunctive mode ; for, what- 
ever meaning they attach to the phrase an indicative 
sentence, the sentences, " I am at liberty to go," " I 
have power to go," into w^hichthe subjunctive phrases? 
I may go, I can go, resolve themselves, are as clearly 
indicative, as, " I go/' The subjunctive is clearly 
as much an indicative mode, as is the imperative. 
And, accordingly. Dr. Crombie distinctly afl&rms — 
at utter variance, as it appears to me, with his own 
account of the origin and meaning of moods, or 
modes, quoted a short time ago — "that in English 
there is only one mood, namely, the indicative." 
This assertion is not, however, placed by this writer 
on the asserted ground that both subjunctive and 
imperative phrases may be resolved into indicative 
ones ; but on the opinion, " that those only can be 
justly regarded as modes which, by a different form 
of the verb,'' i, e. a variation of inflexion, "express 
a different mode of existence." In short, different 
inflexions of the verb are, in the view of this writer, 
essential to the existence of different modes. The same 



EXIST. 185 

decision is given in regard to tense. Two tenses 
only are assigned to English verbs, as love, and 
loved; the other tenses, as we call them, being 
formed by auxiliaries, are not tenses. The correct- 
ness of Dr. Crombie's statements depends altogether 
upon the definition which should be given of the 
words tense, and mode. If they must be so defined 
as to contain a reference to the termination of each, 
it is manifest that Dr. C. is right; — and that we 
ought not to admit more modes, and tenses, than 
we have variations of inflexion. But the argument 
by which he seeks to support his opinion is obvi- 
ously fallacious. He states that, though the English 
language possesses means of expressing the relations 
which are indicated by the terminations of nouns in 
the Latin language, we do not maintain that our nouns 
have six distinct cases ; and his inference is, that it 
is not less absurd to admit that auxiliaries can 
form modes and tenses, than prepositions can 
form cases. " By a king," would not be called the 
ablative case : why, then, he says in effect, should " I 
may love" be denominated the subjunctive mood ? 
"We reply, the whole argument strangely overlooks 
the fact, that the very word " case'' implies termi- 
nation, while there is no such implication in the 
words mode and tense. In the strict sense of the 
term case, the number of cases in any language 
must be bounded by the number of changes of ter- 
mination which its nouns undergo. But there is no 
similar strict sense of the terms mode and tense. 
There exists nothing in their etymology to forbid a 



186 DR. crombie's statements 

generalized definition of them, — a definition com- 
prehending any manner of denoting the subject of 
affirmation (see previous definitions of mode and 
tense), and the time in which the assertion is said 
to he true. Such a generalized definition of " mode" 
would seem to be required, as we have said, by Dr. 
Crombie's own statement of its origin. As actions 
"take place in a variety of ways, they may be 
spoken of as diversified in their modes of production. 
Hence arises another accideyit of verbs^ called a 
modey expressing a mode or manner of existence." 
Now as modes express manner of existence, and as 
the manner of existence may be different, we have 
of course need for more " modes" of verbs than one- 
Similar remarks may be made upon what he says 
with regard to tense. "As all things exist in time, 
and whatever is predicable of any subject, must be 
predicated as either past, present or future" — " hence 
arises the utility of tenses, to express the time, or 
relative order of their existence." This fact, so cor- 
rectly stated, seems to render three tenses at least 
necessary ; and yet Dr. Crombie declares that we 
have only two, — " I write," and, " I wrote." What 
then are, "I have written;" " I had written." Are 
they not tenses, i, e, forms of expression chosen and 
adapted to denote sufficiently distinct divisions of 
past time in which the action of writing was per- 
formed? And this is the general and correct notion 
of tense. To represent variations of termination as 
essential to tense, is to identify the mode of doing a 
thing with the actual doing of it ; — the mode of draw- 



EXAAIlNED. 187 

ing a tooth, for instance, with the actual drawing of 
it. The term "tenses" does not, like "cases/' imply 
termination. Hence it is not correct to reason from 
the one to the other. 

The reasons stated by Dr. Cromhie do not then 
justify us in denying that the English verb has more 
modes than one. Whether the alleged fact, if it be 
a fact, that every supposed mode may be resolved 
into the indicative, ^YOuld justify that denial, is 
another question altogether. Certainly if the cri- 
terion, or differentia, of the indicative mode be that 
it asserts, or if this be taken to be the meaning of 
indicative, every mode is indicative ; for there is 
assertion, or implied assertion, in every mode — in 
the subjunctive as well as in the indicative. Nor is 
it the distinction between them, as some have 
thought, that the latter affirms absolutely, and the 
former conditionally. They both express absolute 
affirmation ; " I may write," not less so than, " I 
write." The sole difference is in the thing affirmed. 
" I write" affirms a connexion between the agent 
and the action. " 1 may write," a similar con- 
nexion between the agent and liberty to write. 
" Write thou," when resolved, affirms a connexion 
between the agent and a desire on his part to have 
the action performed. Now, as the corresponding 
Latin terms, scribo, scribe, scribam, which affirm 
precisely the same things, and might be resolved in 
precisely the same manner, are admitted to be dif- 
ferent modes of the same verb, why should we deny 
this of the three forms of the English verb. The 



IBS NUMBER OF MODES. 

thing done is the same, the only difference lies in 
the manner of doing it. 

How many modes should exist in language? 
whether formed by auxiliaries, or by variations of 
termination, is clearly a question belonging to the 
department of general grammar. Mr. Harris 
pleads for the following, viz. the indicative, the po- 
tential, the interrogative, the requisitive, the im- 
perative, and the precative ; while Dr. Gregory 
laments that the number is not multiplied beyond 
this ; and it is manifest, from our preceding state- 
ments, that it might be multiplied almost ad infinitum. 
" It may be justly doubted, however,'' says the 
Britannic a, especially, we add, when they are 
formed by changes of termination, " whether such 
a multiplication of modes would be any improvement, 
in language. The verb, ^ith the modes and tenses 
which it has in all languages, is already a very 
complex part of speech, which few are able, and 
still fewer inclined to analyze ; and it would surely 
be no advantage to make it more complex by the 
introduction of new modes, especially when the va- 
rieties of meaning which could be marked by them 
are, with equal, and perhaps greater, precision, 
marked in the living speech by the different tones 
of voice adapted to them by nature ; and in written 
language by the reader's general knowledge of the 
subject and of the persons who may be occasionally 
introduced. If there be any particular delicacy of 
sentiment or energy which cannot tbus be made 
known, it is better to express it by a name appro- 



THE IXFiyiTIVE. 189 

priated to itself^ together with the original and 
simple verb of affirmation, than to clog the com- 
pound verb with such a multiplicity of variations as 
would render the acquisition of every language as 
difficult as is said to be that of the Chinese written 
character." 

Nothing, it will be observed, has been as yet said 
about the infinitive. The reason is, that we do not 
consider it a verb, but a noun, denoting the abstract 
action affirmed by the indicative. The whole of the 
preceding statements render it manifest, either that 
assertion is not the essence of the verb, or that the 
infinitive has no claim to that title. In the sen- 
tences, '^ to write," " to die," there is obviously no 
assertion. 'We cannot abandon the doctrine pre- 
viously affirmed concerning the nature of the verb ; 
and are, consequently, constrained, with the ancient 
grammarians, to consider it as " nomen verbi," the 
" noun or name of the verb ;'' i. e. to regard it not 
as a verb but a noun 

Many arguments of OA'erpowering force have been 
adduced in support of this opinion. It is frequently 
used, like the noun, as the nominative case to a verb, 
as, " to obey God is the duty of all ;' i. e. the act of 
obepng God, or obedience to God, is incumbent upon 
aU. It is, again, capable, like a noun, of being go- 
verned by an active verb ; " he refuses to obey 
God;'' i.e. refuses to perform the act of obeying 
God, or, in other words, obedience to God. Farther, 
we are told, that, sometimes in the Latin language, 
an adjective is employed to agree with it, as with a 



190 THE INFINITIVE 

noun. The follo^Ying example is given in the Bri- 
tannica. " Petronius says, ' meum intelligere nulla 
pecunia vendo.* Here/' adds the Britannica, " in- 
telligere is used for intellectum, the accusative of 
intellectus." I sell my to understand^ i. e, under- 
standing, at no price. It is true/' proceeds the same 
writer, " this kind of phraseology is not common even 
in the Latin language, and it is never found in the 
English. There is nothing, however, in the nature of 
the case to prevent it." If we had been accustomed 
to say, " a good to understand, instead of a good un- 
derstanding," we should feel it to be equally proper 
with the latter. 

The mode in which the infinite, as it is called, is 
used in the Hebrew is strongly corroborative of the 
preceding remarks. It frequently occurs where we 
should employ a noun. Thus, in the fourth verse 
of the second chapter of Genesis, we meet with the 
following examples. " These are the generations of 
the heavens, and the earth, in to be created them, or 
of them," i. e. "m their creation /' or, as the words 
are properly rendered, " when they were created. " 
'' In the day of to make of Jehovah God of the earth 
and the heavens," i. e. in the day of " the making" 
of or by Jehovah God "of the heaven, &c ;" properly 
rendered in our version, "In the day that the Lord 
God made the earth and the heavens." 

Unconvinced by these arguments. Dr. Gregory 
maintains that the infinitive is truly averb, because, 
as he says, "the thought expressed by it maybe ex- 
pressed in synonymous and convertible phrases in 



IS A NOUN. 



191 



different languages. In support of this statement, 
he refers to the following among other phrases. " Dico 
Titium existere.'"' I affirm the existence of Titius; 
literally, "I say Titius to exist." This phrase is, 
he says, " synonymous with Dico quod Titius existat ; 
I say that Titius may exist." TheBritannica, how- 
ever, in examining these phrases, which it has done 
with great ingenuity, shows that the infinitive, in 
the above instance, acquires, in consequence of 
its connexion with the verb dico in the indicative, 
something of the form of affirmation ; and that it 
is used as an abstract noun in the accusative case, 
denoting, in conjunction with " Titium," one complex 
conception; — the existence of Titius. "I say, and 
the object of my speech is, Titium existere, — the ex- 
istence of Titius." In reference to the subjunctive 
forms, he adds, " Every one knows that quod, though 
often called a conjunction, is always a relative pro- 
noun." "Dico quod Titius existat must, therefore, 
be construed thus ; Titius existat (id est) quod dico. 
Titius exists is [that thing] which I say." 

Dr. H. Dewar, at the close of a long and a very 
fair statement of the argument on both sides of the 
question, takes leave of the subject in the follovdng 
words ; " But both of these circumstances are too 
slight, to confer on the infinitive the same rank with 
the assertive verb, and to divest it of the character 
of a noun ; especially when we consider," he contin- 
ues in substance, that it is often used without any of 
those circumstances which, as he had stated, cause 
it to resemble a verb ; but never, he adds, "indepen- 



192 KINDS OF VERBS. 

dent of some character of syntax which is common 
to it with the noun." 

The Voices and kinds of Yerhs. 

It appears to be a just remark, that since predica- 
tion or assertion is the essence of the verb, there can- 
not be different kinds or species of verbs, since the 
copula, or bond of union between the subject and its 
attribute — and the verb is that bond — cannot be af- 
fected by the nature of either, especially by that of 
the latter. This is too apparent to require any ar- 
gument when the verb is simply the copula, i. e. the 
substantive verb. But the greater part of verbs, as 
we have seen, contain the predicate as well as the 
copula, — the attribute as well as the affirmation. 
Thus "lego," 1 am reading; "ambulo," I am walk- 
ing, " sto," I rnn standing ; "verbero," lam striking ; 
"verberor," I am stricken. In these cases, though 
the verb undergoes no change, and though it merely 
unites these different attributes to the common sub- 
ject I, yet the attributes themselves are evidently of 
different kinds ; some consisting in action, some in 
suffering ; and some in a state of being which is 
neither active nor passive r This is the only foun- 
dation for the common division of verbs. Their de- 
nomination as active, passive, or neuter, depends 
upon the nature of the attribute which they unite 
with the subject. If it consist in action, the verb 
is said to be active ; if of suffering, it is called a 
passive verb, &c. This does not, indeed, appear to 



VOICES, ETC. 193 

be a very correct nomenclature, since it is properly 
speaking not upon the verb, but upon the nomina- 
tive, that the change takes place when the verb 
alters its voice. Thus, in the examples, " I strike," 
^^I am stricken;" — the I, or the being denoted by 
it, is active in the former, but passive in the latter ; 
for, " when the nominative is the name of an agent, 
the verb is active ; — when it is the name of an ob- 
ject affected, it is said to be passive. The difference 
of these two uses," or voices as they are usually 
called, '^ of the verb, is, that they give these cha- 
racters to the noun. There is no necessity, however,'' 
adds this author very justly, " to alter our settled 
phraseology. It is established by common usage, 
and possesses the advantage of a convenient brief- 
ness." 

Most languages, perhaps, have different forms of 
the verb to denote the active and passive sense. 
This is not, however, necessary, and, therefore, not 
universal. We, for instance, can use the word 
" cut," in any one of the three following ways. 
" They cut the trees." Here it is considered active 
and transitive. "These tools cut smoothly ;" it is 
here intransitive, or neuter. "Fir cuts more easily 
than oak ;" here it is passive, the meaning being, 
fir is cut more easily than oak. We say also, "look 
at that person's face ;" and "he looks well," i. e. he 
appears, or is seen to be well. Dr. Dewar conjec- 
tures that those verbs which we call active were, 
in their earliest application, of no particular voice ; 
though from the agent generally appearing in the 





194 VERBS TRANSITIVE 

miiid of the speaker more important than any object 
acted upon, the active application of them is the 
most frequent. This remark wonld seem to be, in 
some measure, supported by the instances just men- 
tioned. To these, others may be added. Thus we 
say, " he drinks wine," — and " the wine drinks plea- 
santly.'' " The kind of connexion between the wine 
and the act of drinking is left to be inferred from the 
nature of the subject." 

Among verbs denoting action a distinction exists, 
or is thought to exist, between some which are said 
to be transitive, and others which are called intran- 
sitive. The distinction is thus explained. In the 
case of the former, the action passes over to some 
object ; in that of the latter, it begins and termi- 
nates in the agent himself " I strike," and ^' I 
walk," are regarded as examples of this distinction. 
Common, how^ever, as this statement is, it is not 
strictly true. It has been show^n (vide pp. 82 — 83) 
that even physical actions can only be said in a 
loose and popular sense to pass over to their objects, 
i. e. in the sense of affecting them, — that mental 
actions, such as love, hate, esteem, fear, &c. do not 
always, and indeed but seldom, even thus pass over 
to their objects, — that there are some transitive 
verbs, such as similare, or resemble, which denote 
no action at all, so that it cannot even be conceived 
to pass over to, or affect, the object. Even in the 
case of physical actions — the most favourable to the 
common doctrine — the affirmed distinction between 
transitive verbs does not seem to exist. The action 



AND INTRANSITIVE. 195 

of walking, and the same thing may be said of all 
actions of this kind, does as truly affect something, 
i. e. pass over to an object, as the action of striking. 
" In walking, a man w^alks upon some object, which 
supports him ; he walks from some place to some 
other." The ground is as truly affected by the 
action of walking, as the horse by the action of 
striking. '' Each of the phrases, * I strike my 
horse,' and ^I walk upon the ground,' expresses, in 
a manner equally explicit, a particular act, with an 
object affected by it." Where, then, is the difference 
between transitive and intransitive verbs? The 
only intelligible answer is, we think, given by Dr. 
Dewar, who states, in substance at least, that tran- 
sitive verbs are those which express actions when 
we have immediate occasion to mention the object 
acted on. Intransitive verbs describe actions when 
we are satisfied, with stating the connexion between 
the action and the agent. Thus in the cases men- 
tioned above, when we |peak of striking, it is gene- 
rally of importance to point out the object struck ; 
but when we speak of walking, our attention is 
chiefly directed to the act as connected with an 
agent, though each, as we have seen, has an object. 
" It might naturally be expected," says Dr. Dewar, 
" from the numerous and varied occasions which we 
have for the relation of events, that, even in describ- 
ing the same sort of action, we should sometimes 
have a motive for mentioning an object, and some- 
times not." As instances, the Doctor refers to the 
following phrases, — " A miller grinds corn ;" '^ two 

o 2 



196 VERBS TRANSITIVE, ETC. 

women were grinding at the mill." In the first case, 
it is essential to our purpose to mention the object? 
corn, which is affected by the action. In the latter, 
it is not. Here we "have only to speak of the act 
of grinding as characteristic of the situation and 
employment of the women ;" and, accordingly, the 
thing ground is not stated. But there must have 
been something ground — ^. e, the action of grinding 
must have passed over to, or affected something in 
the latter case as well as in the former ; in other 
words, the verb grind, if transitive in one case, cannot 
be intransitive in the other. 

It appears to have escaped this very philosophi- 
cal writer, that there are verbs which, in connexion 
with the occasions on which we use them, require 
the mention of the object ; and others again which 
do not require this. Out of this fact has grown the 
prejudice, for it is really such, that the former are 
transitive, and the latter intransitive, verbs. The 
object not being mentioned v^ the case of the latter — 
because there is no need to mention it — we cease to 
think of it, or rather fancy that no object exists. 
It is confirmatory of this view of the matter, that, 
when a verb, allowed to be a transitive verb, is em- 
ployed without mention of the object affected by it, — 
as in the instance, "Two women were grinding at 
the mill," — we think of it as a neuter or intransitive 
verb. Th^ mention of the object, and the notion of 
transition of action, become so firmly blended toge- 
ther by the power of suggestion, or association, that 
the notion does not — if we may not say cannot — 



PARTICIPLES. 197 

arise, when the object affected by the action is not 
mentioned. The action of walking as truly affects 
the ground — or that, whatever it may be — on which 
we walk, as the action of striking a horse affects the 
horse. But, as we habitually, at least, walk on the 
ground, and not on water, or air, there is no need to 
mention the object affected. Hence the prejudice 
that the act of walking has no object. 

PARTICIPLES. 

The participle derives its name from the assumea 
fact of its participating in the properties of the verb 
and the adjective. The following account of its na- 
ture is given us by Mr. Harris. " Every verb," says 
this writer, " except the substantive verb, is expres- 
sive of an attribute, of time, and of an assertion. If 
we take away the assertion, and thus destroy the 
verb, there will remain the attribute and the time ; 
and these combined make the essence of that species 
of words called participles. Thus, take away the 
assertion from the verb ypa^et, waiteth, and there 
remains the participle ypacfxjjv, writing ,- which, with- 
out the assertion, denotes the same attribute, and 
the same time. After the same manner, by with- 
drawing the assertion, we discover ypa\pag, written, in 
eypa\pe, " wrote." Thus, according to this writer, 
the participle denotes an attribute like the adjective, 
and time like the verb ; and from this circumstance 
it derives its name. There are words bearing the 
form of participles, — as <^doctus" "learned;" "elo- 



198 



TWO PARTICIPLES. 



quens" " eloquent," — yet^ as they denote no time, 
they are not participles, but adjectives. It is essen- 
tial to a participle to express both an attribute and 
time. "Add assertion to a participle/' says one, " and 
you make it a verb : take time from the participle, 
and you make it an adjective." 

Now, since the verb simply asserts, and since the 
participle is formed by the withdrawment of asser- 
tion, it would seem to follow that no verbal quality 
can exist in the participle, — or that it cannot com- 
bine in itself the properties of the verb and the ad- 
jective. And when the term " verb" is understood 
in its strict sense, this is no doubt true. The with- 
drawment of assertion from the verb is the extinc- 
tion of the verb, as the withdrawment of life is the 
extinction of the animal. But, if the term " verb'* 
be taken in its loose sense, or as comprehending all 
that the compound words " write" and " strike" con- 
tain — in which sense it appears to be understood by 
Mr. Harris — then his doctrine concerning the par- 
ticiple may be admitted to be perspicuous and just. 
" Write" may be resolved into "is writing'' — aphrase 
which is understood to contain an attribute, an 
assertion, and time. Remove the assertion " is,*' 
and " writing" remains, which word denotes both the 
attribute and the time. Participles, it may also be 
further remembered, have the regimen of verbs, go- 
verning the noun or pronoun which follows them. 

There are, in most languages, two participles form- 
ed in different ways, according to the genius of the 
language in which they are found. They have been 



HOW CALLED. 199 

called ; the present participle active, and the past 
participle passive. The former is distinguished in 
English by the termination " ing ;" the latter, some- 
times by a change in a vowel of the simple verb ; 
but, more commonly, by the termination " ed ;" as, 
writing, wrote, loving, loved. It may be doubted 
whether the names to which reference has just been 
made, are the best fitted to express the difference 
which exists between these two participles. We 
should rather incline to call them the imperfect and 
the jt?er/^c^ participles: for, though the participle in 
" ing " may be more commonly active, it is by no 
means invariably so. We say not only, he is build- 
ing the house, but, " the house is building." '^ I 
heard of a plan forming for his rescue.'' '^ A large 
sum is owing to me." " The prisoner was burning." 
In the first three instances, the participle is un- 
doubtedly used in the passive sense; in the last, 
" our knowledge of the subject only can enable us 
to determine whether the prisoner was active or 
passive ; whether he was employing fire to consume, 
or was himself consuming by fire." Nor is the 
participle in " ed " exclusively passive. " Landed," 
" departed," " strayed," and a variety of others, are 
active in their signification. "As those gramma- 
rians," says Dr. Crombie, " have erred who consider 
the participle in ' ing ' as an active participle, when 
it in fact denotes either action or passion, so those, 
on the other hand, commit a similar mistake, who 
regard the participle in ^ ed' as purely passive." 
" If I say, ^ he had concealed a poniard under his 



200 



DESIGNATION 



coat/ the participle here would be considered as 
active/' (It may, however, admit of doubt, as we 
shall afterwards see, whether concealed is here a 
participle.) " If I say, ^he had a poniard concealed 
under his clothes,' the participle would be regarded 
as passive. Does not this prove that this participle 
is ambiguous, belonging properly to neither voice ? " 
And then, as to time, is it certain that " ing" de- 
notes present time, and '^ ed " past time ? We say^ 
" I was writing yesterday;" ^^ I shall be writing to- 
morrow.'' And again, ^^ I had landed before he came." 
" I shall have landed ere he arrive." In these in- 
stances, each participle appears to express both past 
and future time. Perhaps the very ingenious state- 
ments of the Britannica may partly help us over 
the difficulty. " "When we speak simply of an action 
us j:)7'esenty we must mean that it is present with re- 
spect to something besides itself, or we speak a jar- 
gon which is unintelHgible, but we do not ascertain 
the ti?ne of its presence. From the very nature of 
time^ an action may be present now, it may have 
heeii present formerly, or it may he present at some 
future period ; but \he , precise time of its presence 
cannot be ascertained even by the present of the 
indicative of the verb itself; yet who ever supposed 
that Xhe present of the indicative denotes no time? 
The participle of the present represents the action 
of the verb as going on ; but an action cannot be 
going on without being present in time with some- 
thing. When, therefore, Cebes says, ' We were 
walking in the temple of Saturn,' he represents the 



OF PARTICIPLES. 201 

action of the verb walk di^ present W\i\i something; 
but by nsing the verb expressive of his assertion in 
^past tense J he gives ns to understand that the ac- 
tion was not present with any thing at the period of 
his speaking J but at some portion of time prior to 
that period : what \}ii2X portion of time was, must be 
collected from the subsequent parts of his discourse. 
The same is to be said of the phrases, I was writing 
yesterday^ and, / shall he writing to-morrow. They 
indicate that the action of the verb write was pre- 
sent with me yesterday^ and will again he present 
with me to-morrow!' Dr. Dewar, referring to this 
passage, says, that " the statement will not apply, 
otherwise we might as well use the expression, ' the 
public attention was excited yesterday by an aero- 
naut who ascends, or who is ascending. And we 
might say, I thought that he ascends in a beautiful 
style.' These phrases would be condemned as not 
only chargeable with bad grammar, but with incon- 
gruity and absurdity. It is therefore necessary to 
allow that Che participle in ^ ing ' is not restricted 
to any tense." Now, it is not necessary to plead 
for the use of such phrases ; but how Dr. Dewar — 
contending, as he does, that the present is a uni- 
versal aorist, and that it is correct on that account 
to say, " Yesterday, when I was walking along, 
whom DO I meet, &c." — can pronounce the phrase, 
" I thought he ascends in a beautiful style," a vio- 
lation of grammar, I am unable to conceive. Where- 
in does the latter phrase differ from the former ? 
What else can be said P Surely not, ^' I thought he 



W2 STATEMENTS OF DKWAR;, 

ascended.'' The action of ascending was not pre- 
vious to the thinkings hut contemporaneous with it. 
The correct expression is, therefore, I think that he 
ascended^ or was ascending, yesterday, — not, I 
thought he ascended, &c. The latter phrase would 
imply, what is not the fact, viz. that the ascending 
was prior to the thinking. A very slight variation 
of the phrase, excepted against by Dr. Dewar, will 
show that it does not involve any grammatical ano- 
maly, — " I thought how beautifiilly he ascends !" 
Even the simple ellipsis of " that " will prove it, " I 
thought, he ascends in a beautiful style." It would 
indeed be incorrect to say, " Yesterday the public 
attention was excited by an aeronaut who ascends," 
or " who is ascending." But that is the result of 
the effect produced by the introduction of the rela- 
tive " who^' which brings the individual before us, 
and renders him in conception present to us. In 
consequence of its introduction, we think not of the 
aeronaut of yesterday who went up in his balloon, 
but of the seronaut of to-day, as standing near to us 
in imagination ; and, therefore, looking back to yes- 
terday, we are in this case constrained to say, the 
aeronaut w^ho ascended^ or was ascending. 

Still, though the statements of the Britannic a 
might justify us in regarding our participle in "ing" 
as a jor^5e/^^ participle — if it were thought desirable 
to contend for this nomenclature — yet, as we have 
shown that the present of the indicative is a uni- 
versal aorist, and as it would seem to follow that the 
participle in " ing," derived from it, must also be 



BRITANNICA, CROMBIE, &C. 203 

aoristic as to time, — and, as we have further shown, 
that it is not always active in signification, we pre- 
fer the designation suggested p. 199, and would call 
the participle in " ing " the imperfect, and the parti- 
ciple in " ed " the perfect participle. For, though 
it may be true that, in the great majority of cases, 
the former participle denotes action and present 
time, and the latter, passion and past time ; yet are 
there so many cases of exception, as to lead us to 
seek for a better defined and more invariable point 
of distinction between them : and that, if w^e mis- 
take not, will be found in the circumstance that the 
one denotes complete action, and the other continued 
action. Thus, whether we say, ^^ I am writing," 
" I was writing," or, " I shall be writing," the action 
is presented to us as in a state of progress. On the 
contrary, whether we say, " the letter is written," 
" I have written/' or, " I shall have written it," the 
action of writing is represented as brought to a final 
close. 

Not essentially dissimilar from the above account 
are the statements of Dr. Crombie. " If we say, 
^ James was building the house,' the participle ex- 
presses the continuation of the action, and the verb 
may be considered as active. If we say, ^ the house 
was building,' the participle denotes the continuation 
of a state not of action but — " of suffering, or being 
acted upon, and the verb may be considered as pas- 
sive." And, having cited examples in which the par- 
ticiple in " ed" is used actively as weU as passively, 
but in each case intimating finished action, he adds, 



204 WRITTEN IN THE ACTIVE VOICE 

"the participle in " ed/' therefore, I consider to be 
perfectly analogous to the participle in " ing/' and 
used like it in either an active or a passive sense ; 
belonging, therefore, neither to the one voice nor to 
the other exclusively, but denoting the completion 
of an action or state of being, while the participle 
in "ing" denotes its continuation." 

Yet, though the past or perfect is sometimes ac- 
tive, it may be allowed that this is not its general 
character ; it is usually passive. Hence it has come 
to be a subject of inquiry, why it is employed in the 
compound tenses of the active verb, as, " I have writ- 
ten^' "I had written^' &c. Many writers, assuming 
the fact that the words employed in such examples 
are beyond all doubt participles, have suggested the 
following explanation, which it must be confessed is 
not a little ingenious. "If," says one of their num- 
ber, " we vary the order of the auxiliaries, this will 
be accounted for. Thus, if instead of saying, ' I have 
written a letter,' we say, ^I have a letter written' — 
an order not unfrequently adopted for the sake of 
harmony and variety — it appears at once that the 
participle written belongs not to the verb, but to the 
accusative or object letter (I have a written letter) 
"or object acted upon; thus proving that, though 
connected with the active voice, and forming what 
may be called the compound tenses of the active 
voice, when analyzed and resolved, they are still no- 
thing more than the passive participles." Had the 
conclusion been, " they are nothing more than adjec- 
tives," it would have been more fully justified by the 



IS NOT A PARTICIPLE. 205 

premises. This is not the point, however, which we 
wish the reader at present to mark. That point is 
the following. The whole statement takes it for 
granted, then, let it he ohserved, that the word writ- 
ten^ as well as corresponding ones in similar cases, 
is what is commonly called the passive, and what we 
have denominated the perfect, participle. But may 
not this he douhted ? There are, indeed, facts which 
seem to sanction the opinion. When what is usu- 
ally called the passive participle in English differs 
from the aorist, — as in the case wrote, written, it is the 
latter word that is unifoi'mly used in connexion with the 
auxiliary. Thus we say, not "I have wrote," hut ^^ I 
have written." The words " wrote" and " written" 
are, however, regarded by Dr. De war, Mr, Tooke, and 
others, as only different forms of the aorist, or past 
tense of the verb. The latter gentleman complains 
of it as a redundancy, because, as he says, " one word 
for past time is sufficient for every purpose." 

The opinion seems to derive farther support 
''from the sti'iicture of some phrases in the Italian 
language^ which show that the passive participle is 
really the word employed^ as its inflexions are varied, 
and made to agree with the noun in gender and 
number." Some phrases, also, of a similar nature, 
occur in the French language. A very competent 
authority has, however, stated, "that such construc- 
tions even in the Italian are not general, — that in 
•the French they are altogether peculiar, and give no 
room for supposing that this is the original construc- 
tion of the form of the preterite, afterwards trans- 



206 WHITTEN, ETC. IN THE ACTIVE VOICE 

ferred to an active meaning ; for it only takes place 
when the substantive noun has been previously in- 
troduced, and then is referred to by means of the 
relative que." 

The general practice, then, of those languages 
which form their past tenses of the active voice by 
auxiliaries, is against the opinion that the word 
joined vvith the auxiliary is the passive participle ; 
and, if we examine our own language, the statements 
of Dr. Dewar appear to us unanswerable. This 
writer refers to the case of what are called neuter 
or intransitive verbs. Such verbs being destitute 
of a passive voice, cannot have a passive participle. 
^^ When we say, ' he has gone,' ' I have come,' the 
words ' gone,* and ' come,' cannot be passive parti- 
ciples, agreeing with nouns," as the theory supposes, 
because Dr. Dewar adds, "no nouns are introduced 
after them. There is no sufficient reason why the 
introduction of a noun should alter the nature of 
the word. In the phrase, ' I have struck,' the word 
struck signifies action" — being obviously the past 
tense of the verb — " and, as a part of the active 
verb, it may govern the accusative case with as 
much propriety as any other part of it. When 
w^e say, ' I have struck, and, I have struck my 
enemy,' the word struck is equally active in its 
meaning." It is the preterite tense, and not the 
passive participle. Were it the latter, the whole 
power of government must be in the verb have ; 
and the thing "had," i, e. possessed, would be not 
struck, or the action, but the enemy. Now it may 



IS NOT A PARTICIPLE. 207 

be left to the common sense of any man to say 
whether the two phrases, " I had/' i, e. possessed , 
" struck/' or the finished action of striking, — and, 
'^ I had," or possessed, " an enemy," do not convey 
radically different ideas. 

In addition to all this it should be observed, that 
if the part of the compound tense to which we are 
now referring does not belong to the verb, but to 
the accusative or object, with which it is said also to 
agree, it is not in reality a participle at all, but an ad- 
jective. If the phrase, " I have written a letter, " im- 
ports, "I have a letter written/' the word "written" 
can mean no more than if it stood before the noun, 
as in the phrase, " I have a written letter.'' In that 
position all would admit it to be an adjective, — no 
time whatever being implied in it. I have no doubt, 
therefore, that the word "written/' in the phrase, "I 
have written," even when a noun is subjoined to it, 
should be regarded as part at least of the past tense 
of the verb. 

The present writer would intimate, that perhaps 
the mistaken conception that what he has ventured 
to call the perfect participle is essentially passive, 
may have originated a controversy which more cor- 
rect views on this point would have prevented. For 
since the participle in "ed'' may be active in sense, 
such words as written, beaten, &c. might be allowed 
to be participles with an active signification ; and, in 
that case, there would exist in the past tense nothing 
of the anomaly complained of. 

It is a remark of Dr. Dewar worthy to be remem- 



208 THE ADVERB. 

bered, that, " in the use of the participle, we have a 
method of subjoining a descriptive sentence to the 
noun, which, with respect to briefness, and extent of 
regimen, is intermediate betwixt the use of the ad- 
jective, or of the genitive case, and that of the rela- 
tive. It resembles the adjective in the manner in 
which it is introduced, but always follows the par- 
ticular verb to which it belongs in the regimen which 
it possesses as introductory to other words. Hence 
it is capable of annexing a train of ideas to the 
noun. We say" — " the square of the side of a right 
angled triangle, subtending the right angle, is equal 
to the sum of the squares of the other two." He 
again observes, that the participle is resolvable into 
an indicative sentence introduced by the relative. 
" A man walking is," he says, " resolvable into a 
man who walks." Yet more evidently is this the 
case with the words, "God being rich in mercy,' 
which phrase is obviously the same with "God who 
is rich in mercy." 

The Adverb. 

The grammatical term adverb is derived from the 
Latin word " ad," to, and " verbum," a word. Look- 
ing, therefore, at words of this class etymologically, 
they are words added to verbs which, on account of 
their high rank and great importance in language, 
have appropriated the name "verbum" to them- 
selves. The name, however, merely intimates that 
all of them are capable of being annexed to verbs, — 



PURPOSE OF THE ADVERB. 209 

not that they never stand in connexion with other 
words. In point of fact, they are found united to 
adjectives, as well as verbs, and it is by no means 
unusual to join one adverb to another. They are, 
accordingly, attributes of attributes ; or, as they have 
been very properly called, attributives of the second 
order. ^^As the attributives hitherto mentioned," 
says Mr. Harris, " viz. adjective and verb, denote 
the attributes of substances, so there is an inferior 
class of them which denote the attributes only of 
attributes. If I say, * Cicero w-as eloquent,' I 
ascribe to him the attribute of eloquence simply 
and absolutely ; if I say, ' he was exceedingly 
eloquent,' 1 affirm an eminent degree of eloquence, 
the adverb exceedingly denoting that degree. If 
I say, ^ he died lighting bravely for his country,' 
the word bravely here^ added to the verb, denotes 
the manner of the action." 

It appears, then, that the general purpose of the 
adverb, in common with that of some other parts of 
speech, is to give increased precision to language. 
All nouns, excepting proper names, are general 
terms, of extensive application. Their range of 
application is in a degree restricted by uniting attri- 
butives, especially adjectives, to them, and thus, to a 
certain extent, precision is gained, (vide Adjective). 
But all words denoting attributives are themselves, 
al^7 general terms ; and, consequently, devoid of full 
precision. They need themselves to be defined. 
Thus, after we have applied eloquent to an advocate, 
and say, accordingly, " the eloquent advocate," we 
feel that, though advocate is defined, eloquent is not 



210 IS A PART OF SPEECH. 

SO. There are degrees of eloquence. The question 
arises, " to vrhat degree did his eloquence amount ? 
Haw eloquent was he ? We introduce an adverb 
to give greater precision to the general term eloquent, 
and say, " he was greatly eloquent." But greatly 
itself is a general term as well as eloquent. We 
apply to it, therefore, another adverb, and say, a 
very greatly eloquent man; and thus secure for our 
statement greater precision : and, if it be objected, 
that general terms can never impart full precision, 
^ve would reply, that the fact af&rmed, if it be a fact, 
is only one proof among many of the necessary im- 
perfection of language. 

Whether the words now employed for this pur- 
pose, either in our language, or in other languages, 
are words, or fragments of words, belonging toother 
parts of speech, is an interesting etymological ques- 
tion, and adapted to throw much light on the mean- 
ing of terms which have been sometimes thought 
entirely devoid of meaning ; but the answer, what- 
ever it may be, does not settle the question, " ought 
they now to be regarded as forming a distinct part 
of speech ?" Mr. Home Tooke denies that oitr 
adverbs— extending the denial to the Englis-h parti- 
cles in general— express " any character by which 
a part of speech can be distinguished." He con- 
siders the adoption of it as an artificial means by 
which, "under the colour of scientific order, gram- 
marians have brought together a multitude of words, 
originating in abbreviations and corruptions, and 
possessing in no other respect any common pro- 
perty.". The Britannica unites with Mr. Tooke in 



tooke's opinion exposed. 211 

degrading the adverb from its present position as a 
part of speech. There is, however, a fallacy in the 
reasoning of Mr. Tooke which it is alike surpris- 
ing that he should have committed, and that the 
Britannica should not have detected. Mr. Tooke's 
reasoning, reduced to a syllogism, is as follows ; 
'^ all words which were verbs or nouns, &c. ori- 
ginally, are so now; adverbs, and particles in 
general, w^ere originally nouns or verbs, &c. ; they 
are consequently nouns, &c. &c. now. The validity 
of the conclusion depends, as every logician knows, 
upon the truth of both premises. Mr. Tooke has, 
we admit, sufl&ciently established his minor, but in 
support of the major he has not said a single word. 
This is not, perhaps, surprising. When Mr. Tooke's 
labours commenced, the minor was the more doubtful 
premiss. No one had called in question the major; 
no one had ever dreamed of the truth of the minor. 
To establish that was all — as it was likely to appear 
to him — that he had to do. In the process of inves- 
tigation its truth burst upon his mind with over- 
powering conviction ; and, his attention being divert- 
ed from the major, as it could not well fail to be, he 
fancied that his work was done. We agree, how- 
ever, with Mr. Dugald Stewart in the following 
decision. "To prove that conjunctions,'' — or ad- 
verbs, — " are a derivative part of speech, and that, 
at first, their place was supplied by words which are 
chnfessedly pronouns, or articles, or verbs, does not 
prove that they ought not to be considered as a 
separate part of speech at present, any more than 

p2 



212 tooke's opinion opposed. 

Mr. Smith's theory with respect to the gradual 
transformation of proper names into appellatives 
proves that proper names and appellatives are now 
radically and essentially the same ; or that the em- 
ployment of substantives to supply the place of adjec- 
tives (which Mr. Tooke tells us is one of the signs of 
an imperfect language), proves that no grammatical 
distinction exists between these two parts of speech in 
such tongues as the Greek, the Latin, and the Eng- 
lish. Mr. Tooke, indeed, has not hesitated to draw 
this last inference also ; but, in my opinion, with 
nearly as great precipitation as if he had concluded, 
because savages supply the w^ant of forks by their 
fingers, that, therefore, a finger and a fork are the 
same thing.'' It may be true that " bravely" was 
originally, " brave like ;" but, though two words for- 
merly, it is now one^ performing a distinct and well 
defined office in language, i. e, modifying the attri- 
butive with which it stands connected; as, "he fought 
bravely.'' And thus it is with all adverbs, as we 
call them. They possess the common quality of 
expressing some modification " of an action or qua- 
lity, as the manner, order, time, place, &c. Thus, 
" he wrote well ;"" he stood foremost;" "he came 
first ;" " he went thither," &c. And, on these 
grounds, they are justly entitled to take rank as 
forming a distinct part of speech. 

Kn exception must, however, be made in reference 
to two words generally classed among the adverb's; 
viz. the words " 5'es," and "no." They do not 
modify attributives. "Is he learned. P" No. "Is 



THE DERIVATIVE WORDS. 213 

he brave ?" Yes. " Here/' as it has been justly 
said, " the two words signify not any modification 
of the attributes brave and learned, but a total nega- 
tion of the attribute, in one case ; and, in the other, 
a declaration that the attribute belongs to the person 
spoken of. On this account they should not be 
classed among the adverbs. They are imperatives 
of verbs of northern extraction." 

We fully accord with Mr. Home Tooke in think- 
ing that adverbs are derivative words. There are 
many which scarcely need resolution. The greater 
part, if not all, of the words of this class commencing 
in " a " proclaim their composition, " a '' being evi- 
dently a corruption of on — as afoot, ^. e, on foot, 
adays, ashore, astray, aslope, aright, abed, aback, 
abreast, afloat, abound, around, aloud, &c. Those, 
again, which terminate in " ly," Mr Tooke resolves 
by considering the ly as a corruption of like — as, 
greatly, ^. e. great like, honestly, honest like. Some 
of the more difficult adverbs are resolved in the 
following manner. " Ago '' into the past participle 
agone, or gone ; " asunder " he derives from asnn- 
dered, separated, the past participle of the Anglo- 
Saxon verb asundrian ; " to wit" from wittan, to 
know. " Needs " he resolves into " need is," used 
parenthetically, as, I must needs do such a thing, 
^. e. there is need of doing it. " Anon," which our 
^d authors use for immediately, instantly, means, 
he says, in one, i. e. in one instant, moment, minute. 
" Alone " and " only" are resolved into all one, and 
one like. " Alive " is on life, or in life. " Whilst" 



214 CONJUNCTIONS AND PREPOSITIONS. 

is the Saxon hwile-es, time that. "Aloft" is on 
loft, as it was formerly written. Adverbs of place, 
also, are evidently abbreviations. " Where " is, in 
what place. " Whither," to what place. " Hence," 
from this place. " Thence,'' from that place. " Up- 
wards," in a direction ascending. " Now," at the 
present time. " When,'' at what time. " Then," 
at that time. " Often," many times. " Seldom," 
not many times. The adverbs of affirmation and 
negative, as they are usually called, are thus re- 
solved. " Aye," or " yea," is the imperative of a 
verb of northern extraction, and means have, pos- 
sess, enjoy ; and " yes *' is a contraction of ay-es, 
have, possess, or enjoy that. Thus, when it is 
asked whether a man be learned, if the answer be 
by the word yes, it is equivalent to have, enjoy that 
belief, or that proposition. " No," he derives from 
the Dutch. " In the Danish we have nodig ; in the 
Swedish, nodig ; and in the Dutch, noode, node, and 
no, for averse, unwilling. So that, when it is asked 
whether a man be brave, and the answer be. No, it 
is a declaration that he who utters the word is 
averse from, or unwilling to admit, that propo- 
sition." 

CONJUNCTIONS AND PREPOSITIONS. 

i 

Both these classes of words are comprehended-^ 
by Mr. Harris under the more general class of i. 
connectives whose simple office it is to coalesce 
what could not have been brought into a state of union 



HAVE A MEANING. 215 

without their aid. " Some things/' says this writer, 
" coalesce and unite of themselves ; others refuse to 
do so without help, and as it were compulsion. Thus 
the mortar and stone in a building ; while the 
wainscot and the wall require for their joining, nails 
and pins. Thus, again, substances and their qua- 
lities.'' From these facts he draws the conclusion, 
" that parts of speech unite of themselves, or the 
contrary, as their archetypes unite, or require some- 
thing to effect an union. Thus substantives unite 
with verbs, and adjectives, without any interposing 
link; but tw^o substantives cannot be joined to- 
gether without the aid of conjunctions or prepo- 
sitions. 

The objection to Mr. Harris's doctrine is not 
grounded on his assertion that conjunctions and 
prepositions are connectives, for that they mani- 
festly are ; but that they are merely such, having no 
meaning of their own. He expressly affirms of 
both, that they are devoidof meaning in themselves, 
though, with singular inconsistency, he states after- 
wards, concerning prepositions, that they w^ere ori- 
ginally formed to denote the relations of place, — 
that they came afterwards to denote intellectual as 
well as local relations, — and that, when used as 
prefixes to other words, as inj^retell, to ^2;eract, to 
' underN^yi^y to outgo^ they commonly transfuse some- 
thing of their own meaning into the word with which 
■'they are compounded." It may be very well asked 
how a word, destitute of meaning, can transfuse a 



216 ARE SIGNS 

meanings and, d fortiori^ its own meaning, into 
another ! 

This doctrine of Harris is opposed to all the pro- 
babilities of the case* How can a word^ — and espe- 
cially so large a class of words as that which is 
comprehended by Mr. Harris under the general 
term connectives, — be supposed to have come into 
existence without necessity ? ^^ e, without having any 
thought to express ? Language is the vehicle for the 
communication of thought. It supposes the previous 
existence of thought. Without thought, there would 
of course be no language. And, since language is 
a collection of words, each w^ord supposes the pre- 
vious existence of the thought which it expresses. 
To suppose the existence of a word which, at first, 
had no thought to express, and was not of course 
intended to express any, is to suppose the existence 
of a monster, — an effect without a cause, a child 
without a parent. Yet of this kind are all the par- 
ticles, as they are sometimes called, of every lan- 
guage ! says Mr. Harris. They have no meaning 
in themselves ! Then how came they into existence ? 
and of what use are they ? To resort to a material 
analogy, by comparing conjunctions, prepositions, 
&c. to nails or pegs, or cement, is to shed darkness 
instead of light over the subject. How can words 
be connectives which have no meaning ? If the word 
" with" in the phrase, " the sun t^zVA beams," really^ 
means nothing, how can it unite sun and beams ?^ 
The phrase would express no more than the two 



OF RELATIONS. 217 

substantives without it. If it unite them at all, it 
must be by its meaning ; if it has no meaning, it 
does not unite them. Should it be alleged that it is 
a sign of connexion, it may be replied, that it has 
then meaning, and that the connexion between the 
two is that meaning. The fact seems to be, that 
Mr. Harris, even while he asserted that conjunc- 
tions, &c. are unmeaning words, could not resist the 
impression that they mean relations. Hence the 
self-contradictory statements to which reference was 
made a short time ago. 

Again, this doctrine of Mr. Harris is disproved by 
the circumstance, that all languages have at least 
more than one conjunction and preposition. It is 
impossible for an adherent of the doctrine to answer 
the question of the Britannica. "If prepositions'' — 
and the enquiry applies equally to conjunctions — ^^are 
words devoid of meaning, why should there be in any 
language more than one preposition, since a single 
unmeaningmark of connexion" (we have argued that 
a mark of connexion must have a meaning, — that 
it means connexion) " would certainly answer the 
purpose as well as a thousand ?'' The question 
would be equally unanswerable, w^ere the adherent to 
concede that the words in question indicate connexion ; 
for, unless they denote diversities of connexion, w^hy^ 
we ask, with the Britannica, are they more than one ? 
, The fact of their being many, proves that they de- 
^note diversities of connexion ; — in other words, that 
they are the signs of relations, or rather of classes 



218 FROM WHAT 

of relations, like the terminations of Latin and Greek 
nouns. 

Finally, the very learned and able researches of 
Mr. Home Tooke have directly disproved this doctrine 
of Mr. Harris, by showing that, at least, for we need 
not say more — a great part of our English conjunc- 
tions and prepositions, together with some which ex- 
ist in other languages, are really fragments of that 
very class of words which are admitted by Harris 
to have a meaning in themselves, so that they must 
express the generalized idea which is denoted by 
the primitive words. The mere statement of the 
sources to which Mr. Tooke traces some of our 
English particles, as well as a few others, will be 
sufficient to convince the reader of the general truth 
of that writer's doctrine. 

"And*' is a Saxon word, being an abbreviation of 
" anad," the imperative of ananad, to add to, or heap 
up. So that when we say, " two and two make four," 
we really affirm that two, added to two, make four. 
" Because," is compounded of the Saxon word "be," 
by, and "cause." By some of our most ancient wri- 
ters it was written, "by cause;" befell "because," 
^. e. by cause of his weakness. " Or," is a contrac- 
tion of the Saxon " oder," signifying other, i.e. some- 
thing different and often contrary ; so that " or" must 
always denote diversity, and often direct opposition. 
"If," is the imperative of the Anglo-Saxon verb "f i- ' 
fan," to give, where, as well as in the English formerly^ * 
it was written " gif " If has, therefore, invariably 



DERIVED. 219 

the signification of the English imperative give ; as in 
the following instance ; " If you believe, you shall be 
saved." Salvation is here declared to depend on faith. 
Give tJiat^ or that you believe^ and you shall be saved. 
"An/' is the imperative of the Anglo-Saxon verb 
" anan/' which likewise means to give, or grant ; as, 
" an you had an eye behind you, you might see more 
detraction at your heels than fortunes before you," i, e. 
grant that you had an eye behind you. " Since,'* is 
derived from "seand," seeing, and es, that, or it ; or 
of " sin," seen, and " es" " Seand" and " 5m" are 
the present and past participles of the Anglo-Saxon 
verb to see. Since, then, is ^^ seeing that," or " that 
seen ;' as in the instance, " seeing the atonement 
of Christ is perfect, all who believe shall be saved;'' 
t. e. the atonement of Christ is perfect, — " that 
seen," all who believe, &c. 

The words "wherefore," and "therefore," are 
compounds of the Saxon words, ^'hwoer" and ''thcer," 
vi\\hfor, OY "voor,'' and signify "for which," "for 
those," or "that." With regard to " but" Mr. Tooke 
supposes that, when used at the beginning of a 
sentence, it is derived from the Saxon verb "Z>6>to^," 
to "boot," to "superadd," to "supply," &c.; that, 
when it occurs in the middle of a sentence, it is a 
contraction of " be-utan," the imperative of " beonu- 
tan," to be out. In the following sentences it bears 
botl| these meanings. ''But" he relapsed, and, 
^ but," for the great skill of the physician, he must 
have perished; ^. e. "superadd," to something pre- 
viously said, ^*he relapsed, so that but, ^. e. without. 



220 HARRIS AND TOOKE's 

the great skill of the physician he must have died." 
To this, it may be added, that even now the word 
" but" is used in Scotland for without, as, "he came 
from home but his breakfast." The words "but," 
and " ben," used to describe a cottage having two 
rooms, evidently mean " the be out," ^. e, the o^^;tery 
and " the be in,'' or inner room. " Unless,'* and 
"although," are verbs in the imperative mode; the 
former signifying "take away," or " dismiss ;" the 
latter, "allow," "permit," "grant," "yield," "as- 
sent." 

The preceding account of the origin and true 
meaning of our English conjunctions, exhibits the 
causes of the diversities which, as every one per- 
ceives, exist among them,— diversities somewhat 
pompously stated by Mr. Harris, and grammarians 
of that school, but left by them in obscurity. Some 
conjunctions are said to be copulative, others dis- 
junctive. ''And," is of the former, "or," of the 
latter class. Now the influence of the former to 
imite, and of the latter to disjoin, results from the 
simple meaning of the words ; as " John and," z. e. 
superadd, " James were there," " John or," i. e. 
other, or otherwise, " James was there." 

Again, we are told that diversities exist in each 
of these classes of conjunctions. "Conjunctions 
connecting sentences," says Mr, Harris, " sometimes 
connect their meaning, and sometimes not; as, Rome 
was enslaved because Caesar was ambitious. Man- 
ners must be reformed, or liberty will be lost." In 
these instances it is evident that "because," mean- 



ACCOUNT EXAMINED. 



m 



ing by cause, must connecty and that " or," or oder^' 
" other/' must separate^ the meaning of the clauses 
between which they stand. Further, some of the 
copulative conjunctions are designated by Mr. Kar- 
ris, causal^ and others copulative^ conjunctions. The 
causals subjoin causes to effects ; as, " the sun is in 
an eclipse, because the moon intervenes." " The 
collectives subjoin effects to causes; as, ^^ the moon 
intervenes, therefore the sun is in an eclipse." There 
is more of apparent than real information in this 
statement. It is no doubt true that " because" adds 
the cause to the effect, — and " therefore" the effect 
to the cause ; but the reason of this diversity can 
only be found in the meaning of the words "because," 
and " therefore," as stated by Mr, Tooke. " The 
sun is in an eclipse, because," i, e. hy cause " the 
moon intervenes." " The moon intervenes there- 
fore," OT for that, "the sun is eclipsed." 

The disjunctive conjunctions are divided by Mr. 
Harris into simple and adversative, — words which 
convey no distinct idea, while the explanatory state- 
ments are not much more intelligible. Of the Jvr?ner 
he gives, as an example, " either it is day, or it is 
night;" of the laffer, "it is not day, but it is night.'* 
" The difference between them," he adds," is that the 
simple express nothing more than a relation of diver- 
sity ; the adversative express a relation, not merely 
df diversity, but of opposition. The light which the 
statements of Mr. Harris fail to give is afforded by 
the meaning and derivation of the words. " Either" 
being a distributive pronoun, and " o?' " meaning 



222 HARRIS AND TOOKE S 

" Other," as we have seen, the relation expressed by 
them must manifestly be a relation of diversity 
merely. " But" means « superadd." " It is not 
day, but," i. e. superadd, « it is night." Now, it is 
not strictly correct to caU "but" an adversative 
here, if by an adversative conjunction be meant one 
which expresses opposition; far less is it correct to 
call it an absolute adversative, whatever these words 
may mean. Nor is the designation at anytime a 
proper one. Whatever opposition may exist be- 
tween two clauses, in any specific case, when « but" 
intervenes, it is not made by the conjunction, but by 
the clauses themselves ; as, « Brutus was a patriot, 
but Cssar was not." « The opposition here is not 
intimated by ' hut; superadd, but by the words 
was, and was not " 

Again, the adversative conjunctions are divided 
into adequate and inadequate, both being at the 
same time regarded as preventives. « The /ome; 
are expressed by such words as unless. Troy wi 
be taken unless the palladium be preserved ; that is, 
this alone is sufficient to prevent it. The inadequaie^ 
are expressed by such adversatives as « although. 
Troy will be taken although Hector defend it ; i. e. 
Hector's defence will prove ineffectual." Every one 
must feel how worthless such statements are ! They 
seem to indicate thought and power of discrimina- 
tion, but they explain nothing. The knowledge of 
the derivation and real meaning of the words " un- 
less" and "although" will alone afford us light. 
Mr 'Tooke's explanation of both unfolds everything. 



ACCOUNT EXAMINED. 



ns 



" Unless " means take avmy^ remove ; so that the 
real meaning of " Troy will be taken unless the pal- 
ladium be preserved," is, the city must fall if the 
preservation of the palladium be taken away. 
" Troy will be taken/' remove the palladium be pre- 
served, or the preservation of the palladium. '' Al- 
though " means allow^ so that " Troy will be taken 
although Hector defend it," is the same as, " Troy 
will be taken allow Hector to defend it." The idea 
therefore expressed by " unless " is that of the re- 
moval of one thing to make way for another ; the 
idea expressed by " although " is that of allowing 
one thing to coexist with another with which it is 
apparently incompatible. 

The foregoing statements of these two eminent wri- 
ters, put in contrast with each other, will I doubt not 
prepare the reader to acquiesce in the following judg- 
ment of the Britannica. " The nature of conjunc- 
tions can be thoroughly understood only by tracing 
j.?ach to its original in some parent or cognate tongue ; 
'ind when that shall be done" (shall have been done) 
" in other languages, with as much success as it has 
lately been done by Mr. Home Tooke in English, 
then, and not till then, may w^e hope to see a ra- 
tional, comprehensive, and consistent theory of this 
part of speech. Then, too, shall we get rid of all 
that farrago of useless distinctions into conjunctive, 
adjunctive, disjunctive, subjunctive, copulative, con- 
tinuative, subcontinuative, positive, suppositive, cau- 
sal, (collective, preventive, adequate and inadequate, 
adversative, conditional, illative, &c. &c., which ex- 



224 DERIVATION OF PREPOSITIONS. 

plain nothing, and serve only to veil ignorance, and 
perplex sagacity/' 

The following are some of Mr. Tooke's derivations 
of the prepositions. 

"With," is the imperative of the old Anglo-Saxon 
verh withan, "to join." All the other parts of the 
verb are lost but the imperative, which has degene- 
rated into a particle. " Christ sat at meat " with" his 
disciples ;" i, e, Christ join his disciples, sat at meat. 
It is sometimes, however, the imperative of wrythariy 
" to be ;" hence by and with are often synonymous, the i 
former by being derived from beon, "to be " 

" Without," is the imperative of wrythaii-utan, 
with a slight change of orthography. " A house 
without a roof," is a house, "be out of a roof," — a 
house beyond, or out of, the covering of a roof 

" Through," is a slight alteration of the Teutonic 
substantive thurahy " a door," or " passage." " The 
splendid sun with,'' i.e, "join," "his beams, warmeth 
through^'' i. e. " passage," "the air, the fertile^ 
earth." 

"From," is from the Gothic /rum, "beginning;" 
as, " the figs came from," i. e. beginning, " Turkey," 
or Turkey was the commencing point of their jour- 
ney. " For," comes from a Gothic word signifying 
a cause; "of," from a/ora, progeny; "betwixt," 
from the imperative " be' and twos, the Gothic word 
for "two ;" "beneath," is from an old Saxon wprd 
signifying " bottom ;" " beyond," from geond, which 
has the same meaning with " gone," or " past ;" 
"along," means "on long," i. e. on length; "round," 



CONJUNCTIONS DERIVATIVES. 225 

and " around," come from a word signifying a 
'^ circle ;" " down/' is diifen^ to " dive," or " dip." 

Thus the labours of Mr. Tooke have entirely sub- 
verted the opinion of Harris, that our conjunctions 
and prepositions are devoid of meaning. They are 
abbreviations of nouns, verbs, &c. ; yet it would be 
rash to conclude, a priori^ that it is so in all other 
tongues. Before this opinion can be legitimately 
held, it will be necessary for some one to institute an 
examination of the conjunctions and prepositions of 
other languages, similar to that which Mr. Tooke 
has so successfnlly prosecuted in reference to those 
of our own. Mr. T. expresses a confident opinion 
that all conjunctions are derivatives. He virtually 
denies " that any language contains a real^ original^ 
native^ pure adverb, or conjunction ;" and confidently 
asserts that ^'what he has done with ^if,' and ^an,' 
may be done universally with all the conjunctions 
of all the languages of the world." He asserts it 
" universally," he adds, " from arguments a priori^ — 
confirmed, however," he continues, " by a successful 
search in many other languages besides the English, 
&c," We suspect, however, either that Mr. Tooke 
has somewhat mistaken the source of his own con- 
fidence, or that his logic is defective on this point. 
We should like to ask Mr. Tooke, "what originated, 
in his own mind, the conviction, or rather the first 
suspicion, that adverbs, conjunctions, &c. are deri- 
vatives ?" They obviously answer, we think at 
least, definite and important purposes in language. 
What legitimate a priori confidence, then, can any 

Q 



226 WHETHER ALL PARTICLES 

man have that they are not primitive words, formed 
expressly to answer this purpose, though later, it 
may be, in their origin, than some other words, 
more essential than they, to the purposes of com- 
munication? Did he not ^ist Jind the words, which 
he now proclaims as the originals, — as gifan^ " to 
give," anan^ " to grant," anad^ " to add," — and, 
then, infer that if an^ and and^ are derivatives 
from, or fragments of, these words, because the un- 
doubted meaning of the former may be recognized 
in the latter words ? If he did not, his a priori 
reasonings, as he calls them, were little better than 
conclusions without premises. If he did, his rea- 
soning was a '^ j)osterio7'i,'' not a ^'priori!' In like 
manner, when he began to extend the conclusion he 
had reached concerning English adverbs, conjunc- 
tions, &c., to the particles of other languages, it 
could not have been by the " a priori'' argument, 
properly so called. He must have reasoned from 
discovered facts, in the English language, to un- 
known though suspected facts (if facts they should 
be found to be) in other languages ; and, it may be 
well to observe further, that the reasoning must 
have been disfigured by the same fallacy which has 
led to the conclusion (vide p. 211) that our adverbs, 
conjunctions, &c., are not parts of speech at aU. 
Reduced to a syllogism, the argument is, " the par- 
ticles of all languages have the same origin, or are 
of the same nature." The English particles, i. e, 
adverbs, &c. are fragments of nouns or verbs. 
Therefore, the particles of the French, Latin, Greek, 



ARE DERIVATIVES. 227 

Hebrew, &c. are nouns, or verbs. What a priori 
argument can support the first premiss here ? 
Suppose we admit it to be probable — the utmost 
that can be said of it — the conclusion would be ille- 
gitimate. One premiss being probable merely, not 
certain, the conclusion can only be probable, not 
certain as here. It may be admitted that, as our 
adverbs, conjunctions, &c. are nouns, or verbs, or 
fragments of oie or the other, it ^V likely, or possible, 
that such is tl^ e case with those of the French, Latin, 
&c. ; but no (.autious reasoner will venture to assert 
this till he shall have instituted an examination as 
extensive as that which the Britannica declares to 
be necessary. 

In another respect, also, Mr, Tooke seems to la- 
bour under a mistake. We have seen that conjunc- 
tions, and prepositions, designate relations, or classes 
of relations. Now, as the mind forms conceptions of 
relations, as well as of things which actually exist, the 
words which designate these relations cannot be in- 
significant. Nay it might be contended that they do 
not differ radically from nouns ; and that, on this 
account, they may be said to be nouns. Should it 
be replied, that relations, not being things but mere 
abstractions of the mind, there is an obvious differ- 
ence between the names of relations, and of things, 
it might still be alleged that — -as the objects of hu- 
man knowledge are chiefly the relations of things, — 
and, especially as other terms denoting relations are 
always regarded as nouns — as, " father," " witness," 
subject, &c. — that these terms, i. ^.conjunctions, pre- 



^28 MR. tooke's statements. 

positions, &c., not differing essentially from "father/' 
" witness/' &c., should be placed in the same class 
with them. Mr. Tooke, however, is not satisfied to 
rest their claim to be classed with nouns on the 
ground of their being names of relations. He insists 
that, having been the names of substantial material 
objects, they bear the full meaning of the concrete 
nouns themselves. The preposition "through/' for 
instance, being derived from thurahy a " door," car- 
ries along with it 7iow the entire meaning of that 
concrete word. He went "through," i. e, the door 
of it. To this opinion we trace the determination of 
Mr. Tooke not to give rank to our adverbs, conjunc- 
tions, &c. as distinct parts of speech ; for, certainly, 
if "through" means all that door means, there couldbe 
no propriety in calling the latter a noun, and the for- 
mer a preposition. But this is not the case. Seldom, 
perhaps, do derivatives carry along with them the full 
meaning of their primitives. They frequently embody 
the general idea contained in the original word, drop- 
ping all the specialities. This seems to be the case with 
conjunctions and prepositions. The remark of Dr. 
Dewar is especially worthy of notice on this point. 
"If the whole meaning of the concrete noun," door, 
"were contained in the preposition" through, "it could 
only be in the form of allusion ; and a language is 
not pure, and perfect, till the allusion itself disappears, 
and till the word is employed to express an appropri- 
ate and well defined degree of generality, independ- 
ently of the concomitant ideas contained in the sub- 
ject from the name of which it has been borrowed. 



PREPOSITIONS ARE BRIEF, ETC. 229 

'' Through" expresses only one property of a door, 
and a property which resembles many other objects 
which have different names. This preposition is 
equivalent to a noun, but it is to a more general one 
than that which suggested the term. The noun to 
which it is nearly equivalent is passage, or me- 
dium." 

And while prepositions denote all the variety of 
relations, they are distinguished, as Dr. Dewar ob- 
serves, " by a peculiar brevity, and the absence of all 
inflection, Without the formality of significant ter- 
minations, prepositions express all their force. Thus 
they correspond to the rapidity of human thought, 
and to the subordinate rank of the ideas which they 
convey. The frequent recurrence and consequent 
familiarity of the ideas, together with their subordi- 
nate character, render language copious and minute 
without incumbrance. They are the eirea Trrepoevra, 
the winged words of discourse. Whether we con- 
sider them as always derived from other parts of 
speech of greater length, which a large proportion of 
them undoubtedly are, or suppose it possible that they 
have occasionally consisted of syllables thrown in at 
random, and afterwards adhered to as significant, in 
the same manner as almost all original words must 
have been produced, we see, in their general form 
and application, their excellent adaptation to the 
completion of language." 

On these accounts we plead for the retention of 
conjunctions and prepositions as parts of speech dis- 
tinct from nouns and verbs. They may be in all 



230 CONJUNCTIONS AND PREPOSITIONS 

languages, as they unquestionably are in ours, frag- 
ments of verbs or nouns ; but they answer now dis- 
tinct and important purposes in language, which 
could at best be only awkwardly attained by the 
original words — sometimes perhaps scarcely at all — 
— and never with so much ease, expedition, and 
beauty. They are, accordingly, w^orthy to take 
rank as parts of speech. 

A question occurs here to which some attention 
must be given. Although it might be admitted 
that the kind of words now under consideration 
should not be arranged with nouns and verbs, it 
might be still thought that they ought not to form 
two separate classes of words. Both denote rela- 
tions ; why then should not both be, on this account, 
regarded as forming one, and but one, part of speech ? 
The answer depends upon the reply to another 
question, viz. " Is there a definite and broad line of 
distinction between them ? " We think there is, and 
that this fact justifies their classification as separate 
parts of speech, i, e, as conjunctions and prepo- 
sitions. 

Mr. Harris, treating of this difference, says that 
the latter connect words, and the former sentences. 
We are inclined to think this assertion substantially 
true, though it conflicts w4th the opinion of more 
celebrated writers than one. Mr. Tooke laughs at 
it, as he is accustomed to do at any thing which is 
contrary to his own opinion. The Britannica pro- 
nounces the statement of Mr. Harris an unfounded 
one ; and, doubtless, there are instances in which 



TWO PARTS OF SPEECH. ^31 

conjunctions connect not sentences, but words only, 
as, ^^ two and two are four." It may be replied, 
however, that this is an exception to a general rule. 
Farther, that, in cases where words are united by 
conjunctions, the conjunctions are designed not so 
much to exhibit the relations which the words thus 
united sustain to each other, as the relations w^hich 
both, in their state of junction, bear to other mem- 
bers or words of the sentence ; as in the cases men- 
tioned by Mr. Tooke. " Two and two make four." 
" John and James are a handsome couple." The 
first example shows the relation between two and 
two and four ; the second the relation between John 
and James and handsome. In short, when con- 
junctions do unite words, they do it to secure a more 
ultimate object, as, " If you repent and believe, you 
shall be saved." An excellent writer states " that 
conjunctions sustain the same relation to sentences 
that prepositions sustain to words. In both cases 
they exhibit the relations existing among objects ; 
the one the particular relation existing among the 
separate and individual objects, denoted by the signs 
of language ; and the other the general relation of 
the parts of sentences to one another." Thus God 
exercises forbearance towards man, though his sins 
are great.'' The preposition "towards" exhibits 
the relation between forbearance and man ; the 
conjunction " though" the relation which exists be- 
tween the first member of the sentence and the 
second. 

Now, there is obviously a broad line of distinc- 



232 DISTINCTION BETWEEN THEM. 

tion between those words which, by joining sentences 
or parts of sentences together, are designed to mark 
the connexions and dependences of human thought, 
and those w^hich merely mark the relations in which 
different words, ^. e, nouns, stand to each other. 
And, possibly, it is to the circumstance that prepo- 
sitions bind words together and not sentences^ that 
the power of government is given to them, and not 
to conjunctions ; for this constitutes another broad 
line of distinction between these two classes of signs. 
We say, ^' no one is better for him, but no one is 
better than he'' In harmony with these statements 
Dr. Dewar says, " It is from its properties in syntax 
that the preposition must take its rank among the 
parts of speech." " Conjunctions," he states, ^* con- 
nect words or sentences" (it might have been no- 
ticed formerly that, in the cases in which it is al- 
lowed that conjunctions join words together, the 
conjunction does not govern the latter word) ^^ on 
equal terms, without regimen or subj unction. They 
continue the syntax of the introducing word to that 
which they introduce." 

It is the opinion of Mr. Harris that most preposi- 
tions were primarily employed to express relations 
of place, the relative position of bodies being a rela- 
tion which would soon strike attention ; but that, 
by degrees, " they came to be employed to denote 
relations in general, — intellectual as well as local. 
Thus because he who is above in jo/«(?<? has common- 
ly the advantage over him who is below, we transfer 
over and under to dominion and obedience. Of a king 



WHAT RELATIONS THEY EXPRESS. 233 

we say he ruled over his subjects ; of a soldier he 
served under his general. So we say, with thought; 
vjithout attention; thinking over a subject; under 
anxiety ; ^f7-om fe^ ^ ; ^Ar^^^A jealousy. All w^hich 
instances/' adds this writer, " show that the first 
words of men, like their first ideas, had an immedi- 
ate reference to sensible objects; and that, in after- 
days, when they began to discern with the intellect, 
they took those words which they found already made, 
and transferred them by metaphor to intellectual con- 
ceptions." The Britannica dissents from this opinion 
on the ground, that " the inventors or earliest im- 
provers of language cannot be supposed to have con- 
cerned themselves with relations as abstracted from 
the objects related." I am unable to see the force of 
this objection. Abstract notions of relations must 
have existed at a very early period of society, if not 
at its very commencement. Children form them, per- 
haps in infancy, at any rate while very young. The 
first words used to express relations were, in many 
cases, as we have seen, nouns ; and the nouns would 
probably carry along with them, at first, nearly, if 
not altogether, the full force of the concrete words. 
By degrees, however, — as in the case of the prepo- 
sition "through," from thurah, a door, referred to 
p. 228 — this fall meaning would cease to be recalled 
by the words ; they would become symbols, as they 
are now, merely of the general idea included in the 
terms. The first distinct ideas of relations, thus 
formed, would be, we think with Mr. Harris, the re- 
lations of place, out of which the intellectual ones 

R 



'234 



INTERJECTIONS. 



would arise in the manner so beautifully described b\ 
him. 



INTERJECTION &, 

The term interjection " is applied to those words 
which express by short exclamation certain over- 
powering emotions of the mind, as, " ah/' " alas," 
&c. They are thrown into a sentence, as their 
name imports, for the purpose just stated, but they 
alter neither its form nor its signification. Mr. 
Tooke treats all such words with great contempt. In 
his judgment, " the neighing of a horse, the lowing 
of a cow, the barking of a dog, the purring of a cat, 
sneezing, coughing, groaning, shrieking, and every 
other convulsion with oral sound, have almost as 
good a title to be called parts of speech as interjec- 
tions. In the intercourse of society interjections are 
employed only when the suddenness or vehemence 
of some affection or passion returns men to their 
natural state, and makes them for a moment forget 
the use of speech ; or when, from some circumstance 
the shortness of time will not permit them to exer- 
cise it." This statement is, however, incorrect and 
inconclusive. It is to no purpose to prove that they 
were originally spontaneous and involuntary. That 
may be true, but they are now frequently uttered 
with design, — the design of intimating that certain 
passions or affections exist in our own bosoms, and 
with the hope of exciting them in the minds of others. 
Nor is it true that they are, as Mr. Tooke caUs^ 



^^ 



INTERJECTIONS, 235 

them, brute inarticulate cries. The word '^ alas" 
is as manifestly an articulate sound as ^' afraid/' 
It is not necessary, however, to prove them to be 
articulate sounds. They are oral sounds — most of 
them articulate — which denote the existence of pow- 
erful feeling ; and, therefore, when employed to in- 
dicate that feeling, (whatever may be said of those 
which are uttered involuntarily,) they partake of the 
essence of language, and are entitled to take rank 
as a distinct part of speech. The Britannica, in- 
deed, says, that the "interjection does not owe its 
characteristic expression to the arbitrary form of 
articulation, but derives its whole force from the 
tone of voice, and modification of countenance and 
gesture. Of consequence," he adds, " these tones and 
gestures express the same meaning without any 
relation to the articulation which they may assume ; 
and are, therefore, universally understood by all 
mankind." This appears to me a mistake. If in- 
terjections, i. e. the sounds^ owed all their meaning 
to tone and gesture, — if the oral, and, in most cases, 
articulate sound made in uttering them was in no 
degree significant of the meaning they express, or 
are thought to express, it would be impossible 
for us to have written interjections. We cannot 
write a tone, or a gesture. Written characters 
are the signs of vocal utterances. The letteis 
" alas," are signs of the articulate sound, "alas;" so 
that if that sound be significant of nothing, the 
written characters must be unmeaning. 

"Interjections," says Dr. Dewar, "maybe con- 



236 INTERJECTIONS. 

sidered as a mixture of in^^^"7^+^>'^^ ovT^vo«^^•^rl wifT» 
social discourse. In the use ci this part cf spee 
man is seen to rise from thr- bra 't ?; .-f ^ji i^\\\- ; 
impelled by passion to that 
displays intelligence and ac 
fellow creatures." 

^'Sometimes words beloiigvag 
speech, and expressing defiiuu ideo^. i* ,. < jv ■; 
abruptly to express emotion, and numbered among 
interjections ; . as, ' amazing,' ^wonderful,' ^ pro- 
digious,' ^shocking,' 'horrible,' 'mercy,' 'T)itiful,' 
' wee's me.' Whether we call such exclamations as 
these interjections, or abbreviations by ellipsis, is of 
little importance. Their meaning is never ambi- 
guous." 



THE END. 



SCOTT, PRINTER, JOHN-STREET, BLACKFRIARS-ROAD. 



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